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ABSTRACT
A DEFENSE OF A PARTICULAR 1ST RESEARCH PROGRAM
SEPTEMBER 2008
URI D. LE1BOWITZ. B.A., TEL-AVIV UNIVERSITY, ISRAEL
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Gareth B. Matthews
Particularism is one of the most interesting and controversial doctrines in moral
philosophy today. Yet despite the considerable attention it has received in recent years,
there is still extensive disagreement about its precise content, and whether it is a viable
alternative to traditional moral theories. In this dissertation I develop, motivate, and
defend a novel formulation of particularism.
In Chapter One, I present my formulation of particularism. I claim that
particularism is not a single thesis but a research program. Research programs arc
collections of theories and methodological rules that can be characterized by their “hard
core”—the set of commitments that cannot be abandoned without abandoning the
research program altogether. The particularism-generalism debate. I suggest, is a debate
over which research program we ought to pursue. Generalism is a research program
characterized by the core hypothesis that in order to explain morality, and especially the
rightness and wrongness of actions, we must appeal to exceptionless moral principles.
Particularism is an alternative research program characterized by the core hypothesis
that morality—including the rightness and wrongness of actions—can be explained
without appealing to exceptionless principles. I go on to show that my formulation is
not vulnerable to the most common objections to particularism.
IX
Chapter Two argues that particularist accounts of morality have a certain
advantage over many of their more conventional competitors. Consider the following
moral advice: (RD) Perform action A only if after reflecting on and deliberating about
the normative status of A, you do not believe that A is morally wrong. 1 argue that if
(RD) is good moral advice, then we should be able to explain how it is that the features
that one considers while reflecting on and deliberating about the normative status of
actions reliably track the real right-making features of actions. 1 claim that generalists
cannot explain this fact, whereas particularists can. Finally. I submit that there is strong
intuitive support for the claim that (RD) is good moral advice, and consequently, that
we have reason to favor particularist accounts of morality over generalist accounts.
Chapter Three examines the nature of particularist explanations of the rightness
(or wrongness) of actions. First, 1 discuss some reasons for thinking that explanations
must be grounded in exceptionless principles, and I claim that a deductive approach to
explanation is unmotivated. Next, 1 argue that we have good reasons for thinking that
not all explanations are deductive, and I explore several non-deductivc models of
explanation, some that are based on the availability of ceteris paribus laws, and others
that do not require laws at all. Finally, I argue that when we apply insights about the
nature of explanation from the philosophy of science to ethics, we have good reason to
believe that explanation in ethics need not be deductive.
In Chapter Four, 1 propose a particularist interpretation of Aristotle’s
Nicomachean Ethics. First, by focusing on Aristotle's proclaimed goals and methods in
the Nicomachean Ethics
,
I show that we have ample evidence for thinking that Aristotle
was not a generalist. Next, I argue that we can read Aristotle as offering an explanation
x
of morality without appealing to exceptionless moral principles. More specifically, 1
maintain that Aristotle is not trying to help us identify which of the range of actions
available to us is morally right; instead his theory is meant to teach us how to explain
why those acts that we know are right have the normative status they do. I claim that
Aristotle's doctrine of the mean is not intended to serve as a decision procedure, but as
an explanatory schema that we should apply in order to explain why right acts are right.
Finally, I explain how my proposed interpretation is compatible with Aristotle's claim
that the study of ethics should help us to become good.
xi
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CHAPTER 1
PARTICULARISM AS A RESEARCH PROGRAM
What makes some acts morally right and others morally wrong? Traditionally,
philosophers have thought that in order to answer this question we must find and
formulate exceptionless moral principles—principles that capture all and only morally
right actions. Utilitarianism and Kantianism are paradigmatic examples of such
attempts. In recent years, however, there has been a growing interest in a novel
approach
—
Particularism—although its precise content is still a matter of controversy.
In this chapter 1 develop and motivate a new formulation of particularism as a research
program and I show that my formulation is not vulnerable to the most common
objections to particularism. Moreover, I argue that the particulars! research program
shows enough promise to warrant further exploration.
1.1 Introduction
Particularism is one of the most interesting and controversial doctrines in moral
philosophy today. Yet despite the considerable attention it has received in recent years,
there is still extensive disagreement about its precise content, and whether it is a viable
alternative to traditional moral theories. The most prevalent objections to particularism
arc that particularism is demonstrably false and that particularism is unmotivated.
1
I
believe that these negative assessments of particularism result from a misconception of
See, for example, Sinnott-Armslrong ( 1999), Irwin (2000), Hooker (2000), Crisp
(2000), McKcever & Ridge (2005a, 2005b, 2006), and Raz (2006).
the nature of particularism. I hope to show that particularism, properly understood, is a
well-motivated project that should not be dismissed out of hand.
I proceed as follows: first, I outline one recent version of a standard argument
against particularism and explain why it is based on a misconception of particularism
(section 1.2). Then, I offer a new formulation of particularism as a research program,
and I show that my formulation is not vulnerable to the most common objections to
particularism (sections 1.3 & 1.4). Next, 1 argue that particularism is a promising
research program that warrants further exploration (section 1.5). Last, I respond to three
possible objections to my proposed formulation of particularism (section 1.6).
1.2 The Standard Debate over Particularism
Recent interest in particularism has given rise to a plurality of distinct views that
go under this heading. Particularism has been identified as a claim about moral
2 3
psychology," a statement about the nature of reasons, a view about the relationship
4
between descriptive and evaluative predicates, a thesis about the normative priority of
particular moral judgments,
3
a denial of the existence of exceptionless moral
principles,
6
the theory that morality cannot be codified by any finite set of principles,
7
and as the claim that the possibility of moral thought and judgment does not depend on
the provision of a suitable supply of moral principles.
7
Dancy ( 1983), McNaughton ( 1988), Dworkin (1995).
' Hooker (2000), Little (2000), Richardson (2003), Kirchin (2007).
4
Jackson, Pettit & Smith (2000).
3
Irwin (2000).
Shafer-Landau ( 1997). McNaughton & Rawling (2000), Dancy (1983), Raz (2006).
7
Holton (2002).
8 Dancy (2004).
The common feature of all particularist theses is often identified as the denial of
(some feature of) principle-based moral theories. For example, McKeever & Ridge
claim that: “Different forms of particularism are defined by the different negative
claims they make about moral principles." And that “The dill crcnt species [ of
particularism | arc united in that they all assert what intuitively is a negative thesis about
moral principles." They go on to propose a classification of particularist theories based
on the negative thesis each version advocates, and they add that “each form of
particularism which falls out of our taxonomy corresponds neatly to a form of
gcneralism which is the negation of that particularist thesis." (5) Similarly, Lance and
Little (2006) claim that particularism “hangs its hat on" rejecting classical principles.
They identify classical principles as “exceptionless, explanatory interrelated moral
generalization that are capable of serving key epistemic functions," (571 ) and they
individuate each version of particularism according to the component of the classical
principles framework it rejects. Joseph Raz (2006), in a recent critique of particularism,
considers (and rejects) several possible particularist theses. In each case he characterizes
the particularist thesis by identifying a generalist thesis it denies.
10
Particularism, then,
is often construed as a negative thesis, and the dialectic between particularists and their
generalist opponents is often characterized as follows: generalists propose moral
principles or principle-based accounts of morality, and particularists object to these
principles/accounts.
(
McKeever & Ridge (henceforth M&R) (2006) P. 14.
1,1
Sec Raz (2006) esp. pp. 113-117.
3
After identifying the common feature of all purlieu larist theses, M&R go on to
argue that all partieu larist theses are false. In Chapter Six of their recent book, M&R
present what I take to be their main argument against particularism:
[0]ur judgments about all things considered moral verdicts, insofar as
those judgments constitute knowledge, suffice to ensure the availability
of a suitable moral principle, namely a default principle. So moral
judgment, insofar as it constitutes knowledge, does presuppose the
availability of a suitable stock of moral principles. | Particularism] about
hedged principles is thus false. ( 1 20- 121)
I propose the following two-step reconstruction of their argument:
1
1
The Knowledge to Principles (KP) Argument :
1 . There are instances of moral knowledge.
2. If there are instances of moral knowledge, then there are exceptionless moral
principles.
3. Therefore, there are exceptionless moral principles.
11
The argument in Chapter Six is meant to show that particularism about hedged moral
principles is false; in Chapter Seven M&R argue that we can “trim the hedges”—that
we have reason to be confident that there are non-hedged moral principles that can
codify the entire moral landscape. A hedged principle, according to M&R, is a principle
that doesn't specify all the possible defeaters and countervailing reasons, but instead it
quantifies over them. For example, the following principle is a hedged principle: For
any action, A. if A involves torturing babies for fun and no other reasons are present,
then A is morally wrong. This principle is a hedged principle because of the
qualification “and no other reasons are present.” This “hedge” doesn't specify which
features may outweigh the fact that the act involves torturing babies for fun. Instead,
this principle states that as long as such feature arc not present—whatever they might
be—an act that involves torturing babies for fun is wrong. To the best of my knowledge
no one defends what M&R call “particularism about hedged moral principles.” M&R
discuss this version of particularism as a step in their argument against particularism
about non-hedged principles. However, M&R's argument against particularism about
hedged moral principles—indeed, the fact that their taxonomy allows for particularism
about hedged principles and gencralism about hedged principles—illustrates a standard
misconception concerning the debate over particularism. I will argue that the issue is
not whether there are hedged or non-hedged moral principles, but rather whether there
are principles that are both explanatory and exceptionless. For simplicity of exposition,
then, I reconstruct M&R's argument in the main text as an argument for the conclusion
that particularism is false.
4
1
1
The Principles to Generalism (PG) Argument:
3. There are exceptionless moral principles.
4. If there are any exceptionless moral principles, then particularism is false.
5. Therefore, Particularism is false.
M&R spend most of chapter six defending premise (2). They claim that premise
(2) is demonstrably true, and indeed, they argue for its truth by constructing a method
for generating exceptionless moral principles.
13
According to M&R, moral knowledge
is based on the identification of purely descriptive facts that are moral reasons for and
against performing a certain action: *‘|ll n a standard case knowledge that a given action
is wrong is based on a recognition of the relevant moral reasons, where these reasons
arc themselves simply descriptive facts which favor not performing the action.” (115)
Given the limitations of our perceptual faculties, cases of moral knowledge must be
cases in which the number of morally relevant features is limited—otherwise, we will
not be able to register all the morally relevant facts, and our knowledge claim will be
defeated. So in cases in which we have moral knowledge we can, at least in principle,
list all the morally relevant facts.
If one accepts Atomism in the theory of reasons—that a feature that is a
(primary) reason'
4
in one ease must remain a reason, and retain the same polarity, in
12
In the introduction I have said that I will consider one standard argument against
particularism. The standard argument is the (PG) argument. The (KP) argument is, to
the best of my knowledge, an original contribution by M&R.
13
Since M&R assume that all participants in the particularism-gcneralism debate accept
premise ( I ), they do not argue for it.
14 Some proponents of atomism differentiate primary (or ultimate) reasons from other
(non-ultimate) reasons. These atomists allow that some reasons can sometimes count in
favor of an action, and sometimes count against an action, but they insist that primary
(or ultimate) reasons always make the same contribution. For example, they grant that
the fact that my claim will be a lie may be a reason against making it on some occasion
5
any case
1
—then one has a recipe for generating exceptionless moral principles: (1
)
consider any particular morally right action; (2) list all the relevant moral reasons; call
the conjunction of all these reasons (RC). The following principle, then, is an
exceptionless moral principle:
(K) For any action, /\, if A instantiates (RC) and no other reasons are
present, then A is morally right.
However, particularists reject atomism; instead, they favor holism in the theory
of reasons—a feature that is a reason in one case may he no reason at all, or an opposite
reason, in another.
16
For example, that a job applicant really wants the job may be a
reason to hire her in one context—say, in a context of hiring a new faculty member to a
philosophy department, and a reason not to hire her in another context—say, in a
context of hiring a new guard for Abu Ghraib prison. 1 Thus if holism is true, then even
if an action instantiates (RC) and no other reasons are present, the action may be
morally wrong because (RC) can change its polarity in different contexts in which it is
instantiated. But since the polarity of (RC), even according to holism, is determined by
features of the context, then there are some features of the context that explain why
(RC) changes its polarity when it does. Consequently, even if holism is true, the
following is an exceptionless moral principle:
and no reason at all on another occasion (e.g., when playing “Countraband').
Nevertheless, they maintain that a claim's being dishonest always counts against
making it. See, for example. Crisp (2000).
15
See, for example, Dancy (2004) p. 7. Sec also Shafer-Landau’s discussion of The
Delimiting Thesis in Shafer-Landau ( 1997) csp. pp. 591-597.
Ul
See, for example, Dancy (2004) pp. 73-78.
1
For more examples see Dancy ( 1993) pp. 60-64.
6
(K’) For any action. A, if (a) A instantiates (RC), and (h) No feature of
the situation explains why (RC) would fail to he a reason to perform
A, and (c) No other (moral) reasons are present, then /l is morally
•
, ,
is
right.
Therefore, even if holism is true, the possibility of moral knowledge, according
to M&R, guarantees that there are exceptionless moral principles. Therefore, premise
(2) of the (KP) argument is true.
But is (K') really a moral principle? Moral principles are supposed to identify an
1
9
exceptionless relation between non-moral properties and moral properties. Yet
arguably, not any relation of this sort qualifies as a moral principle. For example,
consider the following claim:
(OR) For any action, /\, if (and only if) A is a member of Group-R, then A is
morally right.
Let Group-R be the set of all (and only) morally right actions. If moral
properties supervene on non-moral properties, then all members of Group-R can, in
2 ()
principle, be described in purely non-moral terms." Consequently, (GR) identifies an
exceptionless relation between non-moral properties and moral properties. But it may
seem odd to call (GR) a moral principle. (GR), though true and exceptionless, is
IN M&R statement of this principle is slightly different (Sec pp. I 17-8). My version of
( K') is a simple generalization of their statement.
1 ’ One might be satisfied with moral principles that identify exceptionless relations
between thick moral properties and thin moral properties. Sec, for example,
McNaughton & Rawling (2000). However, since (K‘) is supposed to identify an
exceptionless relation between non-moral properties and moral properties, the
possibility of principles from thick to thin will not concern us here.
Jl
For case of exposition I use properties and predicates interchangeably throughout this
paper.
7
uninteresting— it identifies the wrong kind of relation between non-moral and moral
properties. The worry is that ( K' ) also identifies the wrong kind of relation between
non-moral and moral properties, so it may not qualify as a genuine moral principle. I do
not offer here an account of the kind of relation between non-moral and moral
properties that is required in order to qualify as a genuine moral principle. My point is
only that not any such relation will do. Consequently, we have reason to doubt whether
(
K'
) is a genuine moral principle.
Moreover, (K’) seems to amount to the claim that there must be some non-moral
difference between any two actions that differ in moral status; that is, that moral
properties supervene on non-moral properties. But particularists admit that the moral
supervenes on the non-moral. For example, although Dancy says that he docs not "insist
in advance that all moral properties exist in virtue of, or result from, non-moral
properties” ( 1999:25) he does insist that particularism is compatible with the
2 |
supervenience of moral properties on non-moral properties. In addition, particularists
acknowledge that the supervenience relation entails that there are true exceptionless
statements of the form:
(SP) V.v (Gx -> Mx)
|.v ranges over actions, G is a non-moral property, and M is a moral property |
(SP) is true and exceptionless when G describes a complete world state. Yet
2?
particularists deny that (SP) is incompatible with particularism," and M&R said
nothing to counter this claim. If this is right, then ( K’ ) has no dialectical force in an
argument against particularism.
21
See Dancy (2004) p. 85.
22
See Dancy (2004) pp. 85-93.
8
Opponents of particularism have typically focused their efforts on trying to
establish that there are exceptionless moral principles. So far, I have claimed that it is
debatable whether M&R's (KP) argument establishes that there are any such principles.
But suppose that it does—that is, suppose that (K') is a genuine moral principle. Or
alternatively, suppose that we can just see that there are some exceptionless moral
principles. For example, one might think that no one should object to the following
principle:
(TBF) For any action, A , if A involves torturing babies for fun and no other
reasons are present, then A is morally wrong.
If (K*) and/or (TBF) are genuine exceptionless moral principles, is this a
problem for particularists?
It has often been taken for granted that if there arc any exceptionless moral
principles, then particularism must be false. In other words, premise (4) of the (PG)
argument has been thought to require no support. 1 suspect that this premise has been
accepted as a result of the interpretation of particularism as the denial of all principle-
based moral theories. The thought, perhaps, is that if there are any exceptionless moral
principles, there is no reason to oppose a principle-based approach. Particularists, on
this interpretation, arc committed to the claim that all moral principles arc
objectionable.
Particularists, I submit, should resist this construal of their thesis for several
reasons. First, if particularism is understood as the denial of the existence of any
exceptionless statement of the form \/x(Gx —> Mx) then particularism is clearly false.
As we have seen, (GR) and (SP) arc obvious counterexamples to this claim. So
9
purlieu larisls will have lo specify which statements of this form qualify as genuine
23
principles." But the philosophical import ol marking this distinction, independent of
the parlicularism-generalism debate, is far from obvious; it would be a mistake to
reduce this exciting debate lo a debate over the proper application of the term moral
principle.
Second, it is hard lo imagine how particularists could succeed in showing that
there are no unobjectionable principles. Proofs of non-existence are notoriously
difficult, and in the absence of a proof for the non-existence of exceptionless moral
principles, the particularist conclusion would always be tentative
—
perhaps the correct
moral principles have not yet been discovered or formulated. Thus, identifying
particularism as a negative thesis—that is, as the claim that all moral principles arc
objectionable
—
places the particularist at a dialectical disadvantage. Particularism could
be refuted, on this construal, by one example of an unobjectionable exceptionless moral
principle.
Finally, even if particularists could establish that all conceivable principle-based
moral theories are problematic, it might still be rational lo retain a principle-based
approach to morality. Theory choice is a comparative task—we adopt the theory that
has the best overall balance of advantages over disadvantages. So if particularists want
to argue that the principle-based approach to morality should be abandoned, they must
offer a plausible positive non-principle-based account of morality; pointing out that a
23
It is noteworthy that the question ‘What statements of the form v.v(G’.v -> Mx) qualify as
genuine principles?’ is equally pressing for the generalist, since no one thinks (and
M&R do not claim) that principles like (GR), (SP), (K’) and (TBF) are the kind of
principles that will partake in a generalist account of morality. It should, therefore, seem
surprising that statements like (SP) and (TBF) can refute particularism despite being
entirely unhelpful in constructing a generalist account of morality.
10
principle-based approach is problematic is not enough. Understood as a negative thesis,
then, particularism is essentially only a partial story.
But if particularism is not a negative thesis, il it is not the denial of (some form
of) principle-based moral theories, then what is it?
1.3 What is a Research Program?
1 propose to understand particularism as a research program. Research
programs, according to Imre Lakatos, consist of theories and methodological rules that
specify which paths of research to avoid (negative heuristic), and which paths to pursue
... .
(positive heuristic). Research programs are individuated by their “hard core”—the set
of commitments that cannot be abandoned without abandoning the research program
altogether. Lakatos writes:
All scientific research programmes may be characterized by their ‘hard
core’. The negative heuristic of the programme forbids us to direct the
modus tollens at this ‘hard core’. Instead we must use our ingenuity to
articulate or even invent ‘auxiliary hypotheses', which form a protective
bell around this core, and we must redirect the modus tollens to
these... | The | ‘core’ is ‘irrefutable’ by the methodological decision of
| the proponents of a research program): anomalies must lead to changes
only in the ‘protective’ belt of auxiliary... hypotheses.” ( 1970:48)
The following example should help us get a sense of what a research program is.
In 1781 William Herschel discovered planet Uranus. By the early 1 800' s it became
clear that the planet's observed location did not match the path predicted by Newton’s
laws. Despite the discrepancies between theory and observation, very few astronomers
doubled the truth of the Newtonian theory. They believed that this anomaly could be
resolved without relinquishing Newton's laws. Some astronomers, for example,
24
See Lakatos (1970).
suggested that observations that were incompatible with the predicted path should be
discarded. Others—most notably, Le Verrier—suggested that the discrepancy in
Uranus' motion was due to the existence of an unknown planet, and that once the
gravitational force on Uranus due to this planet is taken into account, Uranus’ motion
will comply with Newton’s inverse-square law. We can say that these astronomers were
pursuing a Newtonian research program. The hard core of the program—the set of
protected commitments, as it were—included Newton’s laws, and the negative heuristic
of the program forbade directing a modus tollens against this hard core.
Nevertheless, some astronomers were willing to question the accuracy of the
Newtonian framework; they suggested that the discrepancies in Uranus’ orbit lie with
Newton’s law of gravitation. These astronomers, we can say, were pursuing an
alternative research program. The hard core of their research program included all
available observations of Uranus, and perhaps the rule that one should not posit the
existence of unseen entities. Proponents of this research program had to explain the
motion of Uranus without Newton’s law of gravitation. For example, some proposed
that Newton's laws become different at a great distance from the sun.
In 1846 the planet Neptune was observed at the location predicted by Le Verrier.
Le Verrier assumed that Newton's law of gravitation was true, and calculated an orbit
of the yet-unknown planet that together with Newton's theory would account for the
motion of Uranus. And indeed, when the gravitational pull of Neptune on Uranus was
taken into consideration, Uranus's observed motion harmonized with its predicted orbit.
The discovery of Neptune was a great triumph not only for the Newtonian research
12
program, but also for Le Verrier himself; he was deemed by his contemporaries as “a
?5
sage” and “a genius" for having "discovered a star with the lip ol his pen.
It is not surprising, then, that Le Verrier was a passionate devotee of to the
Newtonian research program, and that upon considering the anomalous motion of The
Planet Mercury in 1849 he proclaimed: “If the tables | of Mercury's position | do not
strictly agree with the group of observations, we will never again be tempted into
26
charging the law of universal gravitation with inadequacy. In 1859 Le Verrier
published his report on the anomalous motion of Mercury, and offered the hypothesis
that the anomaly is due to a yet-unobserved mass orbiting between Mercury and the
Sun.
Here, again, we can distinguish between those pursuing a Newtonian research
program, and those who were w illing to question the adequacy of Newton's laws.
Proponents of the former research program began looking for the missing mass. Sure
enough, various sightings of Vulcan—the intra-Mcrcurial planet—were reported, but all
predictions of Vulcan's location based on these observations were disconfirmed.
Nonetheless, Le Verrier' s belief in the existence of an intra-Mcrcurial mass never
wavered. In 1874 he wrote: "There is, without a doubt, in the neighborhood of Mercury,
and between that planet and the Sun, matter hitherto unknown. Does it consist of one, or
of several small planets, or of asteroids, or even cosmic dust? Theory alone cannot
. . 27
decide this point.”
See Baum and Sheehan (1997) esp. p. 118.
Quoted from Baum and Sheehan (1997), p. 133.
7
Quoted from Baum and Sheehan ( 1997) pp. 173-4.
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In contrast, wc can characterize a competing, non-Newtonian research program
by its hard core—that the motion of Mercury can he explained without appeal to a yel-
to-be-found intra-Mercurial mass. For example, in 1894 one astronomer suggested a
modification to the law of gravitation in order to explain Mercury's motion; instead of
inverse-square, lie proposed that the exponent ought to be 2.0000001 6.
~
The puzzle of the motion of Mercury was resolved in 1915, when Einstein
showed that his General Theory of Relativity explains the observed motion of Mercury.
Consequently, the Newtonian research program was abandoned.
1.4 Particularism as a Research Program
Surely there arc numerous dissimilarities between science and moral philosophy
(methods, goals, language, etc.) Nevertheless, there is at least one thing they have in
common. Moral philosophy, like science, is in the business of explaining certain
features of the world.
Suppose we observe that actions A1.A2...A/; are morally right.” Wc may want
to explain these observations. We may ask, for example, (Ql) What is it that makes
these actions morally right? We can think of various ways of approaching this
question—or alternative research programs. According to one research program
—
generalism—a satisfactory answer to (Ql ) must be in the form of an exceptionless
principle that identifies features that AI.A2...A/? have in common. The generalist
research program appeals to a familiar notion of explanation—explanation as
28
See Hall (1894).
"
I do not intend to commit to any particular account of moral epistemology or any
specific theory about the nature of moral properties when 1 say that we observe that
A I ...An are morally right. One could replace this “observation statement" with
whatever one thinks is the source of the relevant data for moral theorizing.
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subsumption under exceptionless principles. So one advantage of the generalist research
program is that if we find an exceptionless principle that gives the right verdict about
AI.A2...A/? we will thereby have a satisfactory answer to (Q I ). M)
According to an alternative research program
—
particularism—we can answer
(Q 1 ) without presupposing that there are exceptionless principles that will give the right
verdict about A1.A2...A//. Proponents of this research program do not search for
features that all and only these actions have in common. Instead, they try to come up
with an explanation of the rightness of each of these actions without appealing to
exceptionless principles. Proponents of this research program can point out that in some
30
Both monists and pluralists are generalists because they both believe that an
explanation of the rightness of an action is inadequate unless it is grounded in an
exceptionless moral principle. Nevertheless, monists and pluralists disagree about the
number of intrinsically morally relevant properties (henceforth IMR-propcrlics). Let us
say that a property, P, is intrinsically morally relevant if and only if P is morally
relevant for its own sake, or non-derivatively morally relevant. A property is
extrinsical ly morally relevant if and only if it is non-intrinsically morally relevant; that
is, if it is only derivatively morally relevant, or morally relevant only in virtue of its
relation to some IMR-propcrty. Monists claim that there is only one IMR-property
—
call it P—and that every action that exemplifies P is morally right. Pluralists maintain
that there are several IMR-properties—call these properties PI ...Pn—and that for each
IMR-property, Pi, there will be a presumptive, or pro tanto, principle: for any action. A,
if A exemplifies Pi then A is presumptively morally right (or wrong). See, for example,
Ross ( 1930) Ch. 2. and Schafer-Landau ( 1997). For instance, consider the following
version of act-utilitarianism: (AU) An act. A, is morally right if and only if A
maximizes utility. (AU) is a monist theory. According to (AU) there is only one 1MR-
property—namely, utility-maximization. If an action exemplifies this property, it is
morally right; otherwise, it is morally wrong. Justice, for instance, can only be
extrinsical ly morally relevant according to (AU); if justice is morally relevant, it is only
in virtue of its relation to utility-maximization. Pluralists. in contrast, hold that there are
several morally relevant properties. So pluralists may claim that being just, being
truthful, and being beneficent are all IMR-properties. Nevertheless, pluralists are
generalists because they think that in order to explain the rightness of A, it is not
enough to recognize that A exemplifies beneficence, and that beneficence is right-
making here; pluralists believe that we must identify an exceptionless principle that
states that for any action, if it exemplifies beneficence, then it is presumptively morally
right.
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areas of inquiry wc are used to, and comfortable with, explanations that do not appeal to
exceptionless principles. For example, when wc explain the aesthetic status of an
artwork wc do so without mentioning exceptionless aesthetic principles.
31
Similarly,
explanations in the special sciences—e.g.. psychology, economies, and history—seem
to conform to a different model of explanation than the model of subsumption under
32
exceptionless principle.
“
The particularism-general ism debate, 1 propose, is best understood as a debate
over which research program we ought to pursue. Generalism is a research program
characterized by the core hypothesis that in order to explain morality, and especially the
rightness and wrongness of actions, we must appeal to exceptionless moral principles.
Utilitarians and Kantians, for example, arc generalists; despite their disagreement about
the content of the correct moral theory, they both strive to identify exceptionless moral
principles in order to explain the moral status of actions. Particularism, in contrast, is an
alternative research program characterized by the core hypothesis that morality
—
including the rightness and wrongness of actions—can be explained without appealing
to exceptionless principles.
We are now in a position to sec why particularists need not argue that all moral
principles are objectionable, or why premise (4) of the (PG) argument is false. Strictly
speaking, research programs are not true or false. Research programs consist of theories
31
For example, one cannot fail to mention symmetry as a relevant feature to the
aesthetic merits of the Taj Mahal. Yet, it seems absurd to think that symmetry is always
aesthetically relevant; the contribution of symmetry to the overall aesthetic status of an
object can change its polarity - it may contribute positively, negatively, or make no
contribution at all. See Little (2000), and Dancy (2004) p. 76.
' 2
For instance, economists may appeal to the law of supply and demand in order to
explain the change in price of certain products, even though this law is not
exceptionless.
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and methodological rules. Theories may he true or false, but methodological rules
require a different mode of evaluation. Lakatos suggests that instead of truth and
falsehood we should evaluate research programs for their success. In order to explain
what makes for a successful research program, Lakatos introduces the following
terminology:
Let us say that. ..a series of theories is theoretically progressive (or
‘constitutes a theoretically progressive problemshiff ) if each new theory
has some excess empirical content over its predecessor... Let us say that
a theoretically progressive scries of theories is also empirically
progressive (or ‘constitutes an empirically progressive problemshift’) if
some of this excess empirical content is also corroborated... Finally, let
us call a problemshift progressive if it is both theoretically and
empirically progressive, and degenerating if it is not. (33-4)
With the notions of progressive problemshift and degenerating problemshift ,
Lakatos states the criterion for success of research programs as follows: “A research
programme is successful if |it| leads to a progressive problemshift; unsuccessful if it
leads to a degenerating problemshift.” (48)
Clearly, some modifications are required in order to import these definitions to
our discussion in moral philosophy.
3
The key point, though, should be clear enough: a
research program provides a strategy for modifying theories in the face of anomalies; if
by employing this strategy we generate better theories—that is, theories with greater
explanatory power—then the research program is successful. So perhaps instead of
premise (4) we should consider the following premise:
33
It should be interesting to work out whether, and if so, how Lakatos's terminology
can be “translated” into terms that are appropriate for moral philosophy. For example, it
would be interesting to figure out what (if anything) in the moral realm corresponds to
“excess empirical content” and how (or whether) this “empirical content” can be
“corroborated.” However, 1 will not pursue this route here.
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(4') If there are any exceptionless moral principles, then particularism is
unsuccessful.
But premise (4’) is clearly false. Even if there were exceptionless moral
principles, it would not email that the particularist research program is unsuccessful,
since it is surely possible that several research programs would lead to progressive
problemshifts. Even if there were no counterexamples to the principle of utility, for
instance, it would not follow that the particularist research program is unsuccessful.
Perhaps the availability of exceptionless moral principles undermines the
motivation to pursue the particularist research program. The thought is that if we had a
satisfactory principle-based account of morality, then there might well be no reason to
pursue the particularist research program, since there would be no need for alternative
explanations. This seems right to me. Yet, not any exceptionless principle would
undermine the motivation to pursue the particularist research program, but only an
exceptionless moral principle that provides an adequate account ofmorality. So, I think
that the following premise is true:
(4") If there are exceptionless moral principles that provide an adequate account
of morality, then particularism is unmotivated.
But principles like (K\), (GR), (SP) or (TBF) clearly do not provide an adequate
account of morality. Indeed, no one has ever claimed that they do.
I take this to show that the standard debate concerning the availability of any
exceptionless moral principles is misguided. For example, Sinnott-Armstrong ( 1999)
claims that generalists have the dialectical upper hand in the particularism-generalism
debate. He writes:
18
Consider the dialectical situation: A generalist holds a theory with a long
list of defeaters shaped into groups. A part icu lari st comes up and claims,
“T his example shows you need another item on your list.” A generalist
can always respond, “No. it doesn't. Your moral judgment about the
example is incorrect.” Alternatively, a generalist can respond, “OK, I'll
add another item to my list.” A part icu larist can then come up with more
examples, hut a generalist again has these two possible responses—and
so on... fit seems possible! in principle for generalists to keep adding
qualifications and defeaters until no more are needed. (7-8)
Generalists, according to Sinnott-Armstrong, can always accommodate
counterexamples offered by particularists by adding these counterexamples to the list of
defeaters to a proposed principle. Eventually, one might hope, the parlicularist will run
out of counterexamples, and so the generalist should be able to formulate the following
exceptionless principle:
(AH) V.v|(Gv & -iC,jc & ->C 2 x... & —iC„ jc) -> Mx\
|.v ranges over actions, G is a non-moral property, M is a moral property, and Cl ...Cn
are the known defeaters to the principle \/x(Gx —> Mx)
\
But even if (AH ) is exceptionless—that is, if it were possible to list all
34
defeaters — it is hardly an explanatory principle, since it is manifestly ad-lioc. And
since (AH), like (K'), (GR), (SP). and (TBF) plays no role in a generalist account of
morality, the question of whether (AH) is exceptionless is tangential to the debate over
particularism.
To the best of my knowledge, no one has yet presented an argument against
particularism based on the availability of exceptionless explanatory principles. I suspect
that the reason no such argument has been offered is that all exceptionless explanatory
34
See Robinson (2006) for some worries concerning the possibility of listing all
defeaters (csp. pp. 349-50).
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principles that have been formulated thus far are, at best, controversial and as a result
they have no dialectical force in the context of the particularism-generalism debate.
Consider, for example, the following argument:
6. If there are exceptionless moral principles that provide an adequate account of
morality, then particularism is unmotivated.
7. The principle of utility is an exceptionless moral principle that provides an
adequate account of morality.
8. Therefore, particularism is unmotivated.
In order to defend this argument one would have to argue for the claim that the
principle of utility provides an adequate account of morality. And likewise, if one
replaces the principle of utility in line (7) with any other comprehensive moral theory
—
e.g., Kantianism, Rule Utilitarianism or Rossianism
35
—one would have to defend that
particular theory in order to demonstrate that particularism is unmotivated. But debates
over the adequacy of such theories have occupied center stage in moral philosophy for
many years, and the prospects for a conclusive argument for the adequacy of any one of
these comprehensive moral theories, at least at present, look grim.
It is not surprising, then, that opponents of particularism have tried to argue
against particularism without arguing for the truth of any specific principle-based moral
theory. For example, M&R describe the project of their book as follows: “This book is a
defense of moral principles, yet it is not a defense of any specific moral principle.
Although we arc as interested as anyone in determining the specific content of morality,
we here address the prior question of whether morality is principled at all.” (3) M&R,
Ross ( 1 930).
20
like all other opponents of particularism, try to undermine particularism without
defending any specific comprehensive principle-based moral theory. But once we
understand particularism as a research program, we can see that without defending a
specific comprehensive principle-based account of morality, the prospects for a
demonstrative argument against particularism are extremely bleak.
1.5 The Positive Heuristic of a Particularist Research Program
So far, I have claimed that my formulation is not vulnerable to the most
common objections to particularism. Still, in order to motivate particularism it is not
enough to show that the standard objections are ineffective; particularists must also
indicate what a particularist account of morality could look like. That is, particularists
must answer the following question: if one wants to pursue the particularist research
program, what should one do? Or in other words, what is the positive heuristic of the
particularist research program? The positive heuristic of the generalist research program
is well known—try to formulate a principle that is not susceptible to counterexamples,
and when faced with a counterexample, adjust the principle (in some acceptable way) so
that it yields the correct verdict about the proposed counterexample. Can particularists
recommend any comparable positive heuristic?
In this section I will outline two research paths particularists could pursue.
These paths by no means exhaust the research possibilities open to particularist.
Nevertheless, identifying these alternatives should suffice to demonstrate that
particularism offers a positive heuristic and that there are promising research paths for
particularists to explore.
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Jonathan Dancy—the philosopher most associated with particularism—initially
thought that holism in the theory of reasons simply entails particularism.
f
’ Accordingly,
a large portion of his work on particularism has centered on developing and defending
holism in the theory of reasons.
37
However. M&R have shown that holism is
compatible with the existence of exceptionless moral principles.
38
They presented the
following principle:
(U) The fact that an action would promote pleasure is a reason to perform
the action if and only if the pleasure is nonsadistic. The fact that an
action would promote pain is a reason not to perform the action. An
action is morally right just in case it promotes at least as great a balance
of reason-giving pleasures over pain as any of the available alternatives;
. ... 39
otherwise it is wrong.
Recall that holism in the theory of reasons is the thesis that a feature that is a
reason in one case may be no reason at all, or an opposite reason, in another case.
Principle (U) is compatible with holism since it allows that a certain feature—namely,
that an action would promote pleasure— is a reason in favor of performing an action in
some situations (i.e., in situations in which the pleasure is nonsadistic), and it is no
reason at all, or an opposite reason, in other situations (i.e., in situations in which the
pleasure is sadistic). We should note that M&R do not argue that (U) is an exceptionless
moral principle, but only that one could formulate principles that arc compatible with
holism, and that for all we know some such principle may be exceptionless.
M)
For example, in his (2000), Dancy claimed that particularism is “merely one
expression” of holism in the theory of reasons.
7
See, for example, Dancy (1993), (2000), (2003), and (2004).
38 See M&R (2005b) and (2006).
39
See M&R (2006) p. 29.
oo
As a result, Dancy now acknowledges that “one cannot argue from holism
directly to the conclusion that moral principles are impossible.” ( 2004:82 ) His current
view is that if holism were true then “it would be a sort of cosmic accident if it were to
turn out that a morality could be captured in a set of holistic contributory principles.”
( 82 )
4<>
Recently, several philosophers have argued that holism provides no support for
particularism. Joseph Raz (2006), for example, questions Dancy’s ‘cosmic accident'
thesis. He argues that since "claims | about principles) arc conceptual or perhaps
metaphysical, if principles are possible and have a role then it would seem that there are
principles. After all conceptual or metaphysical truths are not a domain in which
accidents arc possible.” (117) Moreover, according to Raz. even if the ‘cosmic accident’
thesis were true, it would not help Dancy’s case for particularism because "to succeed
Dancy must show that principles arc impossible; not even a universal accident can bring
them about.” (117) But since holism is compatible with the existence of exceptionless
principles, Raz concludes that "Dancy's | holism] lends no support for particularism,
because it cannot show (and Dancy himself does not claim) that true |exceptionless|
principles are impossible.” (117) Similarly, M&R (2006) reject Dancy's ‘cosmic
accident' thesis: "holism about reasons does nothing to support the thought that the
finite and useful codification of morality would be metaphysically mysterious.” (35)
And since we have no reason to accept the ‘cosmic accident' thesis, they conclude:
“Holism about reasons provides no positive support for particularism. Holism neither
411
For similar theses see Little (2000) and Stratton-Lake (2000) pp. 128-130.
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implies that there are no |cxeeptionless| principles nor that any principles there might
be would be ‘cosmic accidents.’” (45)
Nevertheless, once we understand particularism as a research program, we can
see that the question of whether holism is compatible with the existence of principles, or
whether holism entails that the availability of exceptionless moral principles is
extremely unlikely—that is, that given holism a principled morality would be a ‘cosmic
accident' or a “world historical chance”
41
—is tangential to the particularism-general ism
debate. The relevant question, I claim, is whether holism contributes to a particularist
account of morality.
To see this, consider again the case of The Planet Vulcan. Suppose that the
theory of relativity is compatible with the existence of a mass orbiting between Mercury
and The Sun. Suppose, further, that the theory of relativity doesn't entail that it is
unlikely that some intra-Mercurial mass exists. Nonetheless, it would be odd to argue
that since the theory of relativity doesn't imply that Vulcan does not exist, or doesn't
entail that its existence is unlikely, it offers no support for the non-Newtonian research
program. The theory of relativity provides a good explanation of the motion of Mercury
without assuming that there is a yet-to-be-found intra-Mercurial mass. Therefore, the
theory of relativity undermines the motivation to search for Vulcan, since it solves the
puzzle that was the impetus for positing the existence of Vulcan in the first place.
Analogously, even though holism is compatible with the existence of
exceptionless principles, and even if holism doesn't make the existence of such
principles unlikely, it can provide support for the particularist research program. If
41
Stratton-Lake (2000) p. 128.
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holism makes possible a plausible non-principle-based account of morality, it
undermines the motivation to search for exceptionless principles in much the same way
that the theory of relativity undermines the motivation to search for Vulcan. So far,
philosophers have failed to formulate exceptionless explanatory principles. It seems that
the quest for such principles is motivated by the thought that such principles are
necessary for an adequate account of morality. However, if an adequate non-principle-
based account of morality were available, then we would no longer have reason to
assume that such principles exist, and thereby we might no longer have reason to try to
find and formulate exceptionless principles. Therefore, if holism in the theory of
reasons contributes to the development of a successful particularist account of morality,
then pace Raz and M&R, holism does provide positive support for the particularist
research program regardless of whether it is compatible with the existence of
exceptionless principles, and regardless of whether the ‘cosmic accident’ thesis is true.
I suspect that holism in the theory of reasons will play an important role in a
particularist account of morality. Dancy’s pioneering work on this topic is
commendable. Nevertheless, holism is still in its early stages and the specifics of the
theory need to be worked out in much more detail before we can determine whether a
particularist account of morality based on holism in the theory of reasons is superior to
-P
its generalist competitors. " So a positive heuristic of the particularist research program
is to develop and defend a comprehensive account of holism.
Another
—
perhaps complementary
—
path particularists could pursue is to
develop a particularist-friendly virtue ethics. It is noteworthy that in the Nicomachean
4
‘ For a recent criticism of Dancy's holism, see Raz (2006).
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Ethics
.
Aristotle makes no reference to exceptionless moral principles.
4
' Since
generalists insist that one must appeal to exceptionless moral principles in order to
explain the rightness/wrongness of actions, there seem to he three interpretative
strategies available to generalists who attempt to understand Aristotle’s project in the
Nicomachean Ethics : they can try to identify an exceptionless principle to attribute to
Aristotle; or they can argue that Aristotle wasn't interested in explaining the normative
status of actions; or alternatively, they can claim that Aristotle was just hopelessly
confused and that his whole project was misguided.
To the best of my knowledge no one pursues the third option. However, the two
former interpretative strategies can be easily identified in the work of some neo-
Aristotelians and contemporary virtue ethicists. For example, some philosophers
propose a virtue-based criterion of moral rightness of the following form:
(VE) An act is right if and only if a fully virtuous agent would perform it in the
circumstances.
4
Others claim that Aristotle was not interested in solving moral quandaries or in
identifying a criterion for the rightness/wrongness of actions; instead he was interested
in providing a regimen for a good life or in questions concerning the nature of good
moral character.
45
43
Irwin (2000) claims that Aristotle asserts several exceptionless generalizations such
as “one ought always to be willing to face great danger if some important cause is at
stake, and one ought never to be willing to face it for some trivial reason.” (Ill)
However, 1 doubt that terms like "great danger”, “important cause” and “trivial reason”
can be cashed out without appealing to the judgment of the man of practical wisdom.
44
See, for example, Oakley (1996), Hursthouse ( 1999), and Swanton (2001 ).
45
See, for example, Pincoffs (1971) and Taylor ( 1988). One interesting examples of the
second interpretative strategy is Irwin (2000) who claims that Aristotle did not try
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With the parlicularist research program in mind, though, a new interpretative
strategy becomes available: we can try to interpret Aristotle as offering a parlicularist
account of morality—that is, we can interpret him as giving an explanation of the
normative status of actions which is not based on the availability of exceptionless moral
principles.
40
Indeed, several passages in the Nicomachecm Ethics are as close to an
explicit endorsement of the parlicularist research program as one may hope to find in a
two-thousand-year-old text. For example, Aristotle writes:
In a discussion of [what is noble, just or good| ...we must be satisfied to
indicate the truth with a rough and general sketch: when the subject and
the basis of a discussion consist of matters that hold good only as a
general rule, but not always, the conclusions reached must be ol the
same order... For the well-schooled man is one who searches for that
degree of precision in each kind of study which the nature of the subject
at hand admits. ( 1094b 1 9-26, Oslwald trans.)
| A |ll law is universal but about some things it is not possible to make a
universal statement which shall be correct. In those cases, then, in which
it is necessary to speak universally, but not possible to do so correctly,
the law takes the usual case, though it is not ignorant of the possibility of
error. And it is nonetheless correct; for the error is not in the law nor in
the legislator but in the nature of the thing, since the matter of practical
affairs is of this kind from the start. ( 1 1 37b 1 2-2 1 Ross trans.)
So another positive heuristic of the parlicularist research program is to develop
and defend a particularist reading of Aristotle, or to try to construct a neo-Aristotelian
formulate exceptionless moral principles because he believed that ethical theory
essentially has a practical aim, and formulating exceptionless principles—though
possible—will not serve this aim. I classify Irwin with the second interpretative strategy
because he attributes to Aristotle a goal other than explaining the rightness/wrongness
of actions, and thus excuses Aristotle from the requirement to formulate exceptionless
principles.
4,1
Although several particularists find inspiration and support in Aristotle—e.g.,
McDowell (1979)—no one has yet offered a detailed particularist reading of Aristotle’s
ethics.
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partieularist-friendly virtue ethics, including, among other things, an account of moral
education and moral development that is compatible with particularism.
47
1.6 Objections and Replies
Objection : Particularist explanations ofmorality arc defective. This objection
can be spelled out in various ways. For example: (a) Particularist explanations can, at
best, provide a partial explanation of morality but not afull explanation, because a full
or a complete explanation must be grounded in an exceptionless moral principle. To
pursue the particularist research program is simply to announce that we cannot provide
an adequate answer to the question ‘what makes some acts right and others wrong?’ To
endorse particularism, then, is simply to “admit defeat.” (b) If there are any
exceptionless moral principles, then these principles provide a better explanation of
morality than any non-principle-based account. But if the best possible result of
pursuing the particularist research program is not as good as the best possible result of
pursuing the generalist research program—that is, if we know in advance that
exceptionless principles provide the best explanation of morality—then why should we
pursue the particularist research program in the first place? What's more, if we pursue
the generalist research program and all explanatory principles we come up with turn out
to have exceptions, we can simply accept whatever account we end up with as a
particularist account of morality. So there is no reason to “admit defeat” right at the
48
outset— i.e., there is no reason to pursue the particularist research program.
4
For an account of moral development friendly to particularism sec Dreyfus and
Dreyfus (1990).
48
| omitted for blind review |.
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Reply : The statement that an adequate explanation must be grounded in an
exceptionless moral principle, or that an explanation that is grounded in an
exceptionless principle is superior to an explanation that is not, is precisely the claim
that particularists deny. As we have seen, the core of the particularist research program
is the claim that morality, including the rightness and wrongness of actions, can be
explained—that is, fully, or adequately, explained—without appealing to exceptionless
principles. Opponents of particularism cannot simply cite their commitment to the
generalist research program as an objection to particularism. In the context of the
parlicularism-generalism debate, a generalist who simply asserts that we cannot fully
explain morality without exceptionless moral principles is comparable to an advocate of
the Newtonian research program who declares that we cannot explain the motion of
Mercury without Newton's law of gravitation.
Perhaps the thought is that there are independent arguments for the conclusion
that an adequate explanation must be grounded in an exceptionless principle. The
proposal, perhaps, is that we can use results from the philosophical literature on the
nature of explanation in order to settle the parlicularism-generalism debate. To explain a
phenomenon, the objector might argue, is to subsume it under a general statement. John
Ladd, for example, claims that an explanation “is an ordering of phenomena under
general law...To the question “Why?," explanations answer by a subsumption under a
general statement." So if we are to explain anything in morality we must find
exceptionless moral principles. Without exceptionless moral principles subsumption of
See Ladd (1952) p. 499
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a particular moral phenomenon under general statement is impossible, and consequently
no moral explanation can be had.
Although the covering law model of explanation was—and still is—extremely
influential in the literature on explanation, it is certainly not the only available theory of
explanation. And several alternative theories of explanation arc compatible with the
partieularist project. For example, dispositionalism—the view that dispositions, rather
than laws are the fundamental units of explanation— is one possible alternative to the
covering law model.
50
According to this view, we should understand the claim that
‘lying is wrong’, for example, as the claim that acts of lying have the disposition to be
wrong; under “suitable” conditions acts of lying manifest this disposition, but they need
not do so under all circumstances. On this view, then, explanations may appeal to
generalizations, but these generalizations need not be exceptionless. And since
particularists, as I argue in this paper, want to explain morality without appealing to
exceptionless moral principles, they may appeal to some version of dispositionalism.
But since dispositionalism is a controversial thesis, it is worth pointing out that
there are other avenues open to particularists. In the 40’s, 50' s. and 60' s there has been
a lively debate concerning the nature of historical explanation. Several philosophers
were unsatisfied with the covering law approach to explanation in history as
championed by Hcmpcl. William Dray, for example, argued that the dominance of the
covering law theory of explanation is an instance of what we may call ‘physics
chauvinism.' Even if the covering law model provides an accurate account of
50
See Robinson (2006). Note, however, that my understanding of the disagreement
between particularists and generalists is very different from Robinson's.
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explanation in physics, says Dray, il is unacceptable as an account of explanation in
history:
There is, in fact, some reason for thinking that what the covering law
theory gives us is the criterion of a technical sense of ‘explanation'
found only in narrowly scientific discourse, perhaps only among certain
philosophers of science... Hempel's formulation begins by laying down
the logical structure of explanation as he believes he finds it in physics;
he then goes on to show that historical cases approximate to this in
varying degrees. There is no apology for the direction of the analysis
from physics, where the logical outline is boldly displayed, to other
fields, where traces of the model have to be found by dint of careful
reconstruction... ‘Explanation’, as covering law theorists use it, is a
technical term. ..But if scientists, for their own legitimate purposes,
redefine ‘explain’ so that it means roughly what covering law theorists
say it docs, then we are quite justified in advertising our awareness of
what has been done by saying that, in fact, scientists do not seem to be
much interested in explanation; they care only for ‘explanation’ (as
technically defined). ( 1957:76-78)
Dray argues that many historical explanations as found in some history books
are perfectly adequate. For Dray, then, the fact that most, if not all, historical
explanations offered by historians fail to satisfy Hempcl’s account of explanation does
not demonstrate that historical explanations are inadequate, or that historians typically
present only explanation sketches, but rather it is an indication that Hempel’s account is
defective. Since we currently cannot formulate strict historical laws, and since some
historical explanations are adequate, then il must be the case that at least some kind of
explanation need not appeal to laws, or to exceptionless generalizations. Woodward
(2002) reaches a similar conclusion by focusing on the special sciences. Woodward
notes that explanations in the special sciences often appeal to ceteris paribus law
statements. But since, according to Woodward, there are no ceteris paribus laws, we
must conclude that explanation need not appeal to laws or to exceptionless
generalizations.
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Dray and Woodward propose radically different accounts of explanation that do
not appeal to exceptionless generalizations offered by. Dray opts for a narrative account
of explanation. “An historical explanation,” he writes, “may thus amount to telling the
story of what actually happened, and telling it in such a way that the various
transitions... raise no eyebrows. The story is told in such a way that presumptions of the
form, 'But surely that couldn't have happened!', are rebutted in advance. Answers to
likely objections arc built into the narrative, which may thus have explanatory force”
( 1954:27) Woodward, in contrast, asserts that “the core idea in explanation is that an
explanans should cite variables or factors that make a difference for the
explanandum...for this condition to be satisfied it is neither necessary nor sufficient that
the explanans provide a nomically sufficient condition for the explanandum.”
(2002:320) It is beyond the scope of this paper to present and discuss the details of these
proposals. Suffice it to say that these proposals represent alternative models of
explanation that are not based on the availability of exceptionless generalizations and
thus are friendly to particularism.
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The question whether an adequate explanation must terminate in an
exceptionless principle is. at least at present, an open question. And since the literature
on the nature of explanation does not provide us with a non-controversial account of
explanation, we cannot appeal to results in the theory of explanation in order to resolve
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Several philosophers developed accounts of truth conditions for ceteris paribus
generalizations (c.g., Fodor ( 1991 ) and Pietrosky & Rcy ( 1995)) If, pace Woodward,
there are ceteris paribus laws, then, again, we have available to us a model of
explanation that is not based on the availability of exceptionless generalizations. Also,
van Fraassen’s pragmatic theory of explanation (van Fraassen ( 1980)) seems to be
compatible with particularism. See, also, Scriven ( 1959). For a detailed discussion of
various models of explanation that are friendly to particularism see my ‘Explanation in
Ethics’ [MSI.
the parlicularism/gencralism controversy. Moreover, it is important to keep in mind that
part icu lari st s and generalists are likely to disagree about the standards of adequacy for
an account of morality. A comparison to the competing scientific research programs
discussed above is instructive. For scientists pursuing the Newtonian research program
an adequate explanation of the motion of Mercury requires that we show how the
motion of Mercury can be deduced from Newton's laws (and a set of initial conditions).
But for scientists pursuing the non-Newtonian research program an adequate
explanation of the motion of Mercury need not mention Newton's laws at all. Similarly,
I expect that generalists would think that in order to explain the normative status of an
action we must subsume this action under an exceptionless moral principle.
Particularists, in contrast, would endorse a different model of explanation.
Consequently, given the current status of the debate regarding the nature of explanation,
arguments against particularism based on appeal to a particular theory of explanation
have no dialectical force.
Moreover, ‘explanation’ is a semantically llexible word, and as Dray points out
there are surely contexts in which we give and receive adequate explanations that do not
appeal to exceptionless generalizations. So even if opponents of particularism wish to
draw on results from the theory of explanation, it would not suffice to show that there is
some sense of ‘explanation’ that demands exceptionless moral principles; generalists
will also have to argue that this is the only admissible sense of ‘explanation' relevant to
moral theorizing. We should note that if this could be established, then if, as 1 claim, we
do not yet have exceptionless moral principles available to us, then it follows that we
have never given nor received—and indeed, we have never even consciously grasped
—
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a full, or an adequate explanation of the rightness/wrongness of any action. And this
seems like an implausible consequence for any account of morality.
I do not mean to suggest that a detailed particularisl-fricndly theory of
explanation is currently available, even though Dancy and Lance & Little have made a
5 1
few interesting advancements in this direction already.' ** Nevertheless, the lack of a
full-fledged particulars! theory of explanation does not favor the generalist research
program since there are well known difficulties for the accounts of explanation
generalists make use of. 5 * Moreover, particularists can provide an explanation of
morality without first developing an appropriate theory of explanation. If I am right in
claiming that we can interpret Aristotle’s Ethics as a particularist account of morality,
then this is precisely what Aristotle does. Once a particularist account of morality is
offered, we can evaluate its strength and weaknesses and compare it to competing
principle-based explanations. We should keep in mind, though, that the standards of
adequacy we ought to employ are not independent of the research program we are
pursuing.
Finally, ll is important to keep in mind that a particularist account of morality is
not simply a failed generalist account. A generalist, who admits that the best
explanatory principles she is able to come up with all have exceptions, has not thereby
provided a particularist explanation of morality. A particularist account must explain,
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See, for example, Dancy (2004) esp. pp. 45-49, and Lance & Little (2004) & (2007)
M
Philosophers pursuing the generalist research program do not explicitly state which
theory of explanation they endorse. However, the model of explanation they seem to
employ is some version of Hempel’s covering law model. For a discussion of some
famous counterexamples to HempeFs model see Salmon (1989). For other difficulties
in employing HempeFs model in moral explanations see my ‘Explanation in Ethics'
[MS].
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among other things, why all attempts to come up with exceptionless principles have
failed. Holism in the theory of reasons and the ‘cosmic accident’ thesis may prove to he
useful for this task.
I suspect that some readers may still find the “admitting defeat” charge
compelling. I believe that the reason it seems so compelling is that we have grown
accustomed to thinking about the goal of moral theorizing in terms of identifying and
formulating exceptionless principles. But if, as I suggest, Aristotle's Nicomachean
Ethics can be read as a part icu larist-friendly account of morality, then we have a more
direct way to debunk the “admitting defeat” charge. There are few, if any, moral
theories that arc more ambitious and more instructive than Aristotle’s moral philosophy.
Therefore, if we can sensibly count Aristotle as a particularism we can show that far
from admitting defeat, the particu larist research program is a flourishing line of ethical
inquiry with an unimpeachable pedigree.
Objection : The very conception ofparticularism as a research program is
incoherent. If particularism is a research program, it should lead to the development of
new theories. In order to evaluate those theories we need to be able to make sense of the
notion of explanatory power of theories. For generalists the explanatory power of a
specific theory is a function of the range of phenomena covered by the principles this
theory advocates—the more phenomena these principles cover, the greater the
explanatory power of the theory. But particularists cannot give any comparable
informative account of what the explanatory power of a theory consists in. As a result
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Ihc formulation of particularism as a research program proposed in this paper is at best
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underdeveloped, and perhaps even incoherent.'
Reply : the notion of explanatory power of theories is a difficult concept to
analyze, and there are obvious difficulties for the proposed account of the explanatory
power of generalist theories presented above. For instance, compare the following
version of act-utilitarianism: (AU) An act. A, is morally right if and only if A maximizes
utility, and the principle (TBF) discussed about: (TBF) For any action. A, if A involves
torturing babies for fun and no other reasons arc present, then A is morally wrong.
Intuitively, (AU) has more explanatory power than (TBF). But both principles range
over all actual and possible actions, and to the extent they “cover” the same amount of
phenomena. So perhaps the explanatory power of a generalist theory is not a function of
the number phenomena it covers, but instead it is a function of the range of normative
judgments it implies. While (TBF) implies only the normative status of actions that
involve torturing babies for fun, (AU) implies the normative status of all actions. But
barring obvious difficulties in specifying what the range of normative judgments a
theory implies amounts to, we should note that a principle alone does not imply the
normative status on any action. In order to deduce the normative status of a particular
action from a principle, we must also recognize that this action satisfies the antecedent
of the principle. Surely a principle according to which an act is morally right if and only
if it is morally right does not explain the normative status of any action.
All this is to say that there is no simple account of the explanatory power of
theories available to generalists. Nevertheless, even though we cannot provide a strict
M Thanks to an anonymous referee for pressing me on this issue.
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analysis of this concept, 1 believe that we can apply it intelligibly. Moral theories
provide us with certain theoretical machinery and explanatory standards, or paradigms,
that we can employ in our attempts to explain moral phenomena. For example, consider
a particular wrongful act of stealing. Can a generalist theory explain the wrongness of
this action? Presumably, if the specific generalist theory under consideration identifies
an exceptionless principle according to which any action that manifests a certain
property is wrong, and one could justifiably claim that this particular act manifests this
property, then this generalist theory could explain the normative status of this action
based on the standards of explanation generalists typically endorse.
Can a particularist theory explain the wrongness of this action? Surely, the
answer depends on the specific theory under consideration. But in this respect
particularism is no different from generalism. However, different particularist theories
may endorse different standards of explanation; some theories may require that we
identify disposition, other theories may focus on exception-full principles that might be
applicable to this case, and yet other theories may look for the right kind of story we can
tell about the relevant action. Particularists reject a deductive model of explanation, but
this does not mean that “anything goes," or that these theories do not impose any
constraints on good explanation. We have no formula for determining the explanatory
power of theories—this is true of particularist theories as well as generalist theories
—
but there is no reason to think that particularists cannot make sufficiently good sense of
this notion based on the theory of explanation they end up endorsing.
Objcetion : The defense ofa particularist research program proposed in this
paper defends too much. Everything argued for in this paper in defense of a particularist
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research program can be used, nmtatis mutandis
, lo defend other research programs,
including research programs that no one should lake seriously. For example, consider
the ‘ch-isf research program. Ch-ism is a research program characterized by the core
hypothesis that morality, including the rightness and wrongness of actions, can be
explained by using only sentences that start with the letters ‘eh’. Since cli-ism is a
research program, it is neither true nor false, and it should be evaluated for its success.
Moreover, the motivation lo pursue ch-ism cannot be undermined simply by citing one
unobjectionable principle that does not start with the letters ‘eh’; in order to undermine
ch-ism one would have to present a non-‘ch’-starting-principle-based moral theory that
provides an adequate account of morality. But since no such theories are currently
available, ch-ism remains unscathed. Moreover, ch-ists can offer the following positive
heuristic: try to formulate explanations of morality that begin with the letters ‘ch\
Obviously, no one should seriously consider pursuing the ch-ist research program. Yet
the arguments pul forward in this paper lead to the conclusion that ch-ism should be
taken seriously. Therefore, there must be something wrong with the arguments
presented in this paper—if they prove anything they prove too much .
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Reply : In defending a particu larist research program I have not argued that the
generalist research program should be abandoned. Indeed, I have presented no
arguments against pursuing a generalist research program, or any other conceivable
research program for that matter. The main goal of this paper is to fend off a familiar
and prominent line of objections lo particularism that purports to show that the
particularist project is founded on a simple mistake—that particularist are committed to
55
Thanks to Kelby Mason for pressing me on this issue.
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a thesis which is demonstrably false and/or entirely unmotivated. I think that these
objections fail for reasons discussed in the previous sections. Moreover, I think that
these objections are equally ineffective as objections to ch-ism; the fact that we can
formulate one or a few unobjectionable moral principles such as (SP) or (7’BF) is
clearly not the reason why we should not pursue ch-ism. The reason we shouldn't
pursue ch-ism is that it is an uninteresting project and we have no reason to believe that
it will produce any worthwhile results. The fact that the aforementioned objections fail
to undermine ch-ism does not demonstrate that my defense of particularism defends too
much, but instead it indicates that these objections are completely misguided.
Someone might, perhaps, think that particularism, like ch-ism. is uninteresting
and that we have no reason to think that it will lead to any worthwhile results. However,
to the best of my knowledge no one has yet argued that particularism is uninteresting,
and it seems to me that the part icu larist research program has already generated
worthwhile results—namely, holism in the theory of reasons; even those who reject
holism admit that it is an interesting and worthwhile contribution to the study of the
nature of reasons. Yet more, if it is reasonable to suspect that we can sensibly interpret
Aristotle as offering a parlieu larist account of morality, then we may have good reason
to think that particularism will lead to further interesting and important philosophical
results. Surely there are many important differences between particularism and ch-ism
and it should be clear that particularists, like generalists, have the resources to explain
why—unlike particularism and gcneralism
—
ch-ism is not worthy of pursuit.
Objection : The main thesis of this chapter is just trivial. This chapter defends the
thesis that the particu larist research program is worthy of pursuit—that is, that we
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should try to develop an explanation of morality that is not based on the availability of
yet-to-be-found exceptionless moral principles, and that it may turn out that a
particularisl account of morality will be superior to competing principle-based accounts.
But why would anyone think otherwise? Why would anyone think that any explanation
must be grounded in exceptionless principles? Clearly, in the soft sciences we explain
phenomena without exceptionless principles. No one has ever claimed—or at least, no
one should ever have claimed—that a full explanation of a historical event, for example,
must be grounded in an exceptionless principle. Moreover, the objector might say, even
in physics our explanations are not exception-free since our fundamental physical
theories are notoriously inconsistent. So why spend all these words arguing for a trivial
point?
Reply : When an objection to the effect that a thesis is trivially true is juxtaposed
with an objection to the effect that this thesis is obviously false, one might think that the
prefixes “trivially' and “obviously" cancel each other out—the thesis is either true of
false, but it is probably neither trivially true nor obviously false. But perhaps those who
arc moved by the triviality objection think that the objection to the effect that the main
thesis is obviously false need not have been mentioned at all. I am happy to endorse this
part of the criticism. However, it should be clear that, at least since Kant, many
outstanding philosophers have tried to find and formulate exceptionless moral
principles, and many outstanding philosophers still do so today. So even if the point is
trivial, I believe it is worth mentioning.
In fact, however, I do not think that this is a trivial matter. In this chapter I have
only mentioned what I take to be the most prevalent objections to particularism. But
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there are other worries that I have not discussed. For example, it has been claimed that a
particularist account of morality entails one or more of the following undesirable
consequences: (i) moral knowledge is impossible;
56
(ii) other people’s (moral) behavior
is entirely unpredictable;
57
(iii) moral disagreements cannot be resolved;'
S
and (iv)
59
moral education is impossible.' 1 will not try to respond to these worries here. Sul I ice
it to say that even though I believe that these worries are not insurmountable,
circumventing these problems is certainly not a trivial matter.
1.7 Conclusion
Moral philosophy in the past few hundred years has been dominated by
generalism. Philosophers have assumed—without argument—that a successful
explanation of morality must be grounded in exceptionless principles. Perhaps the
commitment to generalism was influenced by the remarkable progress in the sciences
spawned by the scientific revolution. Perhaps the thought was that a successful
explanation of morality should be modeled on explanations in the sciences, and that
moral philosophers should seek exceptionless moral principles that would play a similar
explanatory role to the role played by laws of nature in the sciences. Yet despite the fact
that many outstanding philosophers have spent their careers trying to find and formulate
exceptionless explanatory moral principles, such principles have not yet been found.
It would be a mistake to argue from the persistent failure to formulate
satisfactory principles, to their non-existence. After all, it was Le Verrier’s unwavering
%
See Tannsjo (1995) and M&R (2006).
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See Hooker (2000).
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See Sinnott-Armstrong (1999).
V)
Sec Hooker (2000) and Hare ( 1952).
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commitment to the Newtonian research program in the face of persistent failures that
led to his celebrated discovery of The Planet Neptune. However, it was his unwavering
commitment to the Newtonian research program that led him on a wild goose chase in
search of The Planet Vulcan.
Despite the surge of interest in particularism in recent years, we must not forget
that particularism is a budding research program— it promises an account of morality,
but it has not yet delivered a full-fledged theory. At present, then, it would be rash to
endorse particularism. However, we should also keep in mind that generalism is only a
promise of a theory as well. A full-fledged generalist theory will consist of a principle,
or a set of principles, that provides an adequate account of morality. At present, no such
principle has been found. So it is equally rash to endorse generalism for the very same
reasons it is rash to endorse particularism, and consequently, the claim that
particularism is only a promise of a theory has no dialectical force in the context of the
particularism-gencralism debate.
Even though it may be rash to endorse particularism, it may well be rational to
explore its strengths and weaknesses. As Laudan observes, one can pursue a research
program without endorsing it. He writes:
IThere are| many historical cases where scientists have investigated and
pursued theories or research traditions which were patently less
acceptable, less worthy of belief, than their rivals. Indeed, the emergence
of virtually every new research tradition occurs under just such
circumstances... it would be. ..mistaken to refuse to pursue |a budding
research program 1 if it has exhibited a capacity to solve some problems
(empirical or conceptual) which its older, and generally more acceptable
rivals have failed to solve. (1977:1 10-1)
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We cannot yel determine whether the part icti larist research program will
produce a better account of morality than competing principle-based theories.
Nevertheless, the persistent failure to formulate exceptionless explanatory principles
should motivate us to explore new routes and particularism shows enough promise to
warrant further exploration. Particularism, I submit, is worthy of pursuit.
1.8 Appendix: Dancy’s (2004) Formulation of Particularism
Jonathan Dancy is the philosopher most associated with particularism; the
current interest in particularism is largely due to his extensive work on the topic. In his
recent book. Ethic Without Principles (2004), Dancy offers a succinct statement of the
particulars! thesis. Given Dancy’s singular contribution to the advancement of the
particularist project in the past twenty years, and given that Dancy describes his recent
book as “the culmination of twenty-five years’ work” on this topic, his own recent
formulation of the particularist thesis undoubtedly deserves special attention. Dancy's
identifies particularism as follows: “Particularism: the possibility of moral thought and
judgment does not depend on the provision of a suitable supply of moral principles.” (7)
Several philosophers have recently examined Dancy's statement. Joseph Raz
(2006), in his recent critique of Dancy’s book, struggles with Dancy’s formulation of
particularism. He claims that this formulation is open to several interpretations, but only
one of these interpretations, he thinks, can be properly attributed to Dancy, since the
others appear to be empirical theses. So Raz proposes that the best literal interpretation
of Dancy’s particularism is the denial of the following claim: “Conditions ofthought
generalism (CTG): no one would be capable of having moral thought and judgments
unless there were suitable moral principles.” (114)
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But the denial of CTG, Raz claims, is clearly false: “The problem is that it is a
necessary truth that general moral thoughts are possible only if there are general moral
propositions which express them, propositions being the content of a possible truth-apt
thought. And it may be a necessary truth that all particular propositions have
corresponding general propositions.” ( I 14-5). So, he concludes, we must interpret
Dancy non-literally.
Perhaps, he suggests, particularism is the denial of the following claim: “JG:
Justificatory gencralism is the thesis that the justification of any moral view involves a
true, or justified moral principle.” (115) However, Raz thinks that we cannot properly
interpret Dancy’s particularism as the denial of JG. Raz cites the following passage
from Dancy:
[T|here can be forms of holism that do not go so far as particularism.
That is, we can accept the context-sensitivity, the variability, of reasons,
but still suppose that there are the sorts of general truths about how
reasons behave that might be expressed by moral principles (Dancy
(2004) pp. 7-8)
He then comments that “This
|
passage], in showing | Dancy] to believe that
particularism denies that there are true or valid moral principles, shows that my
interpretation of his definition |as the denial of JG | does not capture his intentions.”
(115) Having ruled out this interpretation of Dancy’s particularism, Raz goes on to
attributes to Dancy the following view “there are true moral propositions but no true
moral principles” (115) and concludes that this view is untenable.
M&R also have difficulties with Dancy's formulation since it does not fit nicely
into their proposed systematic taxonomy of particularist theses. They name Dancy’s
form of particularism Anti-Transcendental Particularism (henceforth ATP), and they
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view it as one of several negative claims that particularists make about moral
principles.
60
They interpret ATP as “a thesis about what is presupposed by our ability to
make moral judgment successfully or correctly, where this includes the ability to have
moral knowledge” ( 19) and they observe that “Anti-Transcendental Particularism seems
ill-suited to provide the radical challenge to the possibility of moral theory particularists
sometime envisage. ..[ATP] poses a challenge not to principled morality as such, but
merely to transcendental arguments for it.” ( 19-20)
The problems Raz and M&R encounter with interpreting Dancy’s formulation
indicate that Dancy’s formulation is probably not as clear as we may have wanted it to
be. Nevertheless, it seems to me that both of their proposed final interpretations are
unacceptable. In the very first paragraph of his book Dancy writes: “A part icularist
conception | of morality
|
is one which sees little if any role for moral principles.
Particularists think that moral judgment can gel along perfectly well without any appeal
to principles, indeed that there is no essential link between being a lull moral agent and
having principles.” Dancy is not saying, pace Raz, that there are no true moral
principles. Moreover, these two sentences indicate that Dancy’s project, pace M&R.
does pose a "radical challenge” to traditional moral philosophy since it undermines the
foundational assumptions of some of the most widely discussed ethical theories—viz..
Utilitarianism and Kantianism.
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See M&R (2006) p. 14. Other “negative claims” include: eliminativism—that there
are no true moral principles, skepticism—that there is no reason to think that there are
any moral principles, abstinence—that we ought not rely on principles, and principled
particularism—that any finite set of moral principles will be insufficient to capture all
moral truths.
45
It seems to me that the hest way to understand Dancy's hook is to interpret his
formulation of particularism as a statement of the particularisl research program.
61
Understood as such, we can view his account of holism in the theory of reasons as
fleshing out a schema for non-principle-based explanations of moral facts/judgments,
rather than as an argument against the existence of moral principles. 1 do not mean to
suggest that Dancy thought of his project in these terms, or that there arc no textual
difficulties for interpreting Dancy's project in the way I suggest here. Nevertheless, it
seems to me that this interpretation allows for the most plausible, and perhaps also the
most interesting, construal of Dancy's project.
61
In personal correspondence, Dancy acknowledged that this interpretation is close to
how he sees the matter.
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CHAPTER 2
MORAL ADVICE ANI> MORAL THEORY
2.1 Introduction
Monists, pluralists, and particularists disagree about the structure of the best
explanation of the rightness (wrongness) of actions. In this chapter I argue that the
availability of good moral advice gives us reason to prefer part icularist theories and
pluralist theories to monist theories. First. 1 identify two distinct roles of moral
theorizing—explaining the rightness (wrongness) of actions, and providing moral
advice—and I explain how these two roles are related. Next, I explain what monists,
pluralists, and particularists disagree about. Finally. I argue that particularists and
pluralists are better situated than monists to explain why it is a good idea to think before
we act, and that this gives us reason to favor particularism and pluralism over monism.
2.2 The Two Roles of Moral Theorizing
It is common to distinguish between two different roles of moral theorizing: a
theoretical role and a practical role.
1
The theoretical role of moral theorizing is to
provide an account of the rightness/wrongness of actions. Smith, for example, asserts
that the theoretical role of moral principles is to '’specify the characteristics in virtue of
7
which acts possess their moral status.’"' Similarly, Bales stales that one thing an ethical
theory is supposed to do is “to provide an account of that characteristic, or perhaps that
1
This terminology is due to Smith ( 1988). Similar distinctions can be found, for
example, in Bales (1971 ), Reed and Brown (1984), Railton ( 1984), Frazier ( 1994),
Crisp (2000), and Vayrynen (2006).
2
Smith (1 988) p. 89.
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very complex set of characteristics, which all and only right acts have by virtue of
3 4
which they are right.” Let us say that a theory fulfils the theoretical role if it explains
the rightness/wrongness of actions, or if it identifies the feature (or the set of features)
that makes right acts right.
The practical role of moral theorizing is to guide judgment or action. Smith, for
example, says that the practical role of moral principles is to serve as “a standard by
reference to which a person can guide his or her own behavior: a standard to help the
person choose which acts to perform and which not.”
5
And Bales suggests that in
addition to identifying a criterion of moral rightness, we may want moral theories to
provide us with “a procedure which would help us single out, in the particular case and
under an immediately helpful description, which alternative would in fact [ be morally
right |.”
6
In order to fulfill the practical role, a theory must provide some advice
regarding which action to perform.
7
General moral advice is a statement of the
following form: perform action A if and/or only if y/.
S
' Bales ( 1 97 1 ) p. 260.
1
Smith and Bales seem to think that in order to provide an account of the
rightness/wrongness of actions, we must find and formulate exceptionless moral
principles of the form: For any action. A, if A exemplifies property 1\ then A is morally
right (wrong). However, we need not presuppose that the only way to explain the
rightness/wrongness of actions is to identify exceptionless moral principles—there may
be other ways to do so. See Chapter I and section 2.3 below.
5 Smith (1988) pp. 89-90.
6
Bales (1971) p. 261.
For simplicity of exposition, I focus on guiding action alone, rather than guiding
action or judgment. However, everything I say about guiding action applies, mutatis
mutandis
, to the guidance ofjudgment as well.
In particular situations moral advice could take a simpler form: perform action A
(without the ‘if and/or only if y/' clause). 1 will focus on moral advice that is meant to
apply generally, and not only to an individual case. Nevertheless, we sometimes
give/receive advice in different forms; e.g., ‘think about the consequences', or ‘if 1 were
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The theoretical role and the practical role of moral theories tire distinct. A theory
can fulfill one of these roles without fulfilling the other. For example, many act-
consequentialists believe that although act-conscqucntialism provides the best account
()
of what makes right acts right, it offers no moral guidance. Several non-
consequentialists also endorse this distinction. C. D. Broad, for example, writes: "We
can no more learn to act rightly by appealing to the ethical theory of right action than
wc can play golf well by appealing to the mathematical theory of the flight of the golf-
ball.”
10
In a similar vein, one can offer moral advice without committing oneself to any
particular account of what makes right acts right; indeed, this is quite common in the
applied ethics literature.' ' Simply put, then, the point is this: an explanation of what
makes right acts right need not help us determine which act to perform, and a statement
of moral advice need not explain what makes right acts right. Let us reserve the term
moral theory for accounts that explain the rightness/wrongness of actions, and the term
moral advice for accounts that purport to guide judgment or action.
In principle, we can supplement any moral theory with any moral advice.
Consider, for example, the following version of act-utilitarianism:
you, 1 would do A". But strictly speaking these forms of advice do not help us decide
which action to perform; they could be helpful if they are understood as shorthand for
something like the following: ‘think about the consequences, and perform the action
that you believe would lead to the best possible consequences’; and ‘Perform action A if
you want to perform that action that I would have performed if I were you’. So even if
moral advice does not explicitly take the form: perform action A if and/or only if (//, we
should be able to restate it in this form.
9
See, for example. Bales (1971 ), and Feldman (2006).
111
Broad ( 1930) p. 285. It is interesting to compare Broad’s view to Aristotle’s view.
Aristotle motivates his project in the Nieomaehean Ethics by suggesting that the study
of ethics is likely to help us hit upon what is right ( 1094al 8-25). For more on this, see
Chapter Four.
1
1
See, for example, Hebert ( 1 996), and Strong ( 1 988).
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(AU) An act. A, is morally right if and only if A maximizes utility.
(AU) tells us that an act is right if and only if it exemplifies the property of
utility maximization. We could supplement (AU) with the following advice: Perform
action A if and only if A exemplifies the property of utility maximization. But we could,
instead, supplement (AU) with different advice. For example: Perform action A only if
you believe that your mother would not disapprove of it.
One could insist that the theoretical role and the practical role of moral
theorizing are not distinct. Consider (AU) again. One could claim that (AU) both
explains what makes right acts right and tells us which action to perform; to say that an
act is morally right is simply to say that it is permissible to perform that act. So ( AU)
can be stated as follows:
(AU’) It is permissible to perform act A if and only if A maximizes utility.
We can restate (AU') in the imperative mood as follows:
(AU”) Perform action A if and only if A maximizes utility.
But (AU") is a statement of moral advice. So a criterion of moral rightness does
tell us which action to perform, and as a result, the objection goes, there is no
distinction to be made between moral theory and moral advice.
(AU") satisfies the one constraint on moral advice that we have discussed so
far—that is, it has the proper form for moral advice (perform action A if and/or only if
y/). But surely there is more to good moral advice than having this form. I propose the
following two additional constraints on good moral advice:
1. Good moral advice is advice that agents can use. Let us say that agents can use
moral advice S just in case the condition y/ mentioned in S is specified under a
50
helpful description. Roughly speaking, a description of (// is helpful if (normal)
agents can usually tell whether this condition (as described) is satisfied. This
requirement on good moral advice is an epistemic requirement— if we usually
cannot determine whether y/ is satisfied, then S is not good moral advice. One
reason to think that the theoretical and the practical roles of moral theorizing are
distinct, then, is that the metaphysics of morality need not be constrained by
epistemic requirements. In other words, a criterion of moral rightness could be
true even if we usually cannot tell whether any action exemplifies the property
this criterion identifies as the right making property. So, for example, even if we
cannot use (AU”), the fact that we cannot use (ALT') does not give us reason to
P
believe that (AU) is false. “ And consequently, il we believe that (AU) is true,
but also that we cannot use ( AU"), we must find alternative moral advice in
order to satisfy the practical role of moral theorizing.
2. Good moral advice is advice that agents should follow. Let us say that an agent
should follow S, if she is more likely to do the right thing if she follows S than if
she fails to follow S.
13
It is important to note that it does not follow from the fact
that an agent is more likely to choose a morally right action if she follows S than
This is the main point of Bales's paper (1971 ). He writes: “The...argument|s| I am
challenging may be telling critiques of the decision-making procedure most frequently
associated with act-utilitarianism, as a decision-making procedurefor act-utilitarianism,
but I cannot see that they are even relevant to the question of whether act-utilitarianism,
as it is usually formulated, is true. For certainly it could be the case both that all and
only right acts are those which contribute no less than would any alternative towards
intrinsically good stales of affairs, and that the procedure of estimating and comparing
the probable consequences of alternative acts is an impracticable or self-defeating
procedure for singling out, under immediately helpful descriptions, right acts so
characterized.” (263)
1
' The ‘should’ here is the prudential should; if one wants to act rightly, then one has
reason to use good moral advice.
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if she fails to follow ,S, that all, or even most, agents who follow S would agree
about which action is morally right in any particular situation. Indeed, it docs
not even imply that those agents who follow S are more likely to chose a
morally right action rather than a morally wrong action. The best way to
understand this claim is as follows: Consider a large number of agents, each of
which is required to make a moral decision. Divide these agents into two groups.
All agents in one group
—
Group A—follow .S, while all agents in the other
group
—
Group B—fail to follow S. Let us say that the rightness-to-wrongness
ratio of each group is the number of morally right acts chosen by members of
the group divided by the number of morally wrong acts chosen by members of
that group. We should understand the claim that agents are more likely to choose
a morally right action if they follow S than if they fail to follow S as follows: it
is likely that the rightness-to-wrongness ratio of Group A is greater than the
rightness-to-wrongness ratio of Group B. Surely there are many possible ways to
fail to follow S, and the rightness-to-wrongness ratio of Group B will depend on
the procedure the members of this group adopt. If there is a known procedure, T,
which is distinct from .S'
14
such that if agents in Group B were to follow T the
14
Advice T is distinct from advice .S’ just in case agents who follow 7’ do not, ipso facto,
also follow .S’. For example, if advice S is perform action A only if y/, and advice T is
perform action A only if | <// and to I then agents who follow 7’ also follow S. In other
words, since T is a precisification of 5, agents who follow T do not fail to follow S. This
means that it is possible that agents should follow S even if we know that there is some
other moral advice, O, that yields a greater rightness-to-wrongness ratio, as long as
agents who follow O, ipso facto, also follow S.
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rightness-lo-wrongness ratio of Group B would be greater than the righlness-lo-
wrongness ratio of Group A, then agents should follow 7' rather than .V.
1
To illustrate these constraints on good moral advice, consider the following
advice:
(MAI) Perform action A if and only if A is morally right.
Surely an agent is more likely to do the right thing if she follows this advice than if she
fails to follow it. However, the condition y/ is not specified under a helpful
description—we often do not know whether an action satisfies the description ‘is
morally right’. So although agents should follow (MAI ), they cannot use it.
Now consider this advice:
(MA2) Perform action A only if you believe that A will bring you pleasure in the
immediate future.
Here the condition y/ is specified under a helpful description—we can usually
tell whether we believe that an action would bring us pleasure in the immediate future
—
but it is not true that an agent is more likely to do the right thing if she follows this
advice than if she fails to do so. (MA2), like (MA I ), is not good moral advice. Even
though agents can use (MA2), it is not the case that they should use it.
Much more needs to be said about these constraints on good moral advice. For
instance, we must explain what it is for an agent to use moral advice.
6 We must also
specify more accurately which descriptions of y/ are helpful descriptions. However, for
15
Thanks to an anonymous referee for pressing me on this issue.
16
Smith ( 1988) suggests the following: “an agent uses a principle as a guide for making
a decision just in case the agent chooses an act out of a desire to conform to the
principle, and a belief that the act does conform.” (91 ) She goes on to make several
qualifications to this statement on p. 92, and p. 105 n. 18.
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the purpose of this chapter our intuitive grasp of what it is to use advice, and which
descriptions are helpful descriptions, will do. Instead, I want to focus on a certain
constraint that good moral advice imposes on moral theories, a constraint that has been
largely overlooked: If S is good moral advice, our moral theory should be able to
explain this fact. That is, our moral theory must explain how it is that agents who follow
S are more likely to choose a morally right action than those who fail to follow S.
Recall that moral advice S is a statement of the following form: perform action A
if and/or only if y/. Recall, also, that to say that agents should use S is to say that agents
who follow S are more likely to do a right action than agents who fail to follow .S'. This
means that an agent is more likely to perform a right action if she is sensitive to whether
condition y/ is satisfied than if she is not so sensitive. So in order to explain the fact that
S is good moral advice, we have to explain how being sensitive to the features
mentioned in condition y/ can help agents to identify morally right actions. But in order
for i// to help agents to identify morally right actions, y/ must somehow track morally
relevant features of actions—otherwise it would be utterly mysterious how using S
could possibly increase an agent's likelihood of performing a right action.
Consider, for example, the following moral theory:
(TT) An act. A, is morally right if and only if ip.
Presumably (p explain what makes right acts right—ip is the feature in virtue of
which right acts arc right. Now, if the condition y/ mentioned in S is completely
unrelated to the condition y> mentioned in (TT), then the fact that sensitivity to whether
y/ is satisfied increases one's likelihood of doing a right action is inexplicable. So
although the theoretical role and the practical role of moral theorizing are distinct, they
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arc related in (at least) the following way: there should he some explanation for the fact
that sensitivity to the factors mentioned in i// helps agents to track features that our
moral theory identifies as morally relevant.
2.3 Monism, Pluralism, and Particularism
The particularism-general ism debate, as I understand it, is a debate about the
structure of the best explanation of morality.
17
Generalists believe that in order to
explain the fact that an act. A, is morally right, we must identify some property, P, that
A exemplifies, and an exceptionless principle according to which any action that
exemplifies P is morally right. Particularists, on the other hand, claim that we can
explain the rightness of A without appealing to an exceptionless principle. That is, the
best explanation of the fact that A is morally right is that A exemplifies a property, /\
1 s
and that in this particular case P is right-making.
Monists and pluralists arc generalists because they believe that an explanation of
a normative status of an action is inadequate unless it is grounded in an exceptionless
moral principle. However, monists and pluralists disagree about the number of
intrinsically morally relevant properties (henceforth IMR-properties). Let us say that a
property, P, is intrinsically morally relevant if and only if P is morally relevant for its
own sake, or non-dcrivatively morally relevant. A property is extrinsically morally
relevant if and only if it is non-intrinsically morally relevant; that is, if it is only
See Chapter 1
.
Particularist may be able to say more about why P is right-making in this case. See,
for example, Lance and Little (2004) & (2007). Nevertheless, the key point is that
particularists insist that an explanation of the rightness of an action need not be
grounded in an exceptionless moral principle.
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derivatively morally relevant, or morally relevant only in virtue of its relation to some
IMR-property.
Monists claim that there is only one IMR-property—call it P—and that any
action that exemplifies P is morally right. Pluralists maintain that there are several IMR-
properties—call these properties PI...Pn—and that for each IMR-property, Pi, there
will be a presumptive, or pro tanto, principle: for any action, A
,
if A exemplifies Pi then
A is presumptively morally right (or wrong); or in other words, Pi is always right-
19
making. Pluralists are generalists because they think that in order to explain the
rightness of A. it is not enough to recognize that A exemplifies Pi, and that Pi is right-
making here; they think that we must identify an exceptionless principle that states that
Pi is always right-making, or that any action that exemplifies Pi is presumptively
morally right.
The particularism-generalism debate is a debate over whether we must find and
formulate exceptionless moral principles in order to provide an adequate account of the
rightness (wrongness) of actions. Generalists believe that an explanation is inadequate
unless it is grounded in an exceptionless principle (either an absolute principle: any
action that exemplifies P is morally right, or a contributory principle: Pi is always right-
making); particularists disagree. However, even though monists and pluralists are
generalists, they differs with respect to the number of IMR-properties they allow;
monists insist that there is only one IMR-property, while pluralists, like particularists,
believe that there is more than one.
|l)
Sec, for example, Ross (1930) Ch. 2, and Shafer-Landau ( 1997).
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For example, consider (AU) again. (AU) is a monist theory. According to (AIJ)
there is only one IMR-property—namely, utility-maximization. If an action exemplifies
this property, it is morally right; otherwise, it is morally wrong. Justice, for instance,
can only he extrinsical ly morally relevant according to ( AU); if justice is morally
relevant, it is only in virtue of its relation to utility-maximization. Pluralists, in contrast,
hold that there arc several morally relevant properties. So pluralists may claim that
being just, being truthful, and being beneficent are all JMR-propcrtics. Particularists,
like pluralists, think that there are many IMR-propcrties, but unlike pluralists they hold
that a property can be intrinsically morally relevant in some cases, but not in others. So,
for example, particularists may claim that the fact that an act exemplifies justice is
intrinsically morally relevant on some occasions, but only extrinsically morally
2 ()
relevant, or even morally irrelevant, on other occasions.
“
2.4 The Argument from Good Moral Advice
In this section 1 present my argument for the conclusion that we have reason to
prefer part icu lari si theories and pluralist theories to monist theories. The starting point
of my argument is the following moral advice:
2() One might think that if a properly is morally relevant in virtue of its intrinsic nature
and if the intrinsic nature of a property does not change from one case to another, then a
property that is morally relevant in one case must be morally relevant in all cases.
However, Jonathan Dancy—the philosopher most associated with particularism
—
argues that we should distinguish between favorers/d is favorers and enablers/disablers.
According to Dancy, a feature that favors an action in one situation may be disabled (or
it could fail to be enabled) in another situation. Nevertheless, the absence of a disabler
(or the presence of an enabler) in the first situation is not a part of the feature that favors
the action. For Dancy’s account of holism in the theory of reasons sec his (1993),
(2000), (2003), and (2004).
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(RD) Perform action A only if after reflecting on and deliberating about the
1
1
normative status ol /\, you do not believe that A is morally wrong.
1 believe that (RD) is good moral advice; 1 will argue that there is strong
intuitive support for the claim the agents can and should use (RD). Since my argument
begins with the premise that (RD) is good moral advice, we can call this argument The
Argument from Good Moral Advice |or GMA|:
1
.
(RD) is good moral advice.
2. In order to explain ( 1 ), we must explain how it could be that the factors that
agents consider when they reflect on and deliberate about the normative status of
an action are morally relevant features of that action (either intrinsically or
extrinsical ly).
3. Monist theories cannot explain how it could be that that the factors that agents
consider when they reflect on and deliberate about the normative status of an
action are morally relevant features of that action.
4. Pluralist theories and particularist theories can explain how it could be that the
factors that agents consider when they reflect on and deliberate about the
normative status of an action are morally relevant features of that action.
5. Therefore, we have reason to prefer pluralist theories and particularist theories to
monist theories.
21 (RD) is a very general form of moral advice, and it can be precisified in various
different ways. For example Hebert's decision procedure in Hebert (1996) can be
viewed as one possible precisification of (RD). Ross (1930) seems to endorse some
version of (RD) as well: “we arc more likely to do our duty if we reflect to the best of
our ability on the prima facie rightness or wrongness of various possible acts in virtue
of the characteristics we perceive them to have, than if we act without reflection. With
this greater likelihood we must be content.” (p. 32).
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Our first order of business is to determine whether (RD) is, in fact, good moral
advice. (RD) is meant to capture the moral advice that colloquially can be slated as
follows: ‘Think before you act', or, ‘If you think it’s wrong, don’t do it'. Now surely
this advice is not always good advice. For instance, if a speedy action is called for, one
had better not stop and think before one acts. Furthermore, if one is completely ignorant
about the situation one is facing, or if one is excessively insensitive or irrational,
thinking before acting is unlikely to help one choose correctly. So we must qualify
premise (I ). First, we should restrict the claim that (RD) is good moral advice to
situations in which one has time to deliberate before acting. Second, we should restrict
this claim to a certain type of agents; (RD) is good moral advice for reasonably rational,
sensitive, and well-informed agents (henceforth, RSI-agents). I will not attempt to
provide a demarcating criterion for reasonably rational, sensitive, and well-informed
agent. Suffice it to say that although the notion of RSI-agents is meant to exclude agents
like those described above, it is supposed to include most ordinary mature individuals
—
people like you and me. Premise (
I ), then, should be stated as follows; (RD) is good
moral advice for RSI-agents in situations in which an immediate action is not required.
However, for simplicity of exposition I w ill omit these qualifications in what follows.
In order to ascertain whether (RD) is good moral advice we must determine
whether agents can use (RD) and whether agents should use (RD). Let us address these
questions in turn. In order to use (RD), one must be able to identify whether one
believes, upon reflection and deliberation, that an action one is contemplating is morally
wrong. I see no reason to think that under normal conditions RSI-agents cannot tell
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whether they believe that a particular act is morally wrong. Therefore, I believe that
agents can (usually) use (RD).
One might insist that there are occasions in which one cannot use (RD); indeed,
one might think that (RD) is unusable precisely in those instances where moral advice is
most needed." Consider, for example, the following situation. Due to your outstanding
moral reputation, the Supreme Court has ruled that it is up to you to decide whether a
particular patient in a persistent vegetative slate should be taken off the feeding tube and
allowed to die. You study the case carefully, but you are unsure whether it is morally
permissible to disconnect the feeding tube. You decide to consult your wisest friend.
You describe the case to your friend and you ask her for guidance: “Do you have any
advice for me?” you ask. “I do,” she replies, “my advice to you is this: perform an
action only if after reflecting on and deliberating about the normative status of that act,
you do not believe it is morally wrong.”
Your friend’s advice is disappointing. Nevertheless, although it may well be
appropriate to complain about the advice you received, 1 do not think that you cannot
use it; surely you can reflect on the normative status of a possible course of action, and
... ... 2 ~\
choose not to perform it il you believe it is morally wrong.
But if you can use your friend's advice, then why is her advice disappointing?
There is an important difference between general moral advice and particular moral
advice. (RD) is appropriate as general moral advice, but it is quite unsatisfying as
advice for a particular case. When you ask your friend for advice regarding a concrete
90 . . .
Thanks to Gwen Bradford for pressing me on this issue.
You would be unable to follow (RD) if you believed that all the options available to
you (including non-action) arc morally wrong.
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situation you arc facing, il seems reasonable to expect your friend to help you struggle
through considerations in favor and against various possible courses of action. In
offering (RD) in response to your request for advice in the case described above, your
friend violates certain conversational norms and/or certain norms of friendship (e.g.,
don't state the obvious; try to help your friends). This, I submit, is the reason why her
advice is disappointing.
Let us, then, evaluate (RD) in a context in which general moral advice is
appropriate. Consider, for instance, the following scenario: you have just been
appointed general manager of a large hospital. You decide to gather your employees for
a moral pep talk, and you deliver a passionate speech on the importance of morality in
the hospital setting. You conclude your talk by offering the following moral advice:
“Before you perform any action, stop and think about the act you are about to perform
(unless it's an emergency) and if you think il is wrong, don't do it!” It seems to me that
it would be very odd if one of your employees were to come up to you after your speech
with the following complaint: “I'm sorry to say, boss, but I simply can’t follow your
advice.” I conclude, then, that although in particular situations (RD) may be less than
fully satisfactory, il is, nonetheless, advice that agents can follow. The question now is
whether (RD) is advice that agents should follow.
To my mind, the claim that agents should follow (RD) is simply a platitude
about morality; it is a piece of moral data that any account of morality must respect.
Moreover, 1 believe that pretheoretically the intuition that it is a good idea to think
before we act is overwhelming. However, since there is reason to be suspicious of
philosophers’ claims concerning “pretheoretical intuitions,” and since it is doubtful that
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anyone reading this paper has "pretheoretical intuitions”, 1 will try, in what follows, to
motivate the claim that agents should follow (RD).
Consider the following ease: A 74-year-old man, following the death of his wife,
has severe depression with thoughts of suicide and marked vegetative symptoms. He
has accepted medications and counseling hut remains emotionally unstable. His
.... ">4
physician discovers that he may have prostate cancer.
The physician has to decide what to do. Should she tell the patient about his
condition? Should she wait until she has a definite prognosis or until the patient’s
mental condition improves? I will not try to answer these difficult questions here.
Instead, I want to ask whether the physician should follow (RD). In order to answer this
question we have to compare the physician's likelihood of choosing a morally right
action if she follows (RD), to her likelihood of choosing a morally right action if she
fails to follow (RD).
There arc two kinds of ways for our physician to fail to follow (RD): ( I ) she
could perform an act. A, without reflecting on and deliberating about the permissibility
of A—for example, she could perform A because it is the first act she happened to think
of; or (2) she could performs A even though after reflecting on and deliberating about
the normative status of A, she comes to believes that A is morally wrong. I suspect that
most readers would advise our physician to use (RD) rather than to choose an act
without reflecting on its normative status, or to choose an act she believes is morally
wrong. Moreover, 1 expect that many would advise the physician to use (RD) because
they believe that by using (RD) our physician increases her likelihood of choosing a
~ 4
This case description is quoted from Hebert ( 1996) p.78 (case 4.7)
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morally right action."' Indeed, if we do not believe that by using (RD) the physician
increases her likelihood of choosing a morally right act, then in so far as we are
interested in her doing the right thing, we need not ask the physician to reflect on the
permissibility of her actions, or to act in accordance with her considered moral beliefs. I
find this result extremely counterintuitive, and I lake this to show that there is strong
intuitive support for the claim that RSl-agents should use (RD).
But perhaps my conclusion is too hasty. One might grant my intuition that in the
case described our physician should follow (RD), but deny that agents should always, or
even usually, follow (RD). One could point out that there arc situations in which
reflection and deliberation decrease one's likelihood of choosing a morally right action.
2ft
For example, consider Mark Twain's portrayal ol Huckleberry Finn. Huck helps his
slave friend Jim to escape from his owner. Upon reflecting on his action, Huck believes
that assisting Jim is morally wrong. Yet he cannot bring himself to turn Jim in, even
though he believes that turning him in is the right thing to do. According to the story,
then, had Huck followed (RD) he would have acted wrongly.
Another interesting example of a case in which an agent would have done better
by not following (RD) is described in the story Deutsches Requiem by Jorge Luis
-
) 7
Borges." This story is a lirst-person account ol the actions and thoughts of a fictional
Nazi officer—Otto Dietrich zur Linde. In 1941. zur Linde was appointed subdirector of
There might be other reasons to recommend using (RD). One could argue that agents
should follow (RD) not because (or not only because) it increases the likelihood of
choosing correctly, but rather for reasons that have to do with moral responsibility,
autonomy, or the manifestation of good moral character. However, I will not discuss
these alternatives here.
J '
Sec Bennett ( 1974) and Arpaly (2003) for a discussion of this example, and for
various other interesting cases.
27
Reprinted in Borges ( 1998) pp. 229-234
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the Tarnowitz concentration camp. “Carrying out the duties attendant on the position,”
he tells us,
was not something I enjoyed, hut I never sinned by omission. The
coward proves himself among swords; the merciful man, the
compassionate man, seeks to be tested by jails and others’ pain. Nazism
is intrinsically a moral act, a stripping away of the old man, which is
corrupt and depraved, in order to put on the new. In battle, amid the
captains’ outcries and the shouting, such transformation is common; it is
not common in a crude dungeon, where insidious compassion tempts us
with ancient acts of tenderness. 1 do not write that word “compassion”
lightly; compassion on the part of the superior man is Zarathustra's
ultimate sin.
Zur Linde, as we learn from the story, reflected on and deliberated about his
actions. He believed that succumbing to compassion is immoral, and he made a special
el i ort not to perform acts that he believed were wrong. “I mysell (I confess), he
writes, “almost committed | the sin of compassion | when the famous poet David
Jerusalem was sent to us from Breslau.” Zur Linde admired Jerusalem's poetry, and lie
made a special effort not to give in to compassion in his dealings with Jerusalem. “I was
severe with him; I let neither compassion nor his fame make me soft.” Zur Linde
tortured Jerusalem until eventually Jerusalem succeeded in killing himself. According
to the story, then, zur Linde followed (RD) meticulously, and as a result he performed
,
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heinous acts.
2S
Bennett ( 1974) describes Heinrich Himmler—leader of the S.S.—as one whose
commitment to 'bad morality’ conflicted with his own feeling of sympathy. I do not
know whether Borges had Himmler in mind when he wrote Deutsches Requiem.
Dostoyevsky’s Raskolnikov is another example of this sort that comes to mind.
Raskolnikov believed that it was not wrong for him to kill the old lady. And indeed,
Borges has zur Linde mention Raskolnikov as a moral exemplar.
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These examples illustrate that there are situations in which agents are less likely
to do the right thing if they follow (RD) than if they fail to follow (RD). Does this prove
that (RD) is not good moral advice?
The claim that (RD) is good moral advice is certainly not a conceptual truth or
otherwise necessary truth. We can easily imagine worlds (maybe demon-worlds) in
which (RD) is bad advice. Moreover, the claim that (RD) is good moral advice does not
entail that on each and every occasion one would do better by following (RD). This
claim is best understood as a strategic claim; the rightness-to-wrongness ratio of RSI-
agents who follows (RD) is likely to be greater than that of agents who fail to follow
(RD). Consider, by comparison, the following prudential advice: (LA) Don't buy a
lottery ticket if the expected utility is negative. The claim that (LA) is good advice is
not a necessary truth; we can easily imagine worlds in which it would be prudent to buy
lottery tickets with negative expected utility. However, one could think that (LA) is
good prudential advice (in our world) even though one is well aware that following
(LA) may sometimes lead to worse outcomes than failing to follow it—as anyone who
won a significant amount of money in a lottery would attest. If the number of lottery
winners were substantially larger than it is, we might have had reason to suspect that
(LA) is bad advice. But given the winner-to-loser ratio in standard negative-expccted-
utility lotteries, the fact that there are some winners does not undermine the claim that
(LA) is good advice. Similarly, if there are relatively few cases in which one would do
better by failing to follow (RD) rather than following it, then pointing out that there are
a few such cases gives us no reason to believe that (RD) is not good moral advice.
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Unfortunately, it is not as easy to determine how common cases like those of
Huck Finn and zur Linde arc, as it is to determine the expected utility and the winner-
to-loser ratio in standard lotteries. It may seem tempting to argue that although Huck
acted rightly by failing to follow (RD) in his dealings with Jim, his overall rightness-to-
wrongness ratio is likely to have been greater had he consistently followed (RD) than
had he failed to do so. But it is not quite so tempting to take this route with respect to
zur Linde, whose atrocious actions seem to result from his unfaltering compliance with
(RD). Alternatively, it may seem tempting to argue that zur Linde is not a reasonably
rational, sensitive, and well informed agent, but it is not as tempting to argue that Huck
is not a RSI-agent. Moreover, in order to deny that zur Linde is a RSI-agent, we will
have to specify a criterion for RSI-agents—a task I am not prepared to undertake here.
Instead, 1 wish to sidestep these complicated cases. All I need to establish for purposes
of the GMA argument is that we can identify a sufficiently large group of people for
whom (RD) is good moral advice. If we can identify such a group, we will have to
explain the fact that (RD) is good moral advice for them. And if particularist theories
and pluralist theories can explain this fact, while monist theories cannot, then we have
reason to favor the former theories over the latter.
With this goal in mind, let us return to the case of our aforementioned physician.
The physician, as described, is completely generic— I have not provided any peculiar
information about her. 1 did not specify, for instance, whether she is a consequentialist
or a Kantian. Indeed, I did not specify whether she is committed to any particular moral
theory at all. We do not know how many years of experience she has, whether she is a
theist, or what features she considers when she reflects on and deliberates about the
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normative status of actions. Furthermore, the paucity of specific details about the case
she is faced with suggests that there is very little one could appeal to in order to explain
why (RD) would be good advice in this case but not in others. Consequently, if one
grants the intuition that in the case described our physician should follow (RD), it is
hard to see what grounds one could have for denying that this intuition is quite general.
That is, unless one can identify something special about the particular features of the
case I have described, it is hard to see how one could deny that many physicians should
follow (RD) in many situations.
In contrast, we can identify a feature common to the Huck Finn case and the zur
Linde case that explains why in both these cases (RD) was not good moral advice; in
both these cases the agents arc committed to a ‘bad morality’.
30
Huck Finn believes,
like many of his contemporaries, that slaves are the property of their owners, and that
helping a slave escape is morally on a par with stealing another's property. Zur Linde
believes that the Aryan race is a superior race, and that showing compassion towards
people of other races is morally wrong. There are, no doubt, many people who are
committed to ‘bad moralities’ of varying scopes; some ‘bad moralities' govern a small
set of people’s actions while others might govern most actions. Nevertheless, unless one
grants that some people are not committed to wide scope bad moralities, it is hard to see
how one could avoid moral skepticism. It is common practice in moral theorizing to
take (some set of) the moral intuitions of one's moral peers as the data that one’s moral
theory is supposed to explain. So it seems reasonable to expect that (RD) is good advice
at least for some set of agents, in some set of situations. And as long as the relevant set
30
I borrow the phrase ‘bad morality' from Bennett ( 1974).
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is large enough, then the fact that (RD) is good moral advice in these eases is a moral
phenomenon that demands an explanation.
This concludes my defense of premise ( I ). I have argued, in Section 2.2, that if
advice S is good moral advice, we should be able to explain how the factors mentioned
in condition i// help agents to track features that our moral theory identifies as morally
relevant features of actions. So in order to explain the fact that (RD) is good moral
advice, we must explain how it could be that the factors that agents consider when they
reflect on and deliberate about the normative status of an action are morally relevant
features of that action (either intrinsically or extrinsically).
The question now is this: can monisl theories explain how it could be that the
factors that agents consider when they reflect on and deliberate about the normative
status of an action are morally relevant features of that action? Recall that according to
monism, there is only one IMR- property. According to (AU), for example, the only
IMR-property is the property of utility-maximization. So in order to explain the success
of (RD), proponents of (AU) will have to explain how those factors that RSI-agents
consider while reflecting on and deliberating about the permissibility of a particular act,
reliably track the property of utility-maximization.
Consider, again, our physician from the abovementioned example. While
reflecting on the normative status of a particular action. A, she may think of
considerations like these: Will doing A violate my patient’s autonomy? Will it harm my
patient? Will it violate my duty to be truthful to my patient? Will doing A bring about
bad consequences? Proponents of (AU) must explain how reflecting on factors like
these could possibly increase the physician’s likelihood of choosing the act that
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maximizes utility. But how could they explain this? Surely there is no conceptual
relation between these factors and utility-maximization; it is conceptually possible that
doing A would maximize utility (or fail to do so) regardless of whether in doing A the
physician violates her patient's autonomy, harms the patient, or violates her duty to be
truthful to him, and regardless of her beliefs about the value of the consequences of
doing A. Therefore, if these considerations were reliable indicators of whether an act
exemplifies utility-maximization, it would have to be a contingent fact.
But can proponents of (AU) offer any reasons to believe that this contingent fact
obtains? Mill seems to have thought that we can learn from experience that certain
factors arc reliable indicators of utility maximization.
’ 1
But in order to be able to learn
from experience that factor F is a reliable indicator of utility maximization, we must
know whether those actions that exemplify F usually maximize utility. That is, we must
know that most actions that exemplified F in the past in fact maximized utility. But
there are reasons to think that (typically) we cannot know this.
One reason concerns our ignorance about the far-reaching causal ramifications
of actions. Consider a particular actions, A, that exemplified feature F. In order to know
that action A maximized utility, we must know that A had the best possible outcomes of
all the actions available to the agent at the time she performed A. However, it is not
clear how we could possibly know this if we do not know what many of the outcomes
of A are. And if, as seems plausible, the causal ramifications of (most) actions arc far
reaching into the future, then we actually do no know what many of the outcomes of
actions are.
31
See Mill's Utilitarianism
,
esp. Ch. 2
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Another difficulty concerns the comparative nature of the property of utility
maximization. As stated above. In order to know that action A maximized utility, we
must know that A had the best possible outcomes of all the actions available to the
agent at the time she performed A. This means that in order to know that action A was
right, we must know that there had been no alternative action that would have had better
consequences than A. However, in (almost) all circumstances, agents have numerous
alternative actions available to them—arguably infinitely many—and it is not clear how
we could know that A had the best consequences of all the actions available to the agent
32
d we do not even know what all the other actions available to the agent were.'
To put these points together: in order to know that feature F is a reliable
indicator of utility maximization, we must know that most actions that exemplified F
were such that the value of all their consequences was greater than the value of all the
consequences of each and every one of the actions the agent could have performed
instead of the actions that exemplified F. Since it is unreasonable to think that we are
typically in a position to know all these things, it is not clear what evidence proponents
of (AU) could muster to support the claim that some features arc reliable indicators of
33
utility maximization.
Moreover, even if inductive support of this sort were available, it might not be
sufficient, since it is not enough to establish that in the past acts that exemplified the
property of harm-avoidance, for instance, were typically the ones that exemplified
~ An agent could have perform many actions similar to the one she actually performed
by changing the manner in which she performed her action, or the exact time in which
she performed it. The number of actions available to an agent depends, of course, on
how we individuate actions.
33
Sec Lenman (2000) for reasons for thinking that we are never justified in believing of
any action that it exemplifies utility-maximization
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utility-maximization. To sec this, consider the following analogy: Suppose that 1
watched about one half of the Red-Sox games over the course of one baseball season.
Suppose, further, that it turns out that the Red-Sox’s win/loss ratio is significantly
greater for the games I watched, than it is for the games I did not watch. So over the
course of this season the games that exemplified the property of being watched by me
were typically the ones that exemplified the property of being won by the Red-Sox. But
surely it would be rash to conclude that the Red-Sox arc more likely to win their next
game if I watch it rather than not watch it. In addition to inductive evidence of this sort,
we need some account of how the relevant properties are related: that is, how the
exemplification of one property could possibly increase the probability of the other one
being exemplified. Overwhelming inductive evidence may give us reason to suspect
that an account of this sort is forthcoming. But in the absence of such an account it may
well be that the best explanation of the frequent co-instantiation of the two properties in
the past is that an unlikely event occurred. For example, the best explanation of the
frequent co-instantiation of the relevant properties in the Red-Sox example (given other
things we know about the world) is that the co-instantiation of these properties is purely
coincidental; after all. unlikely events can, and do, occur.
To the best of my knowledge, no one has yet offered any reason to think that, in
fact, the factors that RSl-agents consider when they reflect on and deliberate about the
normative status of actions are reliable indicators of the exemplification of the property
of utility-maximization. Moreover, I doubt that we have any evidence, not to mention
overwhelming evidence, for the co-instantiation of certain properties of actions that
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RSI-agents typically consider and the property of utility maximization.'
4
As a result,
proponents of(AU) are poorly situated in order to explain how it could he that the
factors that agents consider when they reflect on and deliberate about the normative
status of an action are morally relevant features of that action
l believe this point generalizes beyond (AU) to many monist theories. 35 Recall
that the intuition that our physician should use (RD) was elicited without specifying
which features she considers in her deliberation about the permissibility of actions. So
in order to explain how it could be that the factors that agents consider when they reflect
on the normative status of an action arc morally relevant features of that action,
proponents of each monist theory would have to show that the plurality of factors that
RSI-agents consider when they reflect on and deliberate about the normative status of
u
See Feldman (2006) for an explanation of why a move to expected utility will not
help here.
There may be some monist theories that can circumvent this problem. Consider, for
example, the following monist interpretation of Ross's theory oi primafacie rightness:
(MPFR) An act. A, is morally right iff A maximizes prima facie rightness. According to
this theory, there is only one IMR-properly—namely, prima facie-rightness-
maximization. Justice, beneficence, fidelity, and the other primafacie duties that Ross
identifies arc all extrinsically morally relevant; these properties arc relevant in virtue of
their relation to the property of prima /dc/c-rightness-maximization. Nevertheless, this
relation between justice, for example, and prima /dc/c-rightness-maximization is,
arguably, a conceptual relation. Monisls of this variety (with various lists of prima facie
duties) may be able to explain how it is that features that RSI-agents consider are
(extrinsically) morally relevant. Somewhat similar interpretations of Ross's View can
be found in Feldman ( 1978): “An act is morally right if and only if it is a prima facie
duty and no alternative is a more stringent prima facie duty.” ( 156), and Zimmerman
(1996): “S has an overall obligation to do A iff S has a prima facie obligation to do A
that overrides any prima facie obligation that S has not to do A.” (172). In both these
formulations it is not quite clear to me whether there is a conceptual relation between
the right making property (i.e., being the most stringent prima facie duty, or being a
prima facie duly that overrides all other prima facie duties) and considerations like
justice, beneficence, etc.. Since these formulations make use of technical terms, they are
open to interpretation, so it is possible that these monistic interpretations of Ross also
circumvent the problems for monist theories discussed in this paper.
72
an action, reliably indicate whether that act exemplifies a single property—whichever
property that specific monisl theory identifies as the only IMR -property. For example,
consider the following two alternative (monisl) versions of Kantianism:
(Kl) An act, A, is morally right if and only if in performing A the agent of A
treats no one as mere means.
(K2) An act. A, is morally right if and only if the agent of A can consistently will
that the maxim she acts on be a universal law.
According to (K I ), the only intrinsically morally relevant property of actions is
the property of being such that in performing the action the agent of the act treats no
one as mere means. According to (K2) the only intrinsically morally relevant property is
the property of being such that the agent of the act can consistently will that the maxim
she acts on be a universal law. Proponents of each of these theories must explain how
considering features like the ones listed above (Will doing A violate my patient's
autonomy? Will it harm my patient? Will it violate my duty to be truthful to my patient?
Will doing A bring about bad consequences?) could possibly increase the physician's
likelihood of choosing an action that exemplifies either one of these properties. I have
no argument for the conclusion that such an explanation cannot be had, but only that it
has not yet been given, and that it is not clear what this explanation might look like.
And until this explanation is given, it seems to me that there is an explanatory burden
that rests on the shoulders of monists that has not yet been met.
In contrast, particularists and plural ists need not claim that all the factors that
RSl-agenls consider when they reflect on the normative status of an action actually
track a single property. Instead, they can claim that those factors that RSI-agents
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consider are typically genuinely morally relevant features of actions. Of course, not all
factors that RSI-agents consider are intrinsically morally relevant. For example, in
deliberating about the normative status of an action, one may consider whether one
would be prepared to make one’s decision public. 36 Surely the fact that an action has
the property of being such that the agent of the act is prepared to make it public is
(typically) not an IMR-property. However, particularists and plural ists can explain why
this property is (sometimes) extrinsically morally relevant; for example, they could say
that considering whether one is prepared to make one’s decision public helps one to
adopt an impartial perspective, which, in turn, helps the agent to recognize whether an
action exemplifies other properties that, in this particular case, are morally relevant
(e.g.. being just or being beneficent). And this would explain how it could be that the
factors that agents consider when they reflect on and deliberate about the normative
status of an action are morally relevant features of that action.
So far I have argued that particularists and plural ists can explain how it could be
that factors that we consider when we reflect on and deliberate about the normative
status of an action are morally relevant features of that action. The explanation is. in
fact, quite simple: according to particularists and pluralists any property could be a
morally relevant feature of an action, so surely the properties we consider in
deliberating about the normative status of an action could be morally relevant features
of that action. But in order to explain the fact that (RD) is good moral advice we need to
do more than this; we must explain how it could be that the features that we typically
consider are in fact morally relevant features of actions. Nevertheless, any theory that
36
See Hebert (1996)
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cannot explain how it could be that the factors that agents consider when they reflect on
and deliberate about the normative status of an action are morally relevant features of
that action, will be unable to explain the fact that (RD) is good advice. So if I am right
that particularists and pluralists can explain this fact while monists cannot, then, I
believe, we have some reason to prefer particularism and pluralism to monism.
2.5 Conclusion
In conclusion, let me briefly summarize my argument. I maintain that there is
strong intuitive support for the claim that (RD) is good moral advice. But if (RD) is
good moral advice, we should be able to explain how it is that the plurality of factors
that agents consider when they reflect on and deliberate about the normative status of an
action are morally relevant features of that action. But since we have no reason to
believe that the plurality of factors that RSl-agents consider while reflecting on the
permissibility of an action track one single property, it seems that monist theories are
poorly situated to meet this explanatory burden. In contrast, particularists and pluralists
need only to show that each of the factors that RSI-agents consider in deliberating about
the normative status of actions is, or tracks, one of many IMR-properties. Consequently,
it seems that these theories arc better situated to explain the fact that (RD) is good moral
advice. This, I have argued, gives us a reason to prefer particu larist theories and
pluralist theories to monist theories.
15
CHAPTER 3
EXPLANATION IN ETHICS
3.1 Introduction
In Chapter One I argued that the debate between partieularists and generalists is
best understood as a debate over which research program we ought to pursue.
Generalists, I claimed, arc committed to a research program according to which we
must find and formulate exceptionless moral principles in order to provide an adequate
explanation of moral phenomena, whereas partieularists are committed to an alternative
research program according to which we can explain morality without appealing to
exceptionless moral principles. So a key question concerning the particularism-
general ism debate is whether an adequate explanation of morality is possible without an
appeal to exceptionless moral principles. Surely, if the answer to this question is “No,”
then we have good reason to abandon the particularist research program. However, if
the answer is “Yes,” then given that exceptionless (explanatory) moral principles have
not yet been found despite the remarkable efforts of some of the greatest philosophers in
the past few centuries, we will have ample motivation to pursue the particularist
research program.
The main question of this chapter, then, concerns the nature of explanation in
ethics. Must moral explanations involve exceptionless moral principles? In order to
answer this question I will examine several theories of explanation. I proceed as
follows. In section 3.2 1 discuss some reasons for thinking that moral explanation must
be grounded in exceptionless moral principles, and I argue that a deductive approach to
explanation is unmotivated. In section 3.3 I argue that we have good reasons for
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thinking that not all explanations are deductive. In section 3.4 I discuss non-deductive
models of explanation based on ceteris paribus laws. In section 3.5 I present a lew non-
deductive models of explanations that do not require laws at all. In section 3.6 I discuss
the pragmatic nature of explanation, and I present van Fraasscn's pragmatic theory of
explanation. Finally, in section 3.7 1 show that giving up on a deductive model of
explanation not only undermines principle monism, but it gives us good reason to
abandon pluralism as well.
3.2 Explanation and Exceptionless Generalizations
Moral theories are (among other things) in the business of explaining moral
phenomena. Hence, one’s views about moral explanation will greatly influence the kind
of moral theories one in willing to countenance. The view that moral explanation must
appeal to exceptionless moral principles was presupposed by many moral philosophers
in the past few centuries—as evidenced by their persistent attempts to find and
formulate such principles—but it was seldom explicitly argued for. The fact that this
presupposition was accepted without argument does not mean that this presumption was
unmotivated. In Chapter One I proposed that the remarkable progress in the sciences
spawned by the scientific revolution might have motivated moral philosophers to search
for exceptionless moral principles. The discovery and formulation of scientific laws,
and most notably Newton's laws, has clearly led to astounding achievements in the
sciences. So it was natural to expect that if we could find and formulate the "laws of
morality,” we could, perhaps, accomplish similar advances in ethics. Surely moral
phenomena arc complex and diverse, and it may not appear as though the moral
landscape could be captured by a set of simple principles. But then again, prior to the
77
publication of Newton’s Principal in 1687, the thought that three simple and elegant
principles could explain celestial phenomena as well as the behavior of massive objects
on Earth was unfathomable. So even those who respect Aristotle’s dictum, that “a well-
schooled man is one w ho searches for that degree of precision in each kind of study
which the nature of the subject at hand admits” (Nicomachean Ethics 1.3: I094b24) may
insist that although ethics, like science, does not appear to be the kind of study that
admits of a great deal of precision, it may perhaps, like science, permit of more
precision than it seems to allow' at first sight— if only we manage to find the correct
moral principles.
All this is to say that there were, in fact, good reasons to pursue the generalist
research program even though the underlying commitment of this program concerning
the essentiality of exceptionless generalizations to proper explanation was never
explicitly argued for. But if after a sufficiently long period of time a research program
fails to provide the results one had hoped it would deliver, one may find it necessary to
examine the fundamental commitments of the research program in question. And since
we have not yet managed to find and formulate satisfactory exceptionless explanatory
moral principles, the generalist research program has, so far, failed to provide an
adequate account of morality. So we should now ask whether there are any arguments
in support of the generalist presumption, and whether there are any good reasons to
object to the particularist commitment that (adequate) moral explanation need not
appeal to exceptionless moral principles.
A natural place to look for such arguments is the literature on the nature of
explanation. And indeed, the most influential essay in modern discussion of this topic
—
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namely, Hcmpcl and Oppenhcim's seminal essay ‘Studies in the Logic of
Explanation"
—
provides a detailed model of explanation according to which
exceptionless generalizations are essential for adequate explanations.
1
The fundamental
insight of Hempel and Oppenhcim's model, which is also known as the “covering law
model”, or the “D-N model” (Deductive-Nomological model), is that to explain a
certain phenomenon is to demonstrate that this phenomenon hud to occur. An
explanation, on this model, has the form of a deductive argument. The conclusion of the
argument is (a sentence describing) the phenomenon to be explained—the
explanandum—and the premises of the argument—(the sentences describing) the
explanans—must logically imply the explanandum. Moreover, the explanans must
include a statement of a general law, and this law' must play an indispensable role in the
derivation of the explanandum.
Hempel and Oppenheim were interested primarily in the structure o l' scientific
explanation. Nevertheless, moral philosophers have also endorsed the idea that
explanation is subsumptive in nature. John Ladd, for example, in a paper titled “Ethics
and Explanation" claims that “the aim of explanation. ..is an ordering of phenomena
under general law...To the question “Why?,” explanations answer by a subsumption
under a general statement.” ( 1952:499) In a footnote, Ladd directs the reader to Hempel
2
and Oppenhcim's essay for a more precise account of explanation." Since subsumption
1
Hempel and Oppenheim ( 1948). For a discussion of the importance and influence of
Hempel and Oppenhcim’s essay, sec Salmon ( 1989) and Woodward (2003a, 2003b).
For example, in his introduction Salmon writes: “A large preponderance of the
philosophical work on scientific explanation in the succeeding four decades [after the
publication of Hempel and Oppenhcim’s essay] has occurred as a direct or indirect
response to this article.” (3-4)
2
See Ladd (1952) In. I
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under general statement is. according to Ladd, the very essence of explanation, he
concludes that there are no important differences between the basic pattern of
explanation that Hempel and Oppenheim identify in empirical sciences and the basic
pattern of explanation in ethics. “Ethical theory,” he writes, “seeks to explain, and
therefore uses the methods of explanation which are similar to those of the other
empirical sciences such as psychology, physics, meteorology, linguistics, etc.”"
1
Surely if Ladd and Hempel and Oppenheim are right about the structure of
explanation in ethics, then the particularist project is in trouble, because if in order to
explain a certain phenomenon we must subsume this phenomenon under a general law,
then in order to explain the rightness of/? we will have to find a general law (or
principle) that “covers” /?. That is. if Hempel and Oppenheim are right, then an
explanation of the rightness of/? should have the following form:
1 ) Action R has feature <p.
2) Every action that has feature tp is morally right.
3) (Therefore,) action R is morally right.
> Explanans
) Explanandum
Without the (exceptionless) principle stated in line (2), the explanans would not
logically imply the explanandum, and consequently, the explanation would be
inadequate. So if an explanation that fails to conform to this model is defective, the
particularist research program is doomed from the outset.
But why should we think that all explanations must conform to this kind of
deductive model of explanation? Ladd, alluding to Hempel and Oppenheim again.
' Ibid. p. 501 (emphasis added).
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claims that explanations “should provide us with statements that have 'potential
predictive force.’”
4
And the general laws cited in the explanans afford explanations with
predictive power. But Ladd does not explain why we should think that explanations
must have predictive force in the first place. Indeed, for Hempcl and Oppenhcim the
fact that “the difference between (explanation and prediction] is of pragmatic character"
and that “an explanation is not fully adequate unless its explanans, if taken account of in
time, could have served as a basis for predicting the phenomenon under consideration”
(138) are not constraints on a theory of explanation, but consequences of the theory of
explanation they propose.
So why do Hempel and Oppenheim think that explanations are subsumptivc in
nature? Interestingly, this question is not explicitly answered in their essay. Hempel and
Oppenheim tell us that their goal is “to shed some light on | the function and the
essential characteristics of scientific explanation] by means of an elementary survey of
the basic pattern of scientific explanation.” ( 135) They begin their survey with two
illustrations of scientific explanations. The first is an explanation of the initial drop, and
subsequent swift rise of the mercury level in a glass thermometer, when the
thermometer is rapidly immersed in hot water. “How is this phenomenon to be
explained?” they ask. (135) Now this question is ambiguous. It could be understood as a
question about how the abovementioned phenomenon is actually explained by
scientists. Alternatively, it could be interpreted as a question about how this
phenomenon ought to he explained. Hempel and Oppenheim seem to shift from the
descriptive reading to the normative one.
4
P. 499. Ladd borrows the phrase “potential predictive force” from Hempel and
Oppenheim. See Hempel and Oppenheim ( 1948) p. 138.
81
One might think that this shift from a descriptive reading to a normative reading
is innocuous. Naturally, if we are to give an analysis of the concept of scientific
explanation, it is a good idea to begin our inquiry with a few paradigmatic samples of
scientific explanation—samples that exemplify, as clearly as possible, the components
of the proposed analysis. Indeed, providing paradigmatic exemplars could be
understood, plausibly enough, as a way to help the readers identify the concept Hcmpel
and Oppenheim are trying to give an account of. But surprisingly, the illustrations
Hempel and Oppenheim provide do not exemplify the pattern of explanation they
propose. In order to sec this, it is worth citing their sample explanation, and their
analysis of this example, at length. “The increase in temperature,” they write,
affects at first only the glass tube of the thermometer; it expands and
thus provides a larger space for the mercury inside, whose surface
therefore drops. As soon as by heat conduction the rise in temperature
reaches the mercury, however, the latter expands, and as its coefficient
of expansion is considerably larger than that of glass, a rise of the
mercury level results.—This account consists of statements of two kinds.
Those of the first kind indicate certain conditions which are realized
prior to, or at the same time as, the phenomenon to be explained; we
shall refer to them briefly as antecedent conditions. In our illustration,
the antecedent conditions include, among others, the fact that the
thermometer consists of a glass tube which is partly filled with mercury,
and that it is immersed into hot water. The statements of the second kind
express certain general laws; in our case, these include the laws of the
thermic expansion of mercury and of glass, and a statement about the
small thermic conductivity of glass. The two sets of statements, if
adequately and completely formulated, explain the phenomenon under
consideration: They entail the consequence that the mercury will first
drop, then rise. Thus, the event under discussion is explained by
subsuming it under general laws, i.e., by showing that it occurred in
accordance with those laws, by virtue of the realization of certain
specified antecedent conditions. ( 135-6)
Hcmpel and Oppenheim begin by presenting a possible explanation of the
phenomenon in question. Their proposed explanation may well be the answer one
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would receive from u scientist to the question "How is this phenomenon to he
explained?”— first the glass tube expands, causing the mercury level to drop; then,
when the mercury heats up, the mercury expands and the level of mercury in the tube
rises. Next, Hempel and Oppenhcim go on to analyze this proposed explanation. They
claim that this explanation involves two kinds of statements: antecedent conditions and
general laws. The antecedent conditions include "the fact that the thermometer consists
of a glass lube which is partly filled with mercury, and that it is immersed into hot
water.” These features are indeed mentioned in the sample explanation presented in the
first few sentences of the paragraph. However, the statements of general laws they
identify
—
“the laws of the thermic expansion of mercury and of glass”—are not
mentioned in the sample explanation at all. In claiming that explanations involve
statements of general laws, Hempel and Oppenhcim are no longer describing the
sample scientific explanation they have given us; instead they are offering a normative
account of what scientific explanation ought to look like. The last two sentences are
particularly telling. “The two sets of statements |i.e., antecedent conditions and general
laws\,ifadequately and completely formulated, explain the phenomenon under
consideration.” The qualification "if adequately and completely formulated” indicates
that the sample “explanation” described in the beginning of the paragraph is, in fact, an
inadequate explanation; only when the antecedent conditions and general laws are
adequately and completely formulated, we will have properly explained the
5 One of the “statements of general laws” that Hempel and Oppenhcim claim their
proposed explanation appleas to is "a statement about the small thermic conductivity of
glass.” Their explanation does mention that the “coefficient of expansion | of mercury |
is considerably larger than that of glass,” but as stated, this is a statement of fact and not
a statement of a general law.
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phenomenon in question.
‘
'Thus
,
the event under discussion,” they claim, “is explained
by subsuming it under general laws.” But the “thus” here is misleading. Hempel and
Oppenheim proposed a reconstruction of the sample explanation they originally
presented as a subsumptive explanation, but they offered no argument to support their
claim that “the event under discussion is explained by subsuming it under general law.”
In fact, if we lake the sample explanation at face value, the event under discussion is
explained without mention of any general law at all.
Now surely there is nothing wrong with offering a reconstruction of a sample
explanation; it is not uncommon for philosophers of science to try to unmask the
underlying structure of scientific concepts like ‘scientific explanation’ even if this
structure is rarely, if ever, explicitly exemplified in scientific discourse. But if this is
what Hempel and Oppenheim are doing, then the sample explanation they discuss
provides no support for their analysis, nor docs it help us to identify the concept they
are trying to analyze. They could have begun their paper by stating their proposed
analysis and showing that they can reconstruct sample explanation to fit the explanation
schema they put forward.
6
(>
The second example Hempel and Oppenheim present is no more helpful than the first:
To an observer in a row boat, that part of an oar which is under water
appears to be bent upwards. The phenomenon is explained by means of
general laws—mainly the law of refraction and the law that water is an
optically denser medium than air-and by reference to certain antecedent
conditions—especially the facts that part of the oar is in the water, part
in the air, and that the oar is practically a straight piece of wood.—Thus,
here again, the question "Why does the phenomenon happen?" is
construed as meaning "according to what general laws, and by virtue of
what antecedent conditions does the phenomenon occur?" ( 136)
In this case Hempel and Oppenheim do not present the explanation of the phenomenon
in question. Instead they simply assert “the phenomenon is explained by means of
general laws... and by reference to certain antecedent conditions.” Again, the “thus” in
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To be clear, I have not argued that the covering law model is false or even
problematic. All 1 have claimed so far is that we have not yet been given any reason to
think that explanations must have a deductive form; despite Hempel and Oppenhcim's
rhetoric (e.g., “From the preceding sample cases let us now abstract some general
characteristics of scientific explanation." ( 136)) their appeal to sample explanations
offers no support for the pattern of explanation they propose, and as far as I can tell,
they offer no other argument to motivate their deductive model of explanation.
Now if there were no difficulties for Hempel and Oppcnheim's model, and if
there were no alternative theories of explanation, we might have had reason to accept
this model of explanation—even though Hempel and Oppenheim offer no argument to
convince us that this is the correct model of explanation— in virtue of its success, or in
virtue of the absence of competing accounts. In the next section 1 will argue that
deductive models of explanation lace serious problems. In the subsequent sections I will
present several alternative models of explanation.
3.3 Are All Explanations Deductive?
One noticeable difficulty for applying the covering law model of explanation in
ethics is that we have not yet managed to find and formulate exceptionless moral
principles that can be used in deductive explanations. Lying, for instance, is typically
the final sentence is misleading. Surely Hempel and Oppenheim construed the question
" Why does the phenomenon happen?" as meaning "according to what general laws, and
by virtue of what antecedent conditions does the phenomenon occur?" but they offered
no argument as to why it should be so construed. Moreover, their use of passive voice
here is also ambiguous. The phrase "the question is construed as" could be read as a
descriptive claim—emphasizing the point that Hempel and Oppenheim in fact construed
it in this way—or as a normative claim—the question ought to he construed as they
propose. In either case we have no argument for the claim that the question should be
construed as Hempel and Oppenheim construe it.
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wrong (or wrong-making), bul not always.
7
So wc cannot deduce that an act is wrong
from the fact that it involves lying. Usually, an act is right if it brings about the best
consequences, but not always.
K
So we cannot deduce that an act is right from the fact
that it leads to the best consequences.
The absence of exceptionless generalizations that can be used in deductive
explanations is not unique to ethics. In the special sciences—e.g., in biology,
psychology, economics, and history—scientists have yet to find and formulate
exceptionless laws. And since exceptionless laws are not currently available in these
disciplines, it follows that if scientists provide any adequate explanations in these fields
at all, their explanations conform to an alternative, non-deductivc. model of
explanation.
Interestingly, Hempel and Oppcnheim were well aware of this problem, and
they claim that (most) explanations in the special sciences are, in fact, incomplete. As
an example of an explanation in the special sciences they present one popular
explanation of the severe price drop at the US cotton exchanges in the fall of 1946. The
price drop, according to this explanation, was due to the fact that a large-scale
speculator began to liquidate his stocks, which was soon followed by many panicked
liquidations by smaller speculators. According to Hempel and Oppcnheim, even though
For example, lying is not wrong (or even wrong-making) when playing a game in
which lying is the point of the game (e.g.. Diplomacy or Contraband). Other examples
of lies that are, arguably, not wrong (or wrong-making): lying to a Nazi concentration
camp guard: lying to a dying patient (e.g., “everything is going to be all right"); Lying
to a person about their appearance (e.g., just before going on stage to give an important
lecture, your spouse asks you how she looks; it is probably not wrong to tell her that she
looks great even if she, in fact, doesn't—i.e., even if she looks nervous or pale etc.)
s
For example, the “organ harvest” scenario: it is wrong to kill an innocent passer-by
(without her consent) in order to harvest her organs and to transplant them into five
other patients who would otherwise die.
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general regularities are not explicitly mentioned in this explanation, some general
regularities are “referred to” or “implied” by it. For instance, this explanation, they
claim, implies "some form of the law of supply and demand.” and it relies on
“regularities in the behavior of individuals who arc trying to preserve or improve their
economic position.” (141 ) These laws, they admit, “cannot be formulated at present
with satisfactory precision and generality.” And consequently, "the suggested
explanation is surely incomplete, but its intention is unmistakably to account for the
phenomenon by integrating it into a general pattern of economic and socio-
psychological regularities.” ( 141
)
There are several difficulties witli this analysis. First, the fact (if it is a fact) that
the proposed explanation “refers to,” “implies,” or "relies on,” several generalities, does
not mean that these regularities are a part of the explanation. For example, factual
claims “rely on” some evidence. But the evidence for the truth of the explanans need
not be part of the explanation, even though the explanation "relies on” these facts.
Similarly, the explanans may imply all kinds of statements that are not relevant to the
explanation in hand. For example, any explanans trivially implies all tautologies, but
these tautologies are not part of the explanation. Also, a generalization of the form ( I
)
All Fs are Gs implies that (2) if a is F then a is G , but claim (2) may be irrelevant to an
explanation if the explanandum is that (3) b is G. So although (2) is implied by ( 1 ) it is
not a part of the explanation of (3). Similarly, even if the explanation in question
“implies” the law of supply and demand, and "relies on” some psychological
regularities, these regularities need not be a part of the explanation.
}
For a similar criticism of Hempel and Oppenheim see Scriven ( 1962)
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Second, pace Hempcl and Oppenheim, it is not “unmistakably” clear that the
intention of this explanation is to subsume the particular event under an exceptionless
generalization. As they point out, the proposed explanation does not explicitly mention
any generalizations. What evidence is there, then, for the claim that the author of the
explanation intended to subsume the event in question under any generalization, not to
mention the particular generalizations that Hempcl and Oppenheim specify? Isn’t it
possible that the intention is to explain the event in question by citing several events
that are relevant to its occurrence, but that do not necessitate its occurrence?
Finally, since the relevant laws and regularities “cannot be formulated at present
with satisfactory precision and generality,” this explanation fails to satisfy the
conditions of adequacy that Hempcl and Oppenheim identify—the explanans does not
imply the explanandum. So why is this proposed explanation an “incomplete
explanation” rather than simply a failed explanation. Indeed, how is it an “explanation”
at all? ° Perhaps the thought is that this “incomplete explanation” is an explanation
because it approximates the “real explanation” of the phenomenon in question. In an
earlier paper Hempcl introduced the notion of explanation sketches; an explanation
sketch is not a full-fledged explanation, but presumably it could be turned into one:
What the explanatory analyses of historical events offer is. ..in most
cases not an explanation in one of the meanings developed above, but
something that might be called an explanation sketch. Such a sketch
consists of a more or less vague indication of the laws and initial
conditions considered as relevant, and it needs "filling out" in order to
turn into a full-fledged explanation. This filling-out requires further
empirical research, for which the sketch suggests the direction.
(Explanation sketches are common also outside of history; many
10
See Scriven ( 1962)—esp. section 4.2—for a critique of Hempcl and Oppenheim's
notion of “complete explanation.”
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explanations in psychoanalysis, for instance, illustrate this point.)
( 1942 :42 )
Hempel and Oppenheim assume that although explanations in the special
sciences are incomplete, they give us some indication as to how they are to he “filled
out,” or supplemented so as to form complete explanations. In the aforementioned
example, for instance, the proposed explanation indicates that we need to find an
exceptionless formulation of the law of supply and demand, and one or more
exceptionless regularities regarding human psychology and motivation in order to
obtain a full-fledged explanation.
But a few problems remain. First it is still unclear how explanation sketches
explain anything. Since we cannot deduce the explanandum from the explanans in an
explanation sketch, then either explanation sketches do not explain, or deduction is not
required for explanation. Even if explanation sketches indicate to us what we need to do
in order to find a full-fledged explanation, they cannot explain at all if Hempel and
Oppenheim are right about the deductive nature of genuine explanation.
A related problem is that at present, it is an open question whether there are any
strict laws, or exceptionless (explanatory) generalizations, in the special sciences. For
example, it is an open question whether we can find and formulate a non-trivial (i.c.,
explanatory) exceptionless version of the law of supply and demand, not to mention
(strict) psychological laws, or (strict) historical laws. If it turns out that there are no
(strict) laws in the special sciences, then it will follow, on Hempel and Oppenhcim's
account, that these sciences provide no explanations at all—not even explanation
sketches. Another way to put this point is this: it may turn out that what we thought
were explanation sketches were not explanations at all, because the vague laws these
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explanations consist of cannot he filled out and turned into strict laws. This, to
paraphrase Hempel, “does not appear to accord with sound common usage,” which
directs us to say that regardless of whether the law of supply and demand, for instance,
could he “filled out” in order to avoid all possible exceptions, it does explain various
economic phenomena.
Finally, it is not clear that explanation sketches always, or even often, suggest a
direction for “filling out” the explanation sketch in order to fit the Hempel-Oppenheim
schema. Consider, for instance, the following explanation for why Germany declared
war on Russia in August 1914.
Archduke Ferdinand, heir to the Austro-Hungarian throne, was
assassinated in Sarajevo hy a Bosnian Serb on June 28, 1914. Asa
result. Emperor Franz Joseph of Austria-Hungary declared war on
Serbia. Russia, as an ally of Serbia, declared war on Austria, which was
followed by Germany declaring war on Russia on August 1, 1914.
Surely there is a lot more one could say here as part of the explanation of the
German declaration of war on Russia. One could elaborate on the socio-political
situation in Europe, including the various agreements and power struggles between
nations, and in this respect we could think of our proposed explanation as an
“explanation sketch.” However, it certainly doesn’t look like the intention of this
explanation is to subsume the event in question under an exceptionless law. It is not
clear that this sketch “implies,” “refers to,” or “relies on” any exceptionless regularity,
and this “sketch” doesn't seem to suggest any particular way for filling it out in such a
way that it would fit the Hempel-Oppenheim explanation schema.
As we have seen, for Hempel and Oppenheim explanation sketches are defective
explanations—an explanation sketch is merely a placeholder for the “real” explanation
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that we ought to look for, and it is only explanatory to the extent that it indicates to us
how to obtain the “real" explanation. As Weingartner ( 1961 ) notes: “Hempel's article
must be construed not as an argument in support of the thesis that historical explanation
has a certain pattern, but rather as a claim that the explanations offered in history are in
certain ways and in varying degrees inadequate. Fullfledged explanations always have
the same structure, whether they occur in science or history.” (32) Roughly, Hempel’s
line of thought is this: we have made a philosophical discovery regarding the form of
proper explanation; explanations in the special sciences do not exemplify this form, and
therefore, they arc defective.
Other philosophers take it different approach.
1
1
Many explanations in the special
sciences, they claim, are perfectly adequate. But Hempel and Oppenheim’s theory of
explanation tells us that these explanations are defective. Therefore, Hempel and
Oppenheim’s account is false. Indeed, since most, if not all, of the explanations given in
the special science (as well as many of the explanations given in the hard sciences
—
l
0
including Hempel and Oppenheim’s examples) ~ do not exemplily the model ol
explanation that Hempel and Oppenheim develop, we may doubt whether Hempel and
Oppenheim have given us an account of the most important or interesting sense of
‘explanation.’ William Dray, one of the main opponents of the Hempelian model,
writes:
There is, in fact, some reason for thinking that what the covering law
theory gives us is the criterion of a technical sense of ‘explanation’
found only in narrowly scientific discourse, perhaps only among certain
philosophers of science... Hempel’s formulation begins by laying down
11
Sec, for example. Dray (1954, 1957) and Seri veil (1959a, 1959b, 1962)
Cartwright (1983) argues that there arc no strict explanatory laws in physics. If she is
right, then Hempel’s model doesn’t even apply in the hard sciences.
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the logical structure of explanation as he believes he finds it in physics;
he then goes on to show that historical cases approximate to this in
varying degrees. There is no apology for the direction of the analysis
from physics, where the logical outline is boldly displayed, to other
fields, where traces of the model have to be found by dint of careful
reconstruction... “Explanation', as covering law theorists use it, is a
technical term. ..But if scientists, for their own legitimate purposes,
redefine “explain
-
so that it means roughly what covering law theorists
say it does, then we are quite justified in advertising our awareness of
what has been done by saying that, in fact, scientists do not seem to be
much interested in explanation; they care only for ‘explanation’ (as
technically defined). (1957:76-78)
Hempel does not deny that the logical structure he identifies is not usually
displayed in the practice of giving explanations in the special sciences, and indeed, in
the hard sciences. However, for Hempel. once we have identified the logical structure of
explanation, we can use this knowledge to evaluate proposed explanations, and to
criticize explanations that fail to conform to this model. Weingartner explains the
Hcmpclian philosophic methodology as follows: ‘“|T|he starting point of philosophic
reflection is an insight into what an explanation is; all that follows constitutes a
reconstruction and elaboration of that insight in terms of a philosophic position that
does not directly depend upon an understanding of the particular thing (historical
explanation) being examined, but is grounded in philosophic considerations of a much
broader sort.” ( 1 96 1 :36-7)
Dray, by contrast, seems to think that we should take the practice of scientists
—
including scientists in the special sciences—more seriously. Scientists, at least
sometimes, give what they and most of us take to be adequate explanations. But since
scientists rarely, if ever, give explanations in a deductive form, and moreover, since in
many cases we cannot restate their explanations in a deductive form, then it follows that
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Hempel’s account is not an account of ‘scientific explanation’ as the phrase is
commonly used.
This disagreement between Hempel and Dray concerns a profound dispute about
philosophical methodology. At one extreme we find the view that philosophy is in the
business of discovering a priori analyses, and therefore, considerations of actual
applications of concepts have little, or no bearing on philosophical results. On the other
extreme, we find the view that philosophers should only record, organize, and classify
actual uses of various concepts; that we have no access to the meaning of a concept
independent of the way this concept is used in natural language. Obviously, there arc
various “in between” views and it is beyond the scope of my project here to try to
resolve this fundamental debate about the nature and goals of philosophical theorizing.
Nevertheless, in this particular case it seems to me that Hcmpel’s position is especially
suspect, because Hempcl's view not only entails that most, if not all, explanations in the
special sciences are not genuine explanations, it may also lead to the result that
explanations in physics—those explanations which Hempel considered as paradigmatic
instances of successful explanations—arc also not genuine explanations. As Scriven
points out:
The most striking demonstration that |even| explanations in physics are
not natural subjects for the deductive model is afforded by the failure of
Hempel, on his own admission, to produce a single example that meets
the conditions. Certainly he gives a perfectly good example of a physical
explanation... but he does not succeed in formulating it is such a way
that the required conclusion is entailed by it. (I959b:459)
If, in fact, Hempcl’s view entails that very lew "explanations” are genuine
explanations, then we may reasonably conclude that the notion of explanation that
Hempel analyzed is not the only notion of explanation that we are interested in, and that
93
there is some other, non-deductive, sense of ‘explanation' that we actually employ in
scientific discourse.
Interestingly, later on Hempel recognized that a deductive model of explanation
is not the only model of explanation employed in the sciences. In his ‘Aspects of
Scientific Explanation'
13
Hempel developed his inductive-statistical model of
explanation (IS model) in order to account for explanations based on statistical laws.
The explanandum of an IS-explanation cannot be deduced from its explanans; all that
can be deduced is that the explanandum is more or less likely to occur. For example, if
some law entails that a certain coin is 90% likely to land heads if tossed, we cannot use
this law to deduce that this coin would land heads when tossed. Nevertheless, we can
explain the event of this coin landing heads by citing the fact that the coin was tossed,
and that given the relevant law it was 90% likely to land heads. For Hempel, an IS-
explanation is successful to the extent that the explanans confers high probability on the
explanandum.
For our purposes here, we need not discuss the difficulties for Hempel’s IS-
14
model, and the various refinements of statistical explanations offered in the literature.
The important point is that Hempel, like many other philosophers, recognized that not
all explanations are deductive. And by recognizing this, Hempel seems to step closer
towards Dray's preferred philosophical methodology. After all Hempel could have
insisted that by a priori insight we discovered that explanations are essentially
deductive, and since statistical explanations are not deductive, they are defective.
Indeed, Roger Crisp seems to endorse this line of reasoning:
13 Hempel (1965)
14
For a discussion of these issues see, for example, Salmon ( 1989)
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At the quantum level, we might have some set of initial conditions s
which issues in outcome a. But we cannot strictly claim that .v causes o,
because we know that some identical set of initial conditions s* might
issue in an outcome p which is non-identical with o. What we have here
is a case of genuine indeterminism, which is to that extent inexplicable :
...
,
\ 5
it just happens that way.
But Hempcl, instead, admits that statistical explanations are possible. And
indeed, it seems implausible, pace Crisp, to deny that the statistical laws of quantum
mechanics are explanatory. But similarly, it seem equally unreasonable to deny that the
“laws” of psychology are explanatory, even if it turns out that they cannot be turned into
strict laws. So it is hard to see what reasons one could have for thinking that statistical
explanation is the only admissible form of non-deductive explanation.
In this section I have argued that there are various difficulties for Hempel's
deductive model of explanation. Even if Hempel’s account captures the logic of
explanation in the physical sciences—which is far from obvious— it seem quite clear
that it fails to capture the structure of explanation in the special sciences. Moreover,
since we have not been given any argument for the claim that explanations are
essentially deductive, and given Hempel's own admission that some explanations are
not deductive, we have good reason to explore alternative non-deductive models of
explanation.
^ Crisp (2007) p. 47 (my italics). Crisp seems to have an extremely restrictive notion of
causation, and consequently, an implausibly restrictive notion of explanation. I suspect
that Crisp’s endorsement of these unreasonable commitments prevents him from
recognizing the viability of the particularist research program: “If some feature that is
claimed to be an ultimate reason for action in one case fails as a reason in some other
case, then either the two features must be allowed to differ or we have followed the
white rabbit into a world where anything can happen. Normative principles, that is to
say, are like typical natural laws. Each system helps us to understand— in one case, why
something happened; in the other, why someone should do something. Unexplained
exceptions can only hinder our understanding, and spur us on to avoid them through
further specification.” (47)
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3.4 Ceteris Paribus Explanation
As I mentioned in the previous section, for Hempel and Oppenhcim strict laws
are essential for adequate explanations, since without strict laws we cannot deduce the
cxplanandum from the explanans. There are several competing views on the nature of
laws, hut one thing they all agree on is that a strict law is (at least) a universally
quantified conditional statement that asserts that whenever certain conditions obtain,
other conditions obtain as well. Schematically, we can represent strict laws as follows:
‘all Fs are Gs\ If we find one instance of (F & ~G), then ‘all Fs are Gs' is false—i.e.,
“all Fs arc GV is not a strict law. 1(1
Several philosophers, however, have noted that strict laws arc hard to come
by
—
particularly in the special sciences. Pietroski and Rey, for example, write: “it
seems that special sciences do not—and, indeed, probably could not—state genuinely
exceptionless generalizations.” ( 1995:83) Our current best “laws” in the special
sciences are not immune to counterexamples unless we qualify these laws with ‘ ceteris
paribus' (i.e., ‘all thing being equal’) clauses. As Lipton observes “Most laws are
ceteris paribus laws. If we are being punctilious, what we say is not ’All Fs arc G', but
only 'All Fs are G, all else being equal'.” ( 1999: 1 55) Similarly, Silverberg claims that
“If there are any psychological laws, they would be ceteris paribus laws. Between the
occurrence of any sort of psychological going-on and any subsequent sort of event,
intervening disruptive factors can intrude. Between time / 1 and later time t2 a
lfl Of course this is not a sufficient condition for law hood, but only a necessary
condition. We need to distinguish between laws and accidental generalizations that can
be expressed as true universal conditionals.
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psychological system might go mad, or die. or the universe might disappear." (201 ) And
likewise. Morreau maintains that
hedged laws are the only ones we can hope to find. Laws are commonly
supposed to be truths, but interesting generalizations, without some
modifier such as ‘ceteris paribus', are by and large false. This is so in
ethics, in history, and in non-basic sciences: economics, biology,
psychology, and the rest. There are reasons to think it so in basic
sciences like physics, too. ( 1999: 1 63)
1
7
Barring the dispute about the availability ol strict laws in the physical science,
it is clear that we have not yet found strict laws in many of the special sciences, and that
at present we have to settle for hedged generalizations or ceteris paribus generalizations
in those fields. Moreover, some philosophers have argued that the special sciences are
incapable of establishing strict laws.
18
Following Pietroski and Rey and others, I will lake as data for any theory of
explanation that special sciences like biology, psychology, economics, and history
1
9
sometimes provide good explanations even when strict laws are unavailable. This
means that explanation can proceed without strict laws. Nevertheless, one might insist,
with Flempel and Oppcnhcim, that explanation requires subsumption under law.
Woodward (2002) succinctly summarizes this line of thought as follows:
Many philosophers hold the following set of beliefs. (
I ) A genuine
science must contain “laws". (2) Whatever else a law is, it must at least
describe an exceptionless regularity. In particular all laws have the “All
As are Bs" form of ... universally quantified conditionals in which the
condition in the antecedent of the law is “nomieally sufficient” for the
condition in its consequent. (3) Laws are required for successful
explanation and to ground or support causal claims. Even if the DN
17
For more on this debate see, or example, Cartwright (1983. 1989). Pietroski and Rey
(1995), and Earman, Roberts, and Smith (2002)
I 8
Sec, for example, Earman and Roberts ( 1999)
1 ’
See, for example, Fodor ( 1991), Pietroski and Rey ( 1995), Woodward (2002), and
Earman, Roberts, and Smith (2002)
97
model of explanation didn't quite gel the details right, explanation is at
bottom a matter of providing nomically sufficient conditions for an
explanandum and this requires generalizations that are laws. (4) Putting
aside generalizations that are explicitly probabilistic in form, if a
generalization is to be testable at all (if it is to have empirical content
rather than being vacuous), it must take the | universally quantified
conditional! form ... If it does not, we cannot use the generalization to
°()
make determinate predictions. (303)“
As Woodward sees it, it is the acceptance of claims ( 1 )-(4) that leads
philosophers to believe that there are genuine ceteris paribus laws; if one accepts ( 1 )-
(4), then the special sciences must find and formulate laws not only for explanation, but
also in order to vindicate their status as genuine sciences. But since we cannot find strict
laws in the special sciences, then perhaps we can make do with ceteris paribus laws
instead. Ceteris paribus generalizations are defeasible, and they can survive exceptions.
Unlike a strict law, the statement 'ceteris paribus, all Fs are GV is not refuted by one
instance of (F&-G).
Two questions arise: ( I ) Can ceteris paribus generalizations qualify as genuine
laws? That is, can genuine laws have exceptions? And (2) Even if there are genuine
ceteris paribus laws, can these laws explain anything? Let us address these questions in
turn.
The two main worries concerning the existence of genuine ceteris paribus laws
are these: ( 1 ) Wc do not have an informative account of the truth conditions for ceteris
paribus law statements, and consequently, some have argued that a ceteris paribus
20
See, also, Schiffer (1991 ): “Some philosophers believe that there are ceteris paribus
laws and that without them there would be no special-science explanations, and hence
no special sciences. These philosophers think that science is in the business of providing
scientific explanations, that such explanations require laws, and that there are no, or
only very few, strict special-science laws; whence their appeal to ceteris paribus laws."
( 1 )
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luw—c.g., 'ceteris paribus, all Fs arc Gs’—asserts nothing more than the vacuous
T
1
tautology 'All Fs are Gs, except when they are not.' (2) Ceteris paribus laws make no
predictions. The law 'ceteris paribus, all Fs are Gs’, combined with the information that
x is /'’(and together with any combination of auxiliary hypotheses), does not entail that
x is G (or even that with probably p, x is G).
To the best of my knowledge no one has yet offered an account of truth
conditions for ceteris paribus law statements. However, several philosophers have
proposed sufficient condition for the non-vacuity of ceteris paribus laws. For example,
Pietroski and Rey suggest that 'ceteris paribus, all Fs are Gs' is non vacuous if
(roughly) whenever x is F, but x is not G, then there is an independently explanatory
interfering factor at work; that is, there is a factor H that explains why x is not G, and H
11
also explains something other than the fact that x is not G.~~
This proposal is not without difficulties. Several philosophers have argued that it
is too permissive—that is, too many statements qualify as ceteris paribus laws on this
23
account. However, even il it is too permissive, it nevertheless shows that ceteris
21
See, for example, Schiffer ( 1991 ), Earman, Roberts, and Smith (2002), and
Woodward (2002).
22
Sec Pietroski and Rey (1995). See also Fodor ( 1991 ), and Silverberg ( 1996).
See, for example, Woodward (2002) and Ecarman, Roberts, and Smith (2002).
Woodward and Ecarman, Roberst, and Smith, claim that too many statements will
qualify as ceteris paribus laws on Pietroski and Rey’s account. For example, Earman,
Roberts, and Smith write: “Many substances that are safe for human consumption are
white; for every substance that is while and is not safe for human consumption, there
presumably exists some explanation of its dangerousness (c.g., in terms of its chemical
structure and the way il interacts with the human nervous system); these explanations
are not ad hoc, but can be supported by a variety of kinds of evidence; but none of this
constitutes evidence for the hypothesis that il is a law that CP, white substances are safe
for human consumption.” (294) Similarly, Woodward claims that Fodor’ s account and
Pietroski and Rcy's account are “far too permissive. On both proposals, the
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paribus statements are not vacuous—not any general statement qualifies as a ceteris
>4
paribus law.' Moreover, even if this proposal cannot he refined and improved on, the
problem ol the absence of truth conditions for ceteris paribus law-statements may not
be so critical. As Earman, Roberts, and Smith explain:
This point |i.e., the absence of an informative account of the truth-
conditions of ceteris paribus law-statements) is not fatal to CP laws,
however. Perhaps it is unreasonable to demand truth conditions for CP
law-statements. This could be because the concept of a CP law is a
primitive concept, which is meaningful even though it cannot be defined
in more basic terms. Or it could be because an assertabi I ity semantics or
conceptual-role semantics, rather than a truthconditional semantics, is
appropriate for CP law-statements. Furthermore, one might well deny
that it is necessary to have an acceptable philosophical account of the
semantics for a given type of statement before granting that that type of
statement plays an important role in science. And it is hard to deny that
there are examples of statements qualified by CP clauses that seem to be
25
perfectly meaningful."' (293)
However, the second worry—that ceteris paribus laws make no predictions— is,
according to Earman, Roberts, and Smith, conclusive. Since ceteris paribus laws make
no predictions, they are untestable, and since they are untestable, they cannot partake in
scientific theorizing.
But surely one could deny that ceteris paribus laws make no predictions. For
instance, the law "ceteris paribus, all Fs are (7s* predicts that if.v is F. and cetera are
generalization “All charged objects accelerate at 10 m/sA2” qualifies a ceteris paribus
law.” (310)
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Schurz (2001 ) criticizes Pictroski and Rey’s account and he proposes an alternative
account of ceteris paribus laws. Nevertheless, he admits that on Pietroski and Rey's
account ceteris paribus laws are not vacuous, but only almost vacuous.
Silverberg ( 1996) observes that the consequences of denying that ceteris paribus
clauses are meaningful are unacceptable: "ceteris paribus conditions are unexceptional
instances of a very common, and needed, phenomenon in our concepts and assertions,
and hence | the | claim that cp conditions are semantically objectionable is a suggestion
of unacceptably destructive import.” (211) This is because most conditionals we assert
are defeasible.
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paria
,
then a will he G. The problem, of course, is that we cannot specify the conditions
under which cetera are paria , or in other words, that we cannot provide informative
2(>
truth conditions for the statement 'cetera are paria'. But this doesn't seem to be a
different worry than the first—namely, that we cannot provide truth conditions for
ceteris paribus statements. So it seems that if the first problem is not insurmountable
—
that is, if we are willing to accept the idea that ceteris paribus statements arc
meaningful even though we do not have an acceptable philosophical account of the
semantics for these types of statements—then the second problem should be
surmountable as well.
Furthermore, why should we think that predictions are deductive in the first
place? Certainly we cannot deductively predict that a particular F is G from the law
'ceteris paribus, all Fs are Gs’; that is. we cannot predict this with certainty. But we
make non-deductive predictions all the time: we predict the weather; we predict the
outcome of elections and sporting events; we make predictions about the stock market
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Lange (2002) contends that judgment is required in the application of strict laws in
specific cases in much the same way that it is required for the application of ceteris
paribus laws. Even if it were possible to replace the 'ceteris paribus' clause with a fully
explicit list of conditions, the application of the “fully explicit" law “derives its
content... by virtue of our implicit background understanding of what would count as
compelling reasons for (or against) the correctness of applying it to a given case.” (409)
Once we realize this, we see that there is no special problem regarding truth conditions
for, or predictions with, ceteris paribus statements. As Lange explains, the content of
the “law of definite proportion” stated as a ceteris paribus law— i.c.. Any chemical
compound consists of elements in unvarying proportions by mass, ceteris paribus— is
no more vague than a statement of this law without a ceteris paribus quantifier (if such
a statement were possible)—e.g.. Any chemical compound consists of elements in
unvarying proportions by mass unless the compound is a network solid or a polymer.
The content of 'network solid’ in the second formulation is no less vague than the
content of the ceteris paribus clause in the first. This, according to Lange, shows that
“law need not be associated straightforwardly with a regularity. It may be associated
only with an inference rule that is 'reliable' - i.e., that leads to conclusions close enough
to the truth for the intended purposes.” (411)
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and the economy, and so forth. In all these cases our predictions are not deductive, and
the claim that our predictions might he false doesn't undermine their status as genuine
predictions, nor does it prevent us from evaluating them as a good/bad or better/worse
predictions. Our grounds for making such prediction, as well as our justification for
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these predictions may well rest on various ceteris paribus generalizations. This
observation indicates that requiring that all predictions arc deductive—that is, that
predictions must rely on strict laws, and must guarantee the occurrence of the event
predicted— is not a constraint issued by the nature of the concept ‘prediction’.
Finally, even if Earman, Roberts, and Smith are correct in saying that ceteris
paribus laws are inadmissible entities for scientific theorizing because such laws make
no predictions and as a result they are untestable, we may still think that ceteris paribus
laws are admissible in ethics. Ethical “laws”—strict generalizations as well as ceteris
paribus generalizations—are not “testable” in any straightforward way. So if our only
reason to object to ceteris paribus laws in the sciences is that unlike strict laws, ceteris
paribus laws are untestable, then either we must object to all “laws” in ethics, or we
may as well allow ceteris paribus moral laws in our ethical theorizing as well. In other
words, considerations of testability do not differentiate between strict laws and ceteris
paribus laws in ethics.
It is worth mentioning here one account of ceteris paribus laws due to Peter
Lipton ( 1999).“
8
According to Lipton ceteris paribus laws are genuine laws. However
2
I am grateful to Gary Matthews for pointing this out to me.
This is not the only available account of ceteris paribus laws. One alternative
account, due to Marc Lange, is based on a pragmatist account of lawhood. Lange argues
that in order to see that ceteris paribus generalization are genuine laws, we should
identify the distinctive role laws play in scientific theorizing, and recognize that ceteris
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these laws need not identify exceptionless generalizations. Instead ceteris paribus laws
“draw our attention to the stable dispositions and forces that underlie the I lux ol
behaviour.” (163) For example, “to say that glass breaks when dropped, ceteris paribus ,
is to say that glass is fragile and that this feature is not readily lost.” ( 163) The crucial
point is that ceteris paribus laws “refer to stable dispositions that may be widely present
even if only rarely directly manifested.” ( 163-4)
According to Lipton, dispositions can help us make sense of ceteris paribus
laws because, unlike properties which an object either has or lacks, dispositions are
subject to a tripartite distinction: “displaying, presenl-but-not-displaying, or absent."
(163) Roughly, Upton’s proposal is that ceteris paribus laws are true if they truly
attribute a disposition to a kind. Nevertheless, they have exceptions because a thing
could fail to manifest a disposition that it has. So, for example, 'ceteris paribus matches
light when struck’, attributes the disposition to light when struck to individuals of the
kind ‘match’. In oxygen free environment, for example, a match would not light when
struck, even though it has the disposition to light when struck. So the ceteris paribus
law is true, even though there are cases in which the disposition will not be exemplified.
In contrast, 'ceteris paribus, toothpicks light when struck' is false, because toothpicks
do not have the disposition to light when struck, even if there were some situations in
which toothpicks would light if struck.
paribus generalizations play the same role. See Lange (2000, 2003). For an application
of this model to explanation in ethics sec Lance and Little (2007). Silverberg ( 1996)
makes a similar point regarding ceteris paribus generalizations: "Ceteris paribus laws
are laws which, if the qualifying condition expressed in their ceteris paribus clauses
were removed, could have counterexamples, and hence would require the qualification
of their universality that ceteris paribus clauses express. Despite this need for
qualification, the qualified principles are laws, since they retain considerable generality
or scope, and possess considerable predictive and/or explanatory value.” (201
)
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According to Lipton, the dispositional approach to ceteris paribus laws solves
the vacuity problem for ceteris paribus law-statements, and it provides a way to
distinguish between this semantic problem and the predictive problem discussed above:
We don't know when all things are equal, but the whole point of the
dispositional view is in a sense that we do not need to know, since the
disposition is present regardless. Of course some idea of when all things
arc equal (or equal enough) might be essential to applying the law to
predict the manifestation of the underlying disposition, but the basic
dispositional attribution seems safe. (166)
If, as seems plausible, there are acceptable ways to test attributions of
dispositions to kinds, then ceteris paribus law-statements may well be admissible in
29
scientific theorizing.
Now let's suppose that there are genuine ceteris paribus laws. Can such laws
explain anything? For example, can we explain the fact that (3) a is 6’, by noting that
( I ) a is /', and that (2) ‘ceteris paribus, all Fs are Gs'? Surely, we cannot deduce (3)
from (1 ) and (2). However, I have argued that the deductive model of explanation is
unmotivated, and indeed, I have claimed that once we allow for statistical explanation,
we have already given up on a purely deductive model of explanation anyway. Now
once we give up on a purely deductive model of explanation we can sec that (deductive)
prediction and explanation may come apart;'"
0
although we cannot deductively predict
(3) from ( 1 ) and (2), we may still be able to explain (3) in terms of ( 1 ) and (2). One
reason why (deductive) prediction and explanation can come apart is, as Scriven
2t>
For more on dispositionalism—the view that dispositions, rather than laws are the
fundamental units of explanation—see Cartwright ( 1989, 1983) and Mumford (1998).
For an application of this view to ethics see Robinson (2006) (Note, however, that my
understanding of the disagreement between particularists and generalists is very
different from Robinson's).
0
As we have seen above, one need not accept the claim that predictions are deductive.
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observes, that “we have more data for explaining than we did for predicting."
( 1 959b:469)
3
1
To illustrate this point, let us consider one of Hempel's examples:
If a particular revolution is explained by reference to the growing
discontent, on the part of a large part of the population, with certain
prevailing conditions, it is clear that a general regularity is assumed in
th is explanation, but wc are hardly in a position to state just what extent
and what specific form the discontent has to assume, and what the
environmental conditions have to be, to bring about a revolution.
(1942:41)
Recall that according to Hempel, since we are not in a position to identify
exceptionless generalizations that connect population discontent and the occurrence of
revolutions, an explanation of a particular revolution in those terms would be, at best,
an explanation sketch; and as we have seen in the previous section, it is not clear how
an explanation sketch (for Hempel) could be explanatory at all.
Alternatively, suppose we could find and formulate a ceteris paribus law
relating population discontent and the occurrences of revolutions; perhaps we could
formulate a ceteris paribus law that looked something like this:
(CPR) Ceteris paribus, if a sufficiently large part of the population of a
particular nation is sufficiently discontent with its current regime,
32
then a revolution occurs.
Surely, we cannot use (CPR) to (deductively) predict the occurrence of a
revolution in any particular nation with certainty.
33
Even if we knew that 80% of the
Sec Scriven ( 1959a) for an argument that shows that explanation and prediction can
come apart based on a discussion of the explanatory power of evolutionary theory. See
also MacIntyre (1981 ) Ch. 8.
I do not contend that (CPR) is a genuine ceteris paribus law—indeed, as stated, it
probably isn't. I only use (CPR) for illustrative purposes, and for the sake of the
example, I will assume that it is a genuine ceteris paribus law.
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population of nation N arc discontent with their current regime, we do not know
whether 80% is a “sufficiently large part of the population” or whether these 80% are
“sufficiently discontent", and, of course, we do not know whether cetera are paria. So it
is clearly impossible to (deductively) predict with certainly the occurrence of a
revolution based on (CPR) and statements of initial conditions. Nevertheless, suppose
we know that a revolution has occurred in nation N, and we now want to explain this
occurrence. If we know that a large portion of the population of nation N were
discontent, then this fact, together with (CPR) is at least a candidate explanation. And if
we cannot find an alternative (plausible) explanation of the occurrence of the
revolution, then we may well accept this candidate explanation as an adequate
explanation of the revolution, even though its explanans does not logically imply the
explanandum/4
3.5 Explanation without Laws
The claim that there arc genuine ceteris paribus laws is highly contentious.
Indeed, according to some theories of laws, it is impossible for laws to have exceptions,
and consequently, the notion of a ‘defeasible law' ora ‘ceteris paribus law' is, on these
‘ As noted above, we may predict that a revolution will occur in nation N . and we may
justify our prediction by appealing to (CPR) without using (CPR) to deduce that a
revolution will occur.
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This is a simplified version of a kind of explanation that Scriven ( 1959b) calls
‘selection explanations’, “What we have is a range of formally possible
explanations... and on the basis of the facts of the case, we select one of the antecedents
as the explanation. It is the particular fact, not the general proposition or the derivation,
which provides the explanation in such cases. ..The point of the explanation is to locate
the relevant causal antecedent, not to prove that it is a possible one.” (462)
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theories, simply an incoherent notion.
5 Now if we were correct in assuming that special
sciences like biology, psychology, economics, and history sometimes provide good
explanations even when strict laws arc unavailable, then those who deny that ceteris
paribus law statements refer to genuine laws, must conclude that laws are not required
for explanation—that is, that an explanation could be perfectly adequate without
appealing to any genuine laws at all.
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In this section I will briefly describe a few
models of explanation without laws.
The first account is due to James Woodward. Woodward (2002) claims that
there is no such thing as ceteris paribus laws. Instead he argues that “It is. ..false that
successful explanation requires laws and false that the provision of a nomically
sufficient condition for an explanandum is either necessary or sufficient for explaining
it.” (304) Nevertheless, he believes that ceteris paribus generalizations can play a role
in scientific explanation. “While I reject the idea that the generalizations found in the
^ For example, Armstrong’s view, according to which laws are grounded in identities
between universals, seems to preclude the possibility of laws that have exceptions. See
Lance and Little (2007)
Schiller ( 1991 ) writes: “When / read biology, 1 have a hard time finding anything that
looks like a law-invoking explanation, and 1 think I know why. Suppose you just
invented the spring-activated mousetrap and had to explain how it worked. You would
explain that, when the deviee works, it's because the mouse nibbles at cheese placed on
a release mechanism; the movement caused by the nibbling releases a bar attached to a
stretched spring; etc. But you wouldn't mention any laws. Maybe if you went on in an
explanatory chain long enough, you'd get to laws; but they'd be laws of physics, not
laws of mousetrap theory. In the same way, much of biology is concerned to explain
how various mechanisms work—think of the explanation of photosynthesis—and such
explanations seem not to invoke any biological laws, strict or ceteris paribus... since
[cognitive psychology, too, is concerned with
|
explaining how mechanisms work,
there's no obvious reason such explanations should need laws, strict or ceteris paribus."
(16) Schiller docs not explicitly say whether he thinks that “complete” explanations in
biology and cognitive psychology must mention the physical laws that ground the
operation of the mechanisms they explain. His last remark, however—that there is no
obvious reason such explanation should need laws—suggests that he believes that
explanations are perfectly adequate without mention of any laws.
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special sciences are ceteris paribus laws," he writes, “1 fully agree that many of those
generalizations are “scientifically legitimate", that they are testable and in fact strongly
supported by evidence, and that they describe causal relationships and figure in
explanations.” (306)
Woodward claims that there are no good analyses of the meaning of ceteris
paribus claims, and that there are no good reasons for thinking that there are ceteris
paribus laws in the first place. He points out that the locution 'ceteris paribus' is rarely
used in the special sciences, and consequently, it is not clear what the standard of
success for analyses of ceteris paribus laws would be. Moreover, Woodward observes
that philosophers use ceteris paribus clauses to qualify laws in various different ways,
and he argues that there is no reason to think that a single analysis of ‘ceteris paribus
law' could capture all these different instances of laws qualified by a ceteris paribus
clauses.
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Woodward’s proposal, then, is that exception-full generalizations, though not
laws, can be used in explanation. To demonstrate this. Woodward considers the
following example:
(E) Administration A (where this consists | of | administration of drugs D
according to protocol P) to human beings with tumors of type T
causes recovery R (where recovery is understood to mean that the
tumors of type T disappear and remain absent for some specified
period - e.g., five years). (307)
Woodward contends that for some values of A. T, and R. (E) is true, and
strongly supported by evidence. After considering and rejecting various reformulations
" For a classification of various distinct kinds of ceteris paribus laws see Morreau
(1999) and Schurz (2002).
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of (E) as a ceteris paribus law (for reasons similar to those discussed in the previous
section). Woodward proposes an alternative account of the explanatory value of (E).
Woodward notes that we can test claims like (E) by performing randomized
tests. Patients with tumors of type T can be randomly divided in to two groups. One
group receives treatment A, and the other receives no treatment. If our sample is large
enough, then the randomization guarantees that factors besides A that may affect
recovery are roughly evenly distributed between the two groups. So if we find a
statistically significant greater recovery rate in the group that received A, we can
conclude that administration A to patients with tumor of type T makes a difference with
respect to R. It is important to realize that we can determine that A makes a difference
with respect to R even though we do not have a more precise generalization regarding
the specific conditions under which A causes R. “The notion of administration of
treatment being relevant to or making a difference for recovery,” Woodward explains,
is captured by the notion of the counterfaclual dependence of R on A,
where the antecedents of the relevant countcrfactuals are understood as
realized by processes that have the characteristics of idealized
experimental interventions ... what is required for the truth of (E) is
simply that for some individuals, recovery counterfactually depends on
some possible intervention that realizes A. It is not required that for all
people with tumors of type T, recovery counterfactually depends on A.
Instead, it is consistent with the truth of (E) that some people have no
possibility of recovering even if given A. Nor is it required that all
interventions realizing A change whether recovery occurs (or the
probability of recovery occurring) for all or even some individuals. (317)
Instead of a subsumptive model of explanation according to which to explain is
to subsume under a general law. Woodward proposes that to explain is to cite a feature
(or a set of features) that makes a difference to the occurrence of the explanandum. And
since we can identify features that make a difference without identifying exceptionless
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generalization, then exceptionless generalizations are not required for explanation. Once
we realize that nomic necessity is not required for explanation, we can see that laws
—
strict, or ceteris paribus—are not required for explanation, and that we can make sense
of the explanatory value of (E) even though we cannot restate it as a strict- or ceteris
paribus- law.
A different account of non-law-based explanation is due to Michael Scriven
( 1959b, 1962). Scrivcn's insight is that we ought not to confuse an explanation with the
justification of the explanation. Recall that for Hcmpel, (strict) laws are required for
explanation because an explanation must guarantee the occurrence of the explanandum;
il the explanation lacks a true general proposition that connects the explanans with the
explanandum, then the occurrence of the explanans doesn't uniquely imply the
occurrence of the explanandum. Scriven claims that Hempcl’s insistence on always
including laws as part of the explanation is unwarranted— it conflates the explanation
itself with our reasons for thinking that the explanation is a good explanation.
Scriven notes that an explanation could be defective or deficient in (at least)
three different ways: it could be inaccurate, if the explanans is ill supported by the
evidence; inadequate, if the explanans does not fully explain the explanandum; or
irrelevant, if the explanation is of the wrong kind (e.g., causal explanation rather than
psychological explanation). Corresponding to these three possible deficiencies, are three
types of justifications for explanations: Truth-justifying grounds are the grounds for
thinking that the explanation is accurate— i.e., our evidence for the truth of the
explanans; Role-justifying grounds arc our grounds for thinking that our explanation is
adequate (at least in the relevant context); Type-justifying grounds are our grounds for
thinking that one type of explanation is required rather than another.
Scriven argues that just as the truth-justifying grounds and the type-justifying
grounds need not be included as a part of the explanation, so do the role-justifying
grounds. If, upon giving an explanation, we are asked why we think the explanans are
true, we will mention the truth justifying grounds of the explanation—i.e., our evidence
for the truth of the explanans—but these need not be a part of the explanation.
Similarly, if, upon giving an explanation, we are asked why we think the explanans
support the explanandum, we will mention the role justifying grounds of the
explanation—which may include a general (strict) law that connects the explanans with
the explanandum—but these, too, need not be a part of the explanation.
Moreover, Scriven contends that the role-justifying grounds need not involve
strict laws at all. He illustrates this by presenting a case “where we can be sure beyond
any reasonable doubt that we have a correct explanation” and yet. we cannot provide
strict laws as role-justifiers.
As you reach for the dictionary, your knee catches the edge of the table
and thus turns over the ink-bottle, the contents of which proceed to run
over the table's edge and ruin the carpet. If you are subsequently asked
to explain how the carpet was damaged you have a complete
explanation. You did it, by knocking over the ink. The certainty of this
explanation is primeval. It has absolutely nothing to do with your
knowledge of the relevant laws of physics; a cave-man could supply the
same account and be quite as certain of it... its certainly has nothing to
do with your ability to quote the laws... if you were asked to produce the
role-justifying grounds for your explanation, what could you do? Yon
could not produce any true universal hypothesis in which the antecedent
was identifiably present (i.e., which avoids such terms as “knock hard
enough”), and the consequent is the effect to be explained...The simple
fact must be faced that certain evidence is adequate to guarantee certain
explanations without the benefit of deduction from laws. (456)
Striven suggests that instead of laws, we should appeal to normic statements as
the role-justifying grounds for good explanations of particular events. Striven
elucidates the notion of a normic statement with a few examples. (N I ) “Rhombi” means
the same as “equilateral parallelograms”;
38
(N2) The penalty for revoke, in bridge, is
two tricks; (N3) Strict Orthodox Jews fast on the day of atonement; (N4) Other things
being equal a greater number of troops is an advantage in battle; (N5) A rise in the tariff
characteristically produces a decline in the value of imports. Statements like (N
1
)-(N5)
are not analytic, and they are also not refutable by a few counter instances (e.g., a few
erring students who use “Rhombi” and “equilateral parallelograms” in a non-
interchangeable way, do not undermine ( N 1 ); An Orthodox Jew who doesn’t fast due to
illness, doesn't undermine (N3) etc.) Yet more, these claims are not statistical claims.
(N2) could be true even if most bridge players do not apply a two-trick penalty for
revoke; and (N4) could be true even if in most battles ever fought the armies with the
greater number of troops lost the battle. According to Scriven, “The normic statement
says that everything falls into a certain category except those to which certain special
conditions apply. And, although the normic statement itself does not explicitly list what
count as exceptional conditions, it employs a vocabulary which reminds us of our
knowledge of this, our trained judgment of exceptions.” ( 1 959b:466)
Moral statements like (N6) Lying is wrong making; and (N7) One ought to bring
about the best consequences, could also be understood as normic statements. The fact
that we cannot explicitly list the special conditions under which lying is not wrong
making, for example, need not disqualify (N6) as the role-justifying grounds for a good
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Scriven explains that unlike the sentence “Rhombi are equilateral parallelograms,"
(N
I
)
is not analytic because its denial is not self-contradictory.
explanation of the wrongness of a particular act of lying. And the fact that trained
judgment is required in order to determine whether the fact that a particular act involves
lying explains why this act is wrong, need not trouble us; since we do not have a
satisfactory analysis of ‘lying’—or any other interesting philosophical concept, for that
matter—then even if (N6) were a strict law, we would still need to apply trained
judgment in order to determine whether a particular act involves lying in the first
i
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place.
Since Scriven contends that the special sciences provide good explanations even
though strict laws are, for the most part, unavailable, he concludes that normic
statements are essential to the explanation of particular occurrences:
Explanation of an individual occurrence must use normic role-justifying
grounds because ( I ) there aren't any true universal hypotheses to speak
of and (b) statistical statements are too weak—they abandon the hold on
the individual case. The normic statement tells one what had to happen
in this case, unless certain exceptional circumstances obtained; and the
historical judgment is made (and open to verification) that these
circumstances did not obtain. (467)
Finally, we should briefly mention Dray’s suggestion for non-law-based
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explanations. Contra Hempel and Oppenhcim, Dray thinks that an explanation need
not (always) demonstrate that the explanandum had to occur; sometimes an explanation
need only to show that the explanandum could occur. In other words, in some contexts,
all we need to show is that the occurrence of the explanandum is possible
,
even though
it is not necessary.
39
See fn. 26 above.
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See Dray (1954, 1957). The citations in the text are from Dray ( 1954) unless noted
otherwise.
To mark this distinction. Dray differentiates between explaining why something
happened and explaining how it could hare happened. “In explaining why something
happened," he writes, “we rebut the presumption that it need not have happened, by
showing that, in the light of certain considerations (facts and laws), it had to happen.”
(20) In contrast, “in explaining how something could have happened, we rebut the
presumption that it could not have happened, by showing that, in the light of certain
further facts, there is after all no good reason for supposing that it could not have
happened.” (20) Dray contends that these two kinds of explanations are distinct because
they provide answers to different questions, and there is no reason to think that one kind
of explanation is more fundamental than the other.
In order to show that something could have happened, we need not find
premises from which its occurrence logically follows. Instead, all we need to do is to
tell a plausible story about how it could have happened. And according to Dray,
historical explanations are often of this kind. So, he concludes,
an historical explanation may thus amount to telling the story of what
actually happened
,
and telling it in such a way that the various
transitions... raise no eyebrows. The story is told in such a way that
presumptions of the form, 'But surely that couldn't have happened!', are
rebutted in advance. Answers to likely objections are built into the
narrative, which may thus have explanatory force (27)
Dray does not deny that on occasion we may want more than the story of the
event in question. Nevertheless, the telling of any particular story about what actually
happened is meant to answer the question how this occurrence could have happened. If
we ask a different question—e.g., ‘Why this occurrence and not a different occurrence?'
or, ‘Why this story and not a different story?—we should expect a different answer. But
this does not undermine the adequacy of the proposed explanation as an answer to the
question for which it was presented. It is certainly no surprise that different questions
demand different answers, and one ought not to expect that an explanation offered as an
answer to one question would also answer all possible follow-up questions, since if this
were required, no explanation would have been possible at all.
In this section I have presented three accounts of explanation that are not based
on laws, strict or ceteris paribus. For our purposes here, we need not decide whether to
explain is to cite a feature that makes a difference to the occurrence of the
explanandum, whether explanations of particular occurrences ought to be grounded in
normic statements
,
or whether explanations are (sometimes) stories of what actually
happened. The important point for us is that there arc alternatives to the deductive
model of explanations. And since the deductive model of explanation is, at best,
incomplete, there is no reason to think that explanation in ethics must conform to the
deductive model. Indeed, given the kind of phenomena that ethics is about, it seems
reasonable to expect that the kind of explanations we will find in ethics would be more
similar to explanation in the special science than to those we find in the physical
sciences.
3.6 Explanation as a Pragmatic Phenomenon
One of the hallmarks of Hempel’s theory of explanation is that Hempel attempts
to provide a syntactical condition for the adequacy of explanations; an explanation is
adequate only if the explanandum syntactically follows from the explanans. However,
several philosophers, and most notably Scriven, have argued that “Explanation is not a
syntactical but a pragmatic notion,” ( 1959b:452) and consequently, any syntactical
constraints are bound to be too restrictive. According to Scriven, the only thing we can
say about explanation without artificially limiting the concept is that “explanations must
produce understanding, and not simply knowledge.” (451 ) Scrivcn insists that tying
explanation to understanding in this way does not imply that the standards for the
adequacy of explanations are purely subjective, because “there are objective tests for
understanding just as for knowing or inferring. They happen not to be syntactical tests
as are (supposedly) those for deducing.” (452) Unfortunately, though, Seri veil doesn't
have a lot to say about the notion of understanding.
Hempel. in his 1965 ‘Aspects of Scientific Explanation’, admits that there is a
pragmatic sense of ‘explanation’: “To explain something to a person is to make it plain
and intelligible to him, to make him understand it.” (425) However, in this pragmatic
sense, the very same account could constitute an explanation for one person and not for
another. So this pragmatic sense of explanation affords a relativised notion of
explanation: /: is an explanation for a particular individual; there are no explanations
simpliciter. Hempel acknowledges that the pragmatic aspects of explanation are
interesting and important. Nevertheless, lie contends that we must try to find an
objective account of scientific explanation, which conforms to the objective (i.e., non
agent relative) standards of scientific research. The covering law model of explanation
is meant to satisfy this demand for objectivity. Moreover, in response to Scriven's
critique of his deductive model, Hempel declares:
To call attention to the important pragmatic facets of explanation and to
indicate the diverse procedures that may be appropriate in different eases
to dispel the perplexity reflected in someone’s quest for an explanation
is not to show that a nonpragmatic model of scientific explanation must
be hopelessly inadequate... It is therefore beside the point to complain
that the covering-law models do not closely match the form in which
working scientists actually present their explanations. (427-8)
Hempel is clearly correct in saying that merely calling attention to pragmatic
facets of explanation docs not show that all nonpragmatic models of explanation must
be inadequate. Bui this response seems to misconstrue Scriven's objection. Scrivcn
doesn't merely point out that the covering law model is not exemplified in scientific
discourse—which, as Hempel observes, would have been besides the point—but rather.
Scriven claims that many perfectly adequate explanations cannot be restated as
deductive arguments in which the (sentence describing the) explanandum follows from
the (sentences describing the) explanans. So HempeFs response to Scriven is
misguided.
Moreover. Hempel seems to conflate explanation as a pragmatic notion with
explanation as a subjective notion. To say that explanation is a pragmatic notion is to
say that what qualifies as an adequate explanation is context sensitive, but it need not be
agent relative in any objectionable way. In fact, developments in the study of formal
pragmatics in the 70' s made possible the development of a pragmatic theory of
explanation. So one final approach to explanation we ought to consider here is a theory
of explanation that takes seriously the pragmatic nature of explanation, and Bas van
Fraassen ( 1 980) developed such a theory.
Van Fraassen summarizes his view as follows: Explanation is
a three-term relation, between theory, fact, and context. No wonder that
no single relation between theory and fact ever managed to lit more than
a few examples! Being an explanation is essentially relative, for an
explanation is an answer... Since an explanation is an answer, it is
evaluated vis-a-vis a question, which is a request for information. But
exactly what is requested by means of the question ‘Why is it the case
that F?,’ differs from context to context. (156)
An explanation, according to van Fraassen is an answer to a why-question.
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Van Fraassen identifies why-questions with an ordered triple <Pk,X,R>, where Pk is the
topic of the question (or the explanandum), X is the contrast class
, and R is the
relevance relation. It is important to realize that the same interrogative sentence can
express different questions on difference occasions in which it is uttered. For example,
consider the question: “Why is act A morally wrong?” This sentence may express (at
least) two different questions: ( I ) “Why is act A (rather than act B) morally wrong?” or
(2) “Why is act A morally wrong (rather than morally right)?” The topic of the question
in both cases is the same— i.c., that act A is morally wrong—but the relevant contrast
class is different: in the former question the contrast class includes: (PI ) ‘Act A is
morally wrong'; (P2) ‘Act B is morally wrong’; etc.; whereas the contrast class of the
latter question includes: (PI ) 'Act A is morally wrong’; (P2) ‘Act A is morally right’.
A direct answer to a why-question will take the form: Pk in contrast to the rest
of X because A, where A is a proposition that bears relation R to the couple <Pk, X>.
And an explanation, according to van Fraassen, is a direct answer to a why-question.
We evaluate explanations in (at least) three ways: (i) how likely is this explanation to be
true (given our background knowledge); (ii) to what extent does the explanation favor
Pk, rather than other members of the contrast class; (iii) how this explanation compares
with other possible explanations.
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Van Fraassen, following Hcmpcl and Oppenheim, identifies explanation as an answer
to a why-question. But as Dray (1954, 1957, 1959), Scriven (1959b, 1962), and Salmon
( 1989) point out, not all answers to why-questions are explanations, and not all
explanations are answers to why-questions. Yet although the details of van Fraassen's
account arc not quite right, his main insight—that whether a particular account qualifies
an adequate explanation depends on the context in which the explanation is given— is
still worth noting. For a critique of van Fraassen's account, see Kitehcr and Salmon
(1987) and Salmon (1989)
For example, suppose we want to explain why act A is morally wrong (rather
than morally right). The topic, or the explanandum is that act A is wrong. The contrast
class is [A is morally wrong, A is morally right}. A possible answer to the question is
that A is wrong (rather than right) because A involves the breaking of a promise. The
quality of this explanation depends on considerations like the following: Does A in fact
involve the breaking of a promise? To what extent does the fact that A involves the
breaking of a promise support the claim that A is wrong rather than right? How does this
explanation compare to other possible explanations (c.g., "A is wrong (rather than right)
because A involves hurting an innocent by-standcr”) etc.
Note that an adequate explanation, on this model, need not include laws at all.
Furthermore, an explanation need not show that the explanandum had to occur; instead,
it only has to show that the explanandum is more likely than the contextually salient
alternatives in the contrast class, given (the contextually salient features of) our
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background knowledge. “ So. lor example, the fact that a particular action involves the
breaking of a promise might be a perfectly good explanation of its wrongness on one
occasion, even though on a different occasion the fact that an action involves the
breaking of a promise may be irrelevant to the explanation of its wrongness.
3.7 Explanation in Ethics
In the previous sections 1 have shown that we have very good reasons for
believing that adequate explanations need not appeal to exceptionless principles. I have
argued that the most influential account of explanation according to which
In this respect, van Fraassen's model is similar to what Scriven ( 1959b) calls
‘selection explanations’. See note 34 above.
exceptionless generalizations are essential to proper explanation is unmotivated.
Moreover, since the special sciences sometimes provide adequate explanations even
when exceptionless generalization are not available, then even if the deductive model
were a successful account of explanation in the physical sciences, we would have to
identify another non-deductive model of explanation to account for explanation in other
areas. Finally, I have shown that other accounts of explanation are readily available. In
particular Fvc discussed explanations that are based on the availability of ceteris
paribus laws, and explanations that do no require laws at all. 1 conclude that a survey of
the literature on scientific explanation not only does not vindicate the generalist
presumption that explanation must appeal to exceptionless principles, but rather it
shows that this presumption is widely regarded as untenable. Indeed, this survey of the
literature on explanation demonstrates that we arc used to, and comfortable with
explanations that are not grounded in exceptionless generalizations in (almost) all areas
of inquiry.
My discussion in the previous sections was focused on accounts of scientific
explanation, and clearly there are many differences between empirical sciences and
ethics. In order to employ any one of the models of explanation I presented in the
previous section in ethics, some modifications would be called for. For example.
Woodward's thesis—that to explain is to cite a feature that makes a difference to
occurrence of the explanandum—is cashed out in terms of randomized tests. It is crucial
for Woodward’s account that we can identify that a feature is (causally) relevant
without identifying the specific conditions under which it makes a difference. The way
we do this, according to Woodward, is though randomized tests where we can
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justifiably assume that other relevant (or interfering) factors arc (roughly) equally
distributed between the test group and the control group. But randomized tests are not
standard practice in moral theorizing, so clearly some modifications, or at least
clarifications, are in order if we are to adopt this model of explanation as an account of
explanation in ethics.
Other models of explanation are more easily adapted to fit the moral realm.
Explanations based on ceteris paribus laws, or explanations grounded in nonnie
sentences
,
for instance, as well as explanations relative to an implicit contrast class,
could quite effortlessly be “transferred” to ethics.
In Chapter Two 1 discussed two types of generalist approaches: principle
monism and principle pluralism. Monists, as I explained, claim that there is only one
intrinsically morally relevant property—call it P—and that every action that exemplifies
P is morally right. Plural ists maintain that there are several intrinsically morally
relevant properties—call these properties P/...P11—and that for each intrinsically
morally relevant property. Pi, there will be a presumptive, or pro tanto
,
principle: for
any action, A
,
if A exemplifies Pi then A is presumptively morally right (or wrong). I
have argued that both monists and pluralists are generalists because they both believe
that an explanation of the rightness of an action is inadequate unless it is grounded in an
exceptionless moral principle, strict or pro tanto.
We can now see that only monism is compatible with a deductive model of
explanation. For monists the explanation of the rightness of A is that A exemplifies P,
and that every action that exemplifies P is morally right; the explanandum logically
follows form the explanans. For pluralists, in contrast, an explanation of the rightness of
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A is not deductive, because even if A exemplifies Pi, and every action that exemplifies
Pi is presumptively morally right, it does not follow that A is morally right (in this case),
but only that A is presumptively morally right. Ross ( 1930), for example, was well
aware of this difficulty. “Our judgements about our particular duties,” he explains,
arc not logical conclusions from self-evident premises. The only
possible premisses would be the general principles stating their prima
facie rightness or wrongness qua having the different characteristics they
do have; and even if we could (as we cannot) apprehend the extent to
which an act will tend on the one hand, for example, to bring about
advantages for our benefactors, and on the other hand to bring about
disadvantages for fellow men who are not our benefactors, there is no
principle by which we can draw the conclusion that it is on the whole
right or on the whole wrong. In this respect the judgement as to the
rightness of a particular act is just like the judgement as to the beauty of
a particular natural object or work of art. A poem is, for instance, in
respect of certain qualities beautiful and in respect of certain others not
beautiful; and our judgement as to the degree of beauty it possesses on
the whole is never reached by logical reasoning from the apprehension
of its particular beauties or particular defects. Both in this and in the
moral case we have more or less probable opinions which are not
logically justified conclusions from the general principles that are
recognized as self-evident. (31
)
Pluralists, like part icu larists, must endorse a non-deductive model of
explanation. But once we have given up on a deductive model of explanation, it is not
clear what extra explanatory value is gained from being committed to the claim that
every action that exemplifies Pi is presumptively morally wrong, as opposed to the
claim that Pi is typically wrong-making.
Ross believed that the fact that a fulfillment of a promise is always right-
making. for instance, is self evident.
What comes first in time is the apprehension of the self-evident prima
facie rightness of an individual act of a particular type. From this we
come by reflection to apprehend the self-evident general principle of
prima facie duty. (33)
For Ross, then, the commitment to the existence of exceptionless presumptive
principles is not based on their role in explaining moral phenomena, but rather it is due
simply to their self-evidence. However, it is not clear why Ross thinks that these
principles arc self-evident. Presumably, Ross thinks that we observe a few actions that
involve promise keeping, and we notice that in those cases promise keeping is right-
making. By reflecting on these cases we can see, according to Ross, that promise
keeping is always morally relevant. But it is not clear how one could conclude from a
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particular case, or a set of cases, that promise keeping is always morally relevant. And
once we give up on a deductive model of explanation—as pluralists must—the
commitment to the claim that promise keeping is always morally relevant is not only
unmotivated but also unnecessary. So if my argument in Chapter Two is correct—that
is, if we have reason to prefer particularism and pluralism to monism—then we might
as well prefer particularism to pluralism, since pluralists’ commitment to the availability
of strict presumptive principles seems to have theoretical costs, and no theoretical
benefits.
3.8 Conclusion
The claim that moral explanation must appeal to exceptionless principles has
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rarely been argued for. Nevertheless, many philosophers find the particularist research
program objectionable because they believe that giving up on the search for
exceptionless moral principles is tantamount to giving up on moral theorizing. I hope to
11
For a critique of Ross’s self-evidence claim and the epistemological difficulties
involved, see Dancy (1983).
"
I have found only one paper that directly addresses the question of explanation in
ethics—Ladd (1952).
have shown in this chapter that this is mere dogma— it is based on an undefended, and
indeed, an indefensible notion of explanation. A careful study of the literature on
explanation reveals that a deduetivc approach to explanation is unmotivated, and
moreover, that it is widely regarded as an inadequate account of explanation in the
social sciences, and arguably in the physical sciences as well.
In this chapter I have not recommended any particular non-deduetive model of
explanation. I believe that any one of the non-deduetive models discussed in sections
3.4-3.6 is compatible with particularism—once the proper adjustments are made to
accommodate moral explanation rather than scientific explanation. Indeed, different
particularist theories may endorse and defend different models of explanation, and the
structure of each individual particularist theory may well depend on the specific details
of the non-deduetive theory of explanation it is committed to. For instance, some
particularist theories may try to identify ceteris paribus moral generalizations or moral
normic sentences, while other theories may look for moral dispositions, or moral
difference makers.
It is important to keep in mind that each of the theories of explanation discussed
in this chapter is not without difficulties. Explanation, like all other philosophically
interesting concepts, is a difficult notion to analyze, and the plurality of theories of
explanation may lead us to conclude with Roth, that “there is no good reason to believe
that there is just one correct explication of the notion of explanation." ( 1988:3) Be that
as it may, the plurality of theories of explanation, the difficulties they all face, and the
fact that there is no consensus about which theory of explanation is correct, should
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convince us that one cannot dismiss a competing moral theory simply by pointing out
that there are difficulties for the account of explanation this theory is committed to.
One might still insist that since there are known difficulties for all the accounts
of explanation currently available, then we have reason to look for exceptionless moral
principles. One could argue that such principles, if found, would provide a simpler
explanation of moral phenomena than any one of the alternatives discussed above. But
first, the simplicity of the explanation will depend, of course, on whether the
exceptionless principles involved are actually simple. If the only exceptionless
principles we find are extremely complex, then the explanation in which they are
employed may well be no simpler than its competitors.
Second, even though simplicity counts in favor of a theory, it is not the only
virtue a theory must exemplify. In our efforts to eliminate counterexamples, we may
inadvertently rob our principles of their explanatory power, for example, by restricting
the range of situations to which they apply, or due to ad hoe modifications to
circumvent exceptions.
Finally, we must not forget that moral phenomena is undeniably complex, and as
Hayek (1967) observes “a simple theory of phenomena which are in their nature
complex... is probably merely of necessity false—at least without a specified ceteris
paribus assumption, after the full statement of which the theory would no longer be
simple.” (28) Einstein is remarked upon as saying, “Everything should be as simple as
possible but no simpler.” And this is no less true in ethics than it is in the sciences.45
45
In his paper The Tyranny of Principles' Toulmin reports on a quotation, attributed to
H. L. Mencken, that hangs in the staff lounge at The Hastings Center: “For Every
human problem, there is a solution that is simple, neat, and wrong.” (1981:31)
CHAPTER 4
PARTICULARISM IN ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS
4.1 Introduction
One striking feature of Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics is that unlike many
modern moral treatises, Aristotle's work is not concerned with finding and formulating
exceptionless moral principles. Aristotle seems perfectly comfortable discussing
generalizations that are true “for the most part,” or hedged generalizations— i.e.,
generalizations that are true only “in the right times, with reference to the right objects,
towards the right people, with the right motive, and in the right way.” This sharp
contrast between Aristotle's approach to the study of morality and the standard modern
style of ethical theorizing is thought provoking. As Sarah Broadie observes,
That Aristotle provides no ground-level normative ethics, and is
apparently quite untroubled by any lack of a system here, gives us food
for thought. He so blatantly fails to produce the kind of position that it is
a modern tradition to expect as a main deliverance of philosophical
ethics - and he is not wringing his hands! (2006:353)
Why didn’t Aristotle—surely one of the greatest philosophers of all times,
whose work covers almost all areas of philosophy—try to develop a ground-level
normative ethics? Why didn't he try to find and formulate exceptionless moral
principles?
In this chapter I will attempt to answer these questions. I will argue that even
though Aristotle is not in the business of formulating exceptionless moral principles he
does, pace Broadie, provide a ground-level normative ethics—that is, he provides a
theory that purports to explain the rightness of particular actions. I will suggest that the
reason Aristotle did not try to formulate exceptionless moral principles is that he simply
126
didn’t think that such principles arc necessary in order to provide an adequate account
of morality; or in other words, I will argue that we can interpret Aristotle as presenting a
particularist moral theory.
I will proceed as follows: first, by focusing on Aristotle’s proclaimed goals and
methods in the Nicomachean Ethics
,
and by reviewing several commentaries on his
project, I will present a prima facie case for a particularist reading of the text (Section
4.2). Next, I will argue that Aristotle is not trying to help us to identify which of the
range of actions available to us is morally right, but rather, that his theory is meant to
teach us how to explain why those acts that we know are right have the normative status
they do. I will suggest that Aristotle’s doctrine of the mean is not intended to serve as a
decision procedure, but as an explanatory schema that we should apply in order to
explain why right acts are right (section 4.3).
In 11.2 Aristotle famously asserts that “we are not conducting this inquiry in
order to know what virtue is, but in order to become good.” ( I 103b27, Ostwald trans.)
In section 4.4 I will discuss Aristotle's practical ambitions for his ethical work, and I
will explain how these goals arc consistent with the interpretation I propose in section
4.3.
4.2 A Prima Facie Case for a Particularist Interpretation
In 11.2, right after Aristotle explains that virtue is formed by habit, and just
before he begins a detailed presentation of his theory of virtues and the doctrine of the
mean, Aristotle pauses in order to emphasize a point he has already made—indeed, a
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point lie rehearses several times throughout the Ethics
1
—concerning the nature and goal
of ethical theorizing:
But this must be agreed upon beforehand, that the whole account of
matters of conduct must be given in outline and not precisely, as we said
at the very beginning that the accounts we demand must be in
accordance with the subject matter; matters concerned with conduct and
questions of what is good for us have no fixity, any more than matters of
health. The general account being of this nature, the account of
particular cases is yet more lacking in exactness; for they do not fall
under any art or precept but the agents themselves must in each case
consider what is appropriate to the occasion, as happens also in the art of
medicine or of navigation. ( 1 1()3b35-1 104a9, Ross trans.)
Aristotle's repeated remarks about the nature of the subject matter that moral
theories are concerned with— i.e., subject matter that lacks fixity—are congruent with a
particularist approach to morality. Moreover, his constant reminders that we ought not
to seek mathematical precision in ethical theorizing, his comments on the ineliminable
role of perception and practical wisdom in making correct moral judgments, as well as
his characteristic emphasis on the role of habituation in moral development, seem to
invite a particularist interpretation of his project. And indeed, some commentators
interpret these remarks as an explicit rejection of the generalist program.
For example, 1.3, 1 094b 13-26: “Our discussion will be adequate if it achivcs clarity
within the limits of the subject matter. For precision cannot be expected in the treatment
of all subjects alike, any more than it can be expected in all manufactured articles.
Problems of what is noble and just, which politics examines, present so much variety
and irregularity that some people believe that they exist only by convention and not by
nature. The problem of the good, too, present a similar kind of irregularity ... Therefore,
in a discussion of such subjects, which has to start from a basis of this kind, we must be
satisfied to indicate the truth with a rough and general sketch: when the subject and the
basis of a discussion consist of matters that hold good only as a general rule, but not
always, the conclusions reached must be of the same order. The various points that are
made must be received in the same spirit. For a well-schooled man is one who searches
for that degree of precision in each kind of study which the nature of the subject in hand
admits: it is obviously just as foolish to accept arguments of probability from a
mathematician as to demand strict demonstrations from an orator." (Ostwald trans.) See
also 1.7: 1 ()98a25-30, 1.13: I 102a23-26, V.10: 1 1 37b 1 3-32, and IX.2: 1 165a 12- 14.
128
For example, Jonathan Dancy, the leading modern particularism describes the
virtuous agent as one who has been equipped, through training, with a full range of
moral sensitivities. Dancy argues that the virtuous person is not one who has access to a
set of principles she can use to subsume new cases under. Instead, what she brings to
each new situation is “a countless ability to discern what matters where it matters.”
( 1993:50) Dancy then goes on to suggest that this conception of the virtuous agent is in
the spirit of Aristotle’s Ethics : “Anyone who has read Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics
will discern the Aristotelian style of this account of virtue, both in its refusal to sec
moral judgment as the subsumption of a new case under a previously formulated moral
principles and in its stress on the role of moral education.” (1993:50)
Similarly, John McDowell, finds support for his arguments against principle-
based virtue ethics in Aristotle's work: “My aim is to sketch the outlines of a different
view, to be found in the philosophical tradition which flowers in Aristotle's ethics.”
( 1979: 141 ) Although McDowell never explicitly counts himself as a particularism his
interpretation of Aristotle seems quite friendly to a particu larist approach to morality.
“To an unprejudiced eye,” he writes,
it should seem quite implausible that any reasonably adult moral outlook
admits of any such codification |i.e., codification in terms of a set
principles, which are apt for serving as major premises in syllogisms].
As Aristotle consistently says, the best generalizations about how one
should behave hold only for the most part. ( 1979: 148)
In his commentary on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics
,
Harold Joachim claims
that when Aristotle notes the complexity and the lack of fixity of the subject matter of
ethics lie is not merely asserting, “as a modern writer on ethics might say,” ( 1 95 1 : 1 5)
that morality deals with extremely complex phenomena, and as a result the formulation
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of exceptionless moral principles is an arduous task that we have not yet accomplished.
Instead, Aristotle's view, according to Joachim, is that
Conduct belongs to a sphere of reality in which there is no necessity
—
no necessary laws, but at most general rules with exceptions. Hence to
discover and formulate the general rules, the probable conclusions, etc.,
is to attain to the only ‘knowledge’ possible in this sphere. A tissue of
probable judgments, in which the uncertainty is recognized and the
necessity of exceptions admitted, is the accurate reflection of the facts,”
(1951:15)
According to Joachim’s interpretation, then, Aristotle's view is not only that we
do not need exceptionless principles in our moral theorizing, but rather that given the
subject matter of ethics, it is impossible to formulate exceptionless moral principles.
Myles Burnyeat seems to endorse an interpretation of Aristotle not much
different from those proposed by Dancy, McDowell, and Joachim. “Now the noble and
the just,” he writes,
do not, in Aristotle’s view admit of neat formulation in rules or
traditional precepts. It takes an educated person, a capacity going
beyond the application of general rules, to tell what is required for the
practice of the virtues in specific situations. (1980:72)
Burnyeat, like the other commentators discussed above, believes that on
Aristotle's view morality cannot be codified by a set of exceptionless principles. The
capacity to make correct moral judgments is not acquired by learning a set of moral
principles, because the appropriate evaluative attitude cannot be codified by such
principles: “What Aristotle is pointing to is our ability to internalize from a scattered
range of particular cases a general evaluative attitude which is not reducible to rules or
precepts.” ( 1 980:72)
Finally, Robert Louden is also impressed by Aristotle's repeated comments on
the lack of fixity of the subject matter of moral theorizing:
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The radical variability and indefiniteness of the subject matter of
practical science implies that it is not possible to formulate rules which
hold in all cases. Instead, the use of a ‘Lesibian rule' which adapts itself
to changing individual circumstances is needed. ( I 137b3()-32)
(1991:162)
Unlike scientific knowledge, the conclusions of practical sciences are “never
rigidly universal" ( 163) This, Louden explains, is due to the fact that “what is called for
in the way of action cannot be fully determined independently of the context within
which one is deliberating: the account of particular cases ‘does not fall under any art or
set of rules, but the agents themselves must in each case consider what is appropriate to
the occasion.' ( I 1 04a7-9)" ( 162)
In a recent paper, Rebecca Slangl summarizes the kind of support that
particularists find in Aristotelian virtue ethics:
There is an obvious affinity between virtue ethics and particularism.
Both stress the complexity of the moral life, the inadequacy of rule-
following as a guide to moral deliberation, and the importance of
ludgmenl in discerning the morally relevant features of particular
1
situations.” (forthcoming)
All the observations and commentaries that I have cited in this section
emphasize what Aristotle is not doing. He is not looking for exceptionless principles,
and he is not trying to provide a moral theory of the kind that moral generalists are
looking for. These features of Aristotle’s account of morality make a prima facie case
for a particularist interpreting of the Nicomachean Ethics. But as I explained in Chapter
” Interestingly, Stangl directs her readers to Crisp ( 1996b) and Crisp and Slote ( 1997b)
“for examples of the assumption that virtue ethics must be particularist in some sense.”
(In. I ) However, given Crisp's unequivocal rejection of particularism (Crisp 2000 &
2007) it is surprising that Stangl finds any kind of support for a particularist reading of
Aristotle in Crisp. I lake this to show that there is still a great deal of confusion
regarding the nature of particularism; there is still no agreement in the current debate
about what particularism amounts to, and what exactly particularists are committed to.
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One, particularism is not merely a negative claim about what moral theories cannot do.
For all that has been said so far, Aristotle might reject not only general ism, but
particularism as well
—
perhaps he simply wasn’t interested in offering a ground-level
normative ethics; maybe, for instance, he was not interested in explaining the rightness
of actions, but rather, he was only concerned with questions regarding the nature of
good moral character.
3
So in order to show that Aristotle can be read as a particularist we need to do
more than simply to show that he is not a generalist. We must make clear how his
theory explains moral phenomena, including the rightness or wrongness of actions,
without appealing to exceptionless moral principle. In the following sections 1 will
show how Aristotle’s theory can accomplish this task.
4.3 The Starting Point for Moral Theorizing
In this section I will argue that Aristotle is offering a theory that purports to
explain the rightness and wrongness of actions. I will claim that Aristotle is not
providing necessary and sufficient conditions for the rightness of actions in order to
accomplish this task, but that he is offering a schema for explaining why those acts that
are right are right. The doctrine of the mean, 1 propose, is an explanatory schema for the
rightness of actions; it is a template, or a pattern, that we can employ in order to explain
the rightness of particular actions. Aristotle, I will argue, is not trying to help us figure
out which of the actions available to us are right because he is assuming that a student
who is qualified to hear his lectures is already capable of doing this. Instead, what
Aristotle offers is an explanation of why actions have the normative status they have.
’ See, for example, Pincoffs (1971) and Taylor ( 1 988).
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A natural place for us to begin our discussion of Aristotle’s positive account of
morality is the passage in 1.4 in which Aristotle explicitly comments on philosophical
methodology and on the starting points for moral theorizing:
1 1 1
Nor must we overlook the fact that arguments which proceed from
fundamental principles are different from arguments that lead up to
them. Plato, too, rightly recognized this as a problem and used to ask
whether the discussion was proceeding from or leading up to
fundamental principles, just as in a race course there is a difference
between running from the judges to the far end of the track and running
back again. |2| Now, we must start with the known. But this term has
two connotations: “what is known to us” and “what is known” pure and
simple. Therefore, we should start perhaps with what is known to us. |3|
For that reason, to be a competent student of what is right and just, and
of politics generally, one must first have received a proper upbringing in
moral conduct. |4| The acceptance of a fact as fact is the starting point,
and if this is sufficiently clear, there will be no further need to ask why it
is so. 1 5 1 A man with this kind of background has or can easily acquire
the foundations from which he must start. |6| But if he neither has nor
can acquire them, let him lend an ear to Hesiod’s words:
That man is all-best who himself works out every problem...
That man. too, is admirable who follows one who speaks well.
He who cannot see the truth for himself, nor, hearing it from others.
Store it away in his mind, that man is utterly useless. ( 1 095a3 1 -
1095b 12, Ostwald trails.)
One of the difficulties in interpreting this passage concerns the use of the word
arclie and its cognates. Arche
,
in its most concrete sense, means beginning (or starting
. . . , 4
point) but it is also used for first principle (or fundamental principle). Different
translators choose different renderings of the various occurrences of this word, and the
choices give rise to alternative readings of this passage.
5
The interpretation I am about
to propose is based on Ostwald’s translation of this passage.
6
4
See Ostwald ( 1962) Glossary of Technical terms pp. 303. See also Irwin ( 1978) esp.
fn. 18, and Burnyeat ( 1980) esp. pp. 70-74
5
Ross's translation, like Irwin's and Burnyeat’s translations, are quite similar to
Oslwald's translation cited in the main text. However, Broadie and Rowe translate
1095b7 as follows: “But such a person either has the relevant first principles, or might
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Following Burnyeat ( 1980), 1 understand Aristotle here as engaged in a
dialeclieal inquiry towards first principles | I |. This inquiry towards first principles,
Aristotle argues, must begin with what is known to us |2|; those things that are known
to us can serve as our starting point. But what arc the things that Aristotle thinks arc
known to us? What are our starting points?
Our starting points, I suggest, are the normative statuses of particular actions. As
Burnyeat observes, “the ancient commentators arc agreed that Aristotle has in mind
knowledge about actions in accordance with the virtues; these actions are the things
familiar to us from which we must start, and what we know about them is that they are
noble or just.” ( 1980:7 1 -72) In other words, we must start our moral theorizing from our
judgments about particular actions. In order to have correct starting points for moral
theorizing, then, we must be able to identify right acts as right, and wrong acts as
wrong. We need not know why those actions have the normative status we identify
them as having |5]; one could engage in moral theorizing even if one does not know
why right acts are right, as long as one has the ability to identify that they are right, or at
the very least, if one is willing to accept the judgments of “one who speaks well” as
easily grasp them.” (Instead of Ostwald's: “A man with this kind of background has or
can easily acquire the foundations from which he must start.” or Ross's: "the man who
has been well brought up has or can easily get starting points,” or Irwin’s: “Someone
who is well brought up has the beginnings, or can easily acquire them,” or Burnyeat's:
“Such a person has, or can easily get hold of. beginnings (starting points).” The
difference here is important. On Ostwald's translation, as well as on Ross's, Irwin's,
and Burnyeat's, the things that the well brought up person has, or can easily acquire, are
the correct starting points for the study of ethics. According to Broadie and Rowe's
translation, the things the well brought up person has, or can easily acquire, are the first
principles—that is, those things that our current study is trying to obtain. See Irwin
(1978) fn. 1 8 and Irwin ( 1999) p. 1 76-7 for a discussion of this issue.
(l My interpretation is also compatible with the translations by Ross. Irwin, and
Burnyeat—see fn. 5 above.
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one's starting points |6).
7
This is the reason why Aristotle insists that a competent
student is one who has had a good moral upbringing |3|. A person who is brought up
well should be able to tell noble acts from ignoble ones: he is expected to be able to
identify courageous acts, or just acts, and he is expected to be able to tell them apart
from those acts that are cowardly or unjust. The student need not know why a given act
is right, but he ought to know that it is right. And following Burnyeat (again), I believe
that Aristotle’s goal in the Elliics is to teach his students why those acts she identifies as
right, are right.
But how could one identify particular actions as right actions if one doesn't
know why these acts are right? Aristotle thinks that with proper education, one could
form habits that enable one to distinguish right actions from wrong ones. But since
habituation is required, the acquisition of this skill involves a lengthy process; one must
experience a wide range of situation in order for one's ability to identify right actions to
be sufficiently reliable in order to pick out the correct starting points. This is one
reason why in 1.3 Aristotle insists that young men arc not the target audience for his
lectures: “for they arc inexperienced in the actions that constitute life, and what is said
will start from these and will be about these." ( 1095a3-4, Broadie & Rowe trails.) Our
7
Aristotle is well aware of the infinite regress involved in demanding an explanation for
all our starting points, and he claims that our starting points in matters of deliberation
are particular facts: “Nor can we deliberate about particular facts, e.g., whether this is a
loaf of bread or whether this loaf of bread has been properly baked: such facts arc the
object of sense perception. And if we continue deliberating each point in turn, we shall
have to go on to infinity." (III. 3: I I 1 3a I -3, Ostwald trans.)
The claim that one could know that an action is right without knowing why it is right
may seem less puzzling if we consider the fact that a native speaker of a language can
often tell whether a sentence is grammatical even in cases in which she might not know
why it is so. Of course only native speakers who have been “brought up well" with
rcscpcct to language would be able to do this correctly, and young people are less likely
to have this ability.
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discussion, Aristotle tells us, concerns the rightness of actions, but it also begins with
correct judgments about which particular actions arc right. Our ability to identify right
acts as right is acquired through habituation, and the habits we form depend on the kind
of moral upbringing we get. If we are not properly educated, and as a result we do not
form the right habits, we would not have the right starting points for moral theorizing,
and we would be “utterly useless’' [6J; if our initial judgments about the normative
status of actions are incorrect, then surely the first principles we discover by way of a
dialectical inquiry starting from these judgments are likely to be false. Having correct
starting points is key to a successful dialectical inquiry. “Hence it is no small matter,”
Aristotle concludes, “whether one habit or another is inculcated in us from early
childhood; on the contrary, it makes a considerable difference, or, rather, all the
difference.” (11.1 : 1 103b23-24, Oslwald trans.)
In 1.7 Aristotle reminds us again that we must not require the same degree of
precision in all areas of inquiry, and that the appropriate degree of precision for each
investigation depends on the nature of the subject matter being explored, as well as the
purpose of the investigation (1098a26-28). He illustrates this last point with an
example: a geometrician and a carpenter may both be interested in right angles, but their
purposes are quite different; the carpenter's interest concerns the usefulness of right
angles to his carpentry work, whereas the geometrician is interested in the very nature
of right angles. Aristotle then goes on to say the following:
1 61 We should proceed in just the same way in other areas too. so that
the side issues do not overwhelm the main ones. |7| One should not
demand to know the reason why, either, in the same way in all matters:
in some cases, it will suffice if that something is so has been well
shown, 1 8 1 as indeed is true of starting points; some are grasped by
induction, some by perception, some by a sort of habituation, and others
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in other ways: |9| one must try to get hold of each sort in the appropriate
way, and take care that they arc well marked out, 1 10] since they have
great importance in relation to what comes later. For the start of
something seems to he more than half of the whole, and through it many
9
of the things being looked for seem to become evident. ( 1098a33-
1098b7, Broadie & Rowe trails.)
In this passage Aristotle tells us that inquiries can differ not only with respect to
their appropriate degree of precision |7|, but also in the way in which their starting
points are obtained |8|.
m
Moreover, Aristotle insists that it is important to obtain the
starting points for each inquiry in the appropriate way [9]. “Each kind of starting point."
Burnyeat explains,
comes with a mode of acquisition appropriate to it; to give a couple of
examples from the ancient commentators, we learn by induction that all
men breathe, by perception that fire is hot. In ethics the appropriate
mode for at least some starting points is habituation...The thesis is that
we first learn (come to see) what is noble and just not by experience of
or induction from a series of instances, nor by intuition (intellectual or
perceptual), but by learning to do noble and just things, by being
habituates to noble and just conduct. (73)
Finally, Aristotle stresses again the importance of having the correct starting points
1 10 ].
Aristotle’s goal, as I have mentioned above, is to help us understand why those
acts that we identify as right—our starting points—arc, in fact, right. But he warns us
that the kind of explanation we ought to seek should be appropriate to the subject matter
we arc dealing with |7|. When we explain the Pythagorean theorem, for example—that
is, when we explain why for any right triangle, the area of the square whose side is the
'
In this passage Broadie & Rowe translate arche as “starting point,” as does Burnyeat.
In contrast, Ross, Irwin, and Ostwald opt for “first principle” (or “principle,” or
“fundamental principle,” respectively).
111
Aristotle again emphasizes here that in the case of starting points we need not know
why they are so, but it is sufficient to know that they are so |7|-|8|. See also. III. 3:
1 I 13a 1-3 and fn. 7 above.
137
hypotenuse is equal to the sum of the areas of the squares whose sides are the two
legs—we can give a demonstrative expatriation. We can produce a deductive argument
for the conclusion that the Pythagorean theorem is true. But we “should not demand to
know the reason why in the same way in all matters.” Explanations of the rightness of
actions, which is what we are after here, will not be deductive explanations, and given
the subject matter of ethics, they cannot be: “pure science involves demonstration,”
Aristotle tells us, "while things whose starting points or first causes can be other than
they are do not admit of demonstrations.” (VI. 5: I 140a34, Oslwald trails.)
After reminding us in 1 1.2 that the subject matter of ethics lacks fixity, and as a
result, our account will not be very precise—especially in terms of its application to
particular actions ( 1 103b35-l 104a9 cited in section 4.2 above)—Aristotle goes on to
say this: “But though our present account is of this nature we must give what help we
can.” ( I 1 04a 1 0. Ross trails.) What immediately follows, are Aristotle's observations
regarding the harmful effects of excess and deficiency, and the positive effects of the
proportionate amount, or the mean. These observations, Aristotle tells us, hold true for
health and strength as well as for characteristics like temperance, courage, and other
virtues. To act in accordance with the mean is not only the way to acquire virtuous
characteristics, but is also the mark of virtuous actions.
These comments on the mean, it seems, are meant to be helpful in some way or
other. But what kind of help does Aristotle intend his comments on the mean to have?
Broadie (1991 ) proposes the following hypothesis:
| Aristotle | could be deceived into thinking the doctrine of the mean
useful in ways in which in fact it is not. This may be what happens in
NE II. 2, where he bewails the impossibility of giving exact rules for
correct particular responses ( 1 104a5-9); then says that he must give
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what help he can ( 1 1 04a 1 0- 1 1 ); and then goes on to discuss, not
responses
.
but dispositions." (101-2)
Now I agree with Broadie that if Aristotle had thought that his comments on the
mean arc supposed to help us identify the right response in various situations, he was
mistaken about their usefulness. However, I doubt that this is what Aristotle had in
mind. Indeed, in VI. 1 Aristotle denies that he thinks his advice about the mean is
helpful in determining what we ought to do:
We stated earlier that we must choose the median, and not excess or
deficiency, and that the median is what right reason dictates... but this
statement, true though it is, lacks clarity. In all other fields of endeavor
in which scientific knowledge is possible, it is indeed true to say that we
must exert ourselves or relax neither too much nor too little, but to an
intermediate extent and as right reason demands. But if this is the only
thing a person knows, he will be none the wiser: he will, for example,
not know what kind of medicines to apply to his body, if he is merely
told to apply whatever medical science prescribes and in a manner in
which a medical expert applies them.” ( I 1 38b 1 9-35. Ostwald trails.)
So what kind of help are these comments on the mean supposed to provide? I
propose that these remarks are meant to help us explain why those acts that we already
know are virtuous, are virtuous. If we can tell—as we must be able to in order to obtain
starting points for our ethical inquiry—that a particular act is courageous, for instance,
we now know that this action lies in the mean. So we can explain its rightness by
pointing out that this act is neither excessive nor deficient. This, of course, is merely a
rudimentary sketch of an explanatory schema—Aristotle provides us with additional
details about virtues in general in the remainder of book II, and with more specific
details on how to fill out this schema for each particular virtue in books III through V
—
but we can now already identify the basic structure of the explanation: if an act is right,
then we should be able to identify a scale on which it is neither excessive nor deficient.
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Aristotle is well aware of the fact that what he has given us so far is extremely
undeveloped, and indeed, he goes on to expound on this explanatory model in several
phases. First, right after presenting the bare bones of the proposed explanatory schema,
Aristotle discusses some general features of virtues: lie tells us that a mark of an action
performed virtuously is that the agent of the action takes pleasure in performing the
action (11.3); he distinguishes between a virtuous action and an action performed
virtuously (11.4); and he identifies the genus and differentia of virtue (II.5-6). By the end
of II.6 we get Aristotle's definition of virtue: “We may thus conclude that virtue or
excellence is a characteristic involving choice, and that it consists in observing the mean
relative to us, a mean which is defined by a rational principle, such as a man of practical
wisdom would use to determine it." ( 1 1 ()6b35- 1 107al, Ostwald trans.) Now this
provides us with a bit more detail regarding the explanation of why particular actions
arc virtuous. Consider: “Why is this action of standing one’s ground in battle
courageous?" We can now answer this question as follows: “This action is courageous
because the agent chooses to perform this action, and it is located in the mean (relative
to the agent)
1
1
of some relevant scale.” Moreover, we now know that if the agent takes
pleasure in performing this courageous action, then he is not only performing a virtuous
action, but also performing it virtuously.
But this explanatory model is still extremely rudimentary, and we must learn
how to fill out this schema informatively for particular cases in order to provide
explanations of the rightness or wrongness of the relevant actions. Aristotle turns to this
in II. 7:
11
See II. 6: 1 106a30-b4.
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However, (his general statement is not enough; we must also show that it
fits particular instances. For in a discussion of moral actions, although
the general statements have a wider range of application, statements on
particular points have more truth in them: actions are concerned with
particulars and our statements must harmonize with them.” ( I 107a28-33,
Ostwald trails.)
We already know that in order to explain why a particular act is virtuous we
must locate this action in the mean of some relevant scale—this statement has a wide
range of application—hut in order to appreciate its truth, we must see how it applies to
particular virtuous actions and make sure that the results of the application of the
schema harmonizes with the facts— i.c., that the application of this explanatory schema
generates correct result. So in 11.7 Aristotle lists various scales that are relevant to each
virtue.
Moreover, when possible, Aristotle also introduces the relevant vocabulary we
should use in our explanation. For example, if we want to explain why an act is
courageous, we should probably locate the agent’s emotional state while performing the
1
2
action as a mean on a scale (or scales) “ of fear and conlidcnce; the agent might be
reckless if lie exceeds in confidence, or cowardly if lie is deficient in confidence. If we
want to explain why an action is generous we should probably locate the action as a
mean on a scale ranging from stinginess to extravagance.
Aristotle goes on to list relevant scales for other virtues. Yet he is well aware
that even now we have only been given a rough sketch—"For our present purposes, we
|
~)
~ The feelings of fear and confidence are, quite plausibly, two distinct types of
emotions rather than extremes of one type of emotion (see, for example, Pears ( 1980)).
My proposed interpretation of Aristotle is compatible with both readings—whether
Aristotle intended courage to be concerned with one scale or with two different scales.
The main point is that if an action is courageous, then the explanation of this fact
involves locating the action performed and/or the agent’s emotion as a mean on the
relevant scale(s).
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must rest content with an outline and a summary, hut we shall later define these
qualities more precisely" ( I 1 07b 1 5, Ostwald trails.)—albeit a bit more substantive than
what we had so far. By the end of II. 7. if we are asked, for example, why Ms. Smith’s
act of donating $100,000 to cancer research is generous, we could say that she chose to
perform this action, and that given her economic and social situation, donating
$100,000 to this cause was neither stringy nor extravagant. Moreover, if we know that
she took pleasure in her generous donation, we know that she has acted generously.
It is important to note that this explanatory schema does not generate deductive
explanations. From the fact that Ms. Smith’s action was neither stringy nor extravagant
it does not follow that her action was right or virtuous. There may have been other,
more urgent, causes to donate too, or there could have been good reasons not to donate
to the particular organization that she had chosen. Unlike the Hempelian model of
explanation (discussed in Chapter Three), this model of explanation is not syntactical,
and the explanandum does not logically follow form the cxplanans. (Recall that
Aristotle claims that we “should not demand to know the reason why in the same way in
all matters,” and that explanations in ethics “do not admit of demonstrations.”) This is
why it is important for Aristotle that we already know that the action is right before we
explain why it is right; that the aet is right is part of the data we have available to us
when we explain why it is so.
I believe that my proposal helps us to make sense of several features of
Aristotle’s work that commentators have found perplexing. First, it helps us understand
the importance of the doctrine of the mean for Aristotle's project. Some readers of the
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Nicomachean Ethics have been puzzled by the seriousness with which Aristotle
approaches the doctrine of the mean. As Broadie ( 1991
)
puts is:
Aristotle regards | the doctrine of the mean| as an important contribution,
to judge by the solemnity with which he introduces it and the many
pages where lie strains over the details of its application. Yet the
doctrine often gets a disappointed reception. It seems at first to offer
special illumination, but in the end, according to its critics, it only deals
with truisms together with a questionable taxonomy of virtues and vices.
(95)
On my reading, the doctrine of the mean plays an important explanatory role
which lies at the heart of Aristotle's project. Apart from presenting the explanatory
schema itself. Aristotle equips us with a rich theoretical framework and extensive
vocabulary that we ought to employ in our explanations of the rightness of those acts
that are right; this is why he methodically gives us the names of the virtues and vices
that have names, as well as the names of the qualities that resemble virtues, but are not
quite virtues.
Moreover, since the details of the explanation in each particular case will differ
based on the particular features of that action whose rightness we want to explain, it is
important to give many examples of how this is done. This is why Aristotle gives us
many examples of the application of the generic schema. In the case of courage, for
instance, Aristotle suggests different possible objects of fear (e.g., death, poverty,
disease), and various contexts in which one could exemplify courage (e.g.. in battle, at
sea, in illness). “He is courageous,” we arc told,
who endures and fears the right things, for the right motive, in the right
manner, and at the right time, and who displays confidence in similar
ways. For a courageous man feels and acts according to the merits of
each case and as reason guides him.” (III. 7: II 15b 19-20, Ostwald trails.)
143
When we explain the rightness of a particular courageous action, we must
replace the hedges (“the right things,” “in the right manner,” etc.,) with the specifics of
the particular action;
13
for example, his action was courageous because he joined the
army and risked his life in order to protect his country, when no non-military option was
available in order to resolve the conflict (and so forth). The only generic thing we could
say about courageous actions is that they are done for the sake of the noble (III. 7:
1 I 1 5b23-24).
We also get examples of types of excess and deficiency (111 5b25- 1 I 1 6a3), and
a list of characteristics similar to courage that arc not quite courage (III. 8), including
some famous examples of cases in which these qualities were displayed. ( I 1 16a20-25).
With these finer distinctions, we should be able to explain why certain actions that may
appear courageous are not completely courageous; for instance, although an act may
seem like a courageous act it only resembles courage if the agent acts as a result of
excessive optimism, or if she performs an action in ignorance of the dangers this action
involves ( 1 I 1 7a 1 0-27). And the same holds for other virtues; the more examples we get
of the application of the general schema with respect to different virtues, and the more
examples we get of various states that are similar to virtue but differ from it, the more
confident we will be about the appropriateness of our generic schema, and the better
prepared we will be to apply it in new situations. “It will be no bad plan,” Aristotle tells
us in IV. 7, “to describe these states [that have no name| as well; for we shall both know
1
1
.See, for example. III. 1 : “What sort of things are to be chosen, and in return for what,
it is not easy to state; for there arc many differences in the particular cases.” ( 1 I 10b8,
Ross trans.) And 1 1 1.4: “What is good and pleasant differs with different characteristics
and conditions, and perhaps the chief distinction of a man of high moral standards is his
ability to see the truth in each particular moral question, since he is, as it were, the
standard and measure for such questions.” ( I 1 1 3a3 1 -34, Ostwald trans.)
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llie facts about character better if we go through them in detail, and we shall be
convinced that the virtues are means if we see this to be so in all eases." ( I 1 27a 14-16,
Ross trails.)
Rosalind Hursthouse expresses another difficulty that my proposed
interpretation helps to resolve. In her essay ‘A False Doctrine of the Mean', she argues,
. 1
4
as the title of her paper aptly indicates, that the doctrine ol the mean is false. “What 1
want to illustrate,” she tells us, “is that right object and right occasion ... cannot be
specified as means, and that, more generally, some vices that correspond to the virtues
of temperance, courage, and what is usually translated as ‘patience’ or ‘gentleness’
—
the right disposition with respect to anger—cannot be understood as dispositions to
exhibit or feel an emotion (a pathos) too much or too little.” ( 1980:61-2)
Hursthouse provides several examples of vicious acts that cannot be described
as excessive or deficient, and concludes that “Some of the wrong objects which the
greedy and wicked person enjoy would still be wrong simply in so far as they were
contrary to what is honorable; if they were eases of excess this would be accidental.”
(64) Another example she considers involves adultery:
It might be that one had moderate, or even unnaturally low, sexual drive.
But if one has any sexual drive at all and cares naught for what is
honorable, then one will be disposed to commit licentious acts of
‘adultery’.” (66)
1 ‘
14
More accurately, her target is Urmson’s ( 1973) interpretation of the doctrine of the
mean.
15
It is peculiar that Hursthouse includes this particular example, since, as I am sure she
is well aware, Aristotle specifically discusses adultery as an example of a wrong action
that cannot be describes as ‘too much...' or ‘loo little...’ and as an action that cannot be
performed with the right woman, at the right time and so forth: “In eases of this sort, let
us say adultery, rightness and wrongness do not depend on committing it with the right
woman at the right time and in the right manner, but the mere fact of committing such
actions at all is to do wrong. It would be just as absurd to suppose that there is a mean,
145
Similarly, with respect to courage she argues that there are some objects that arc
not appropriate objects of fear, and these objects cannot be described as ‘too much of
or ‘too little of...'. These observations, Hursthouse claims, raise the following
questions:
Why does Aristotle talk in terms of excess and deficiency, too... and
too... at all? Why should he not rest content with saying that men may
go wrong in countless ways, but hit the target and achieve excellence in
only one ( 1 106b30ff) rather than even suggesting that, for each virtue,
there are just two opposed ways of going wrong? (68)
l( '
The answer to Hursthouse’s questions, 1 maintain, is this: Aristotle identification
of the virtuous act as lying in the mean between excess and deficiency is the essence of
the explanatory schema he proposes. It is true that actions can go wrong in countless
ways, but this statement doesn’t explain why the right ones are right.
Now it is important to realize that Aristotle’s schema is supposed to help us
explain why right actions are right; the explanation involves finding the relevant scale
on which the action (or emotion) is in the mean. But even though the rightness of every
right action ought to be explained by locating some scale on which this action is a
median (relative to the agent and /or the situation), it does not follow that the wrongness
an excess, and a deficiency in an unjust or a cowardly or a self-indulgent act.”
(1 107a 1 5- 19, Ostwald trans.)
1,1
Hursthouse’s own answer to this question is this: “The explanation is—that's just the
way we happen to be; we just do wrong in these two ways. Similarly, the explanation of
why the two vices should be opposed, as excess to deficiency is—that’s just the way
things happen to turn out; fear works that way with us. The possibility of the ‘fearless
phobic’ shows that things might have been otherwise. If he were as common as the
cowardly and the fearless, there would be three vices not two. If he and the cowardly
were common and no-one was fearless, there would be two vices but they would not be
opposed ones” (69). I find this solution unsatisfying. There are instances where
Aristotle asserts that one of the extremes is uncommon; nevertheless, Aristotle insists
on identifying the relevant virtues as a means between two extremes, which are viees.
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of every wrong action ought to be explained by identifying a scale on which it is
excessive or deficient. As 1 see it. being in the mean on the relevant scale is a necessary,
but not sufficient, condition for the rightness of an action. So if there is no relevant scale
to locate an action on, this action cannot be right. Furthermore, an adequate explanation
of the rightness of an action will also have to replace the “hedges” of the generic
schema— i.e., the right time, the right object, the right people, etc., —with the specific
details of the ease in hand.
Following Hursthouse's lead. Broadic ( 1991 ) also questions the generality of the
doctrine of the mean as follows:
Although some wrong responses are wrong because they are too high or
too low on some scale or other, not all wrong responses can be faulted in
such a way, unless metaphorically. What does a person do too much or
too little when he agrees to sell secrets to a foreign power? ( 100)
The answer to Broadie’s question will depend, of course, on the particular
details of the ease we are evaluating. If in this particular situation selling secrets to a
foreign power is the right thing to do, then the agent's act might be wrong because he
was too greedy, or because he wasn't scared enough, or too scared, or what not.
However, more typical acts of treason are not right actions. If there are no good reasons
to sell secrets to a foreign power, for example, then an act of selling secrets to a foreign
power would be wrong not in virtue of being excessive or deficient, but in virtue of not
being a mean on any relevant scale. In 11.6 Aristotle is quite explicit about this point:
Not every action nor every emotion admits of a mean. There are some
actions and emotions whose very names connote baseness, c.g., spile,
shamelessness, envy; and among actions, adultery, theft, and murder.
These and similar emotions and actions imply by their very names that
they are bad; it is not their excess nor their deficiency which is called
bad. It is, therefore, impossible ever to do right in performing them: to
perform them is always to do wrong. In cases of this sort, let us say
147
adultery, rightness and wrongness do not depend on committing it with
the right woman at the right time and in the right manner, but the mere
fact of committing such actions at all is to do wrong. It would be just as
absurd to suppose that there is a mean, an excess, and a deficiency in an
unjust or a cowardly or a self-indulgent act. ( 1 107a9- 1 9. Ostwald trails.)
In this passage Aristotle tells us that some emotions and actions are wrong not in
virtue of being excessive or deficient. A typical case of murder is simply wrong even
though it would be absurd to describe it as ‘too much ..." or ‘too little...’ Contrary to
some commentators who read this paragraph as indicating that Aristotle—his repeated
comments on the lack of fixity in ethics not withstanding—does, in fact, think that
morality can be codified (e.g., murder is always morally wrong),
17
I believe that this
passage demonstrates that Aristotle thinks that there is an asymmetry between the
explanation of why right acts arc right, and why wrong ones are wrong. In order to
explain the rightness of an action we must follow Aristotle’s explanatory schema. This
schema is meant to explain why right acts are right, and why some acts that may appear
right are, in fact, wrong in virtue of being excessive or deficient on the relevant scale, or
in virtue of failing to properly discharge the “hedges” (in the right time, with the right
object, etc.,). But there arc some wrong actions and emotions whose very description
ought to be sufficient in order to establish their wrongness—their very names imply that
they arc bad—so no further explanation I required.
Now it is certainly true that Aristotle's discussion of vicious acts focuses on
wrong acts that involve excess and deficiency. I think there are two reasons for this.
First, discussion of the vices involved in excess and deficiency help us to understand the
17
See, for example, Irwin (2000)
148
relevant virtues better; it shows us how the explanation of the rightness of actions would
work in cases where one performs a right action in which the same scale is involved.
Second, and more importantly—and this, I believe, provides further evidence for
my interpretation of Aristotle as offering an explanatory schema—the wrongness of a
standard case of treason, to return to Broadie’s example, is not a phenomenon that
(typically) requires an explanation. When one knows full well the details of a
(paradigmatic) particular act of treason, and there are no doubts about the facts of the
case, the question: "Why was it wrong for Mr. Smith to betray his fellow citizens?” is
rarely, if ever, asked. Indeed, it seems natural to expect that anyone who asks this
question is missing some important fact about the case we are evaluating.
IS
And while it
is common in modern moral ethical works to ask questions like “Why is torturing
babies for fun wrong?”, we do not find these kinds of questions in Aristotle. Aristotle
may well have though that the wrongness of treason, or the wrongness of torturing
babies, is simply obvious and that since it is obvious, no explanation is required; indeed,
it seems plausible to assume that the kind of person who is puzzled about why these acts
are wrong would be disqualified as a proper hearer of Aristotle's lectures.
The closest Aristotle comes to discussing cases like these is in VII. 5, where lie
mentions "the female who, they say, rips open pregnant women and devours the infants,
or of the things in which some of the tribes about the Black Sea that have gone savage
are said to delight— in raw meat or in human flesh, or in lending their children to one
another to feast upon—or of the story told of Phalaris,” ( 1 148b20-23) and "the man
who sacrificed and ate his mother, or with the slave who ate the liver of his fellow.”
1 S o
Sec Gass (1957) on what lie calls “clear cases.”
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(1 148b25-6, Ross trails.) All that Aristotle has to say about these cases is that they are
instances of brutish characteristics, and brutishness, he tells us, is beyond the limits of
vice.
Another interesting problem that my account resolves is a puzzle that has been
largely ignored by most commentators. In his discussion of pleasure as the mark of
virtue in II. 3, Aristotle mentions and criticizes those who define virtues as “states of
freedom from emotion and of quietude.” ( I 104b23, Ostwald trans.) His critique of this
account of virtue may seem quite odd. Hl says: “However, they [who so define virtue
|
make the mistake of using these terms absolutely and without adding such qualifications
as ‘in the right manner," ‘at the right time," and so forth.” ( 1 104b24-25, Ostwald trans.)
Now Aristotle's own definition of virtue as it appears in II.6 (quoted above) is
incompatible with the definition of virtue as “freedom from emotion and quietude.”
And clearly enough, it is also incompatible with the definition of virtue as “states of
freedom from emotions and quietude in the right manner, at the right time, and so
forth.” For Aristotle, an essential component of virtuous activity is the right emotional
response; a virtuous action is not an act that is free from emotion, but rather an act that
involves the appropriate emotion. So what should we make of Aristotle’s critique of
this view?
As I see it, Aristotle’s criticism of this view is categorical; this view is not to be
rejected in virtue of its content, although we soon learn that its content is false as well,
but rather it ought to be rejected because it is the wrong kind of definition. Virtue
simply cannot be defined absolutely and without adding such qualifications as ‘in the
right manner,’ ‘at the right time," so we can dismiss unqualified definition even before
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we assess their content. Now this comment appears in 11.3, shortly alter Aristotle insists
that despite the lack of fixity in ethics, “we must give what help we can." (as discussed
above). This point is important because it reveals that Aristotle believes that the
explanations of the rightness of actions cannot be deductive; the “principles” of
rightness we ought to seek will be hedged generalization, or ceteris paribus
generalizations. But although we cannot formulate necessary and sufficient condition
for right actions, we can construct moral theories that consist of hedged generalizations
that enable us to explain moral phenomena.
One might worry that the explanatory schema that I am attributing to Aristotle is
vacuous in the sense that we may be able to construct an explanation in accordance with
this schema for any action, regardless of whether it is right or wrong. In other words,
that we can identify a scale on which the action we are evaluating is a mean, and that
we can discharge the hedges w ith specific features of the action we arc evaluating, gives
us no indication that the action is, in fact, right. But first, as we have seen in the passage
from II.6 (1 107a9-19, quoted above), according to Aristotle not every action or emotion
can be located on a mean on some scale or other; “It would be ... absurd to suppose that
there is a mean, an excess, and a deficiency in an unjust or a cowardly or a self-
indulgent act.” ( I 1 07a 1 9, Ostwald trails.) And second, we must not forget that this
explanatory schema is not supposed to help us identify right actions; that the acts we
identify as right are right is our staring point.
4.4 The Practical Goal of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics
So far, I have claimed that Aristotle's goal is to help us understand why those
acts that we already know are right have the normative status they have. In other words,
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I proposed thal Aristotle is not trying to answer the question “Which of the actions
available to me is morally right?” but rather, his account is meant to answer a different
questions, namely: "Given that, as I already know, this action is morally right, what is it
about this action that makes it right?”
One might object to this interpretation of Aristotle’s project because it may seem
as though this interpretation does not do justice to Aristotle's proclaimed practical
ambitions in the Nicomachean Ethics. In 1.3 Aristotle tells us that “the end of this kind
of study |i.e., the study of political science and ethics | is not knowledge but action.”
( 1095a6, Ostwald) And in II. 2 Aristotle repeats this point: “The purpose of the present
study is not, as it is in other inquiries, the attainment of theoretical knowledge: wc are
not conducting this inquiry in order to know what virtue is, but in order to become
,19
good, else there would be no advantage in studying it." ( 1 l()3b26-29, Ostwald trans.)
But if my proposed interpretation were correct, the objector might argue, then
Aristotle's project is entirely theoretical; if I am right, then Aristotle's account docs not
help us to identify morally right actions, but instead it only provides us with theoretical
knowledge about why right acts are right. However, since it is unreasonable to think
that Aristotle so radically missed the practical target he has set for this inquiry, we must
reject the particularist reading of the Nicomachean Ethics that I put forward in the
previous section.
That Aristotle expects his work on ethics to be practically useful might seem
surprising regardless of whether we interpret him as presenting a particularist account of
morality. Joachim ( 1951 ) in his commentary on the Ethics is, in fact, puzzled by
19
See also 1.2: 1094a22-4 and X.9: 1 179a35-b4
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Aristotle's practical aspirations. Joachim claims that Aristotle's comments on the
practical goal of his inquiry suggest that Aristotle is uninterested in theoretical
knowledge concerning human conduct.
The reasoning about human conduct and character, | Aristotle | insists, is
only with a view to influencing action. His object is not understanding
—
merely to understand, apparently, even if possible, is valueless—hut to
guide and improve life.” ( 15)
Having stated Aristotle's goals as he does, Joachim is, perhaps unsurprisingly,
disappointed with the kind of practical advice Aristotle has to offer. Indeed, he claims
that in this respect Aristotle's ethical writings are in a glaring dissonance with
Aristotle's own description of his project: "It is difficult to sympathize with Aristotle’s
views here,” he writes,
difficult even to slate them fairly, because they represent a position so
different from that of most modern philosophy. Why should not the
philosopher reflect upon the conduct of his contemporaries and of
preceding generations... why should not his reflection be directed simply
to understand, i.e., to attain to that measure of insight which is possible
for human intelligence in this sphere? ... And why, finally, should a
speculative inquiry into the phenomena of conduct be rejected as
worthless? ... Aristotle’s own practice hardly squares with his
theory. ..in fact, | Aristotle's | own intelligence is actively engaged in the
theoretical study of conduct and in that study it is free and unprevented
by emotion or by the aims of action: and very few thinkers have
contributed so much to the theoretical investigation of the facts of
conduct as Aristotle himself has done in the Nicomachean Ethics and the
Politics." (15-16)
It seems to me that Joachim is clearly correct in highlighting the fact that a large
portion of Aristotle’s ethical work—indeed, arguably all of it— is distinctively
theoretical in nature, and that Aristotle's lasting contribution to moral philosophy
consists in the sophisticated and insightful theoretical framework he constructed.
Moreover, given Aristotle's wide range of philosophical interests, it would be quite
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surprising if Aristotle had thought that one ought not to reflect on moral conduct—be it
one's own conduct or the conduct of others—or if he had thought that theoretical
knowledge in matters of conduct is worthless. As Joachim rightly asks, why would
Aristotle think that theoretical knowledge in other areas of inquiry is valuable, while in
matters of conduct it is worthless? So what should we make of Aristotle’s repealed
remarks regarding the practical goals of his inquiry?
In order to answer this question, and in order to evaluate the objection to the
particulars! interpretation of Aristotle mentioned above, we have to get clear on the
nature of Aristotle's practical ambitions. What would it lake for an ethical treatise to be
practical? How could a series of lectures (or a book) help us “to become good”?
One way for an ethical treatise to help us to become good is by formulating a
(correct) decision procedure—an algorithm that takes as its input information available
to the agent and gives as its output an action that the agent ought to perform. However,
one would search in vain through the pages of the Nicomachean Ethics for anything that
resembles a practicable decision procedure. And consequently, one who thought that
Aristotle’s goal is to help us to identify which of the many actions available to us at any
given moment is an act that we ought to perform, is bound to find Aristotle’s account
wanting. But if Aristotle is not trying to formulate a decision procedure, how does he
expect his work to help us to become good?
I propose that Aristotle's main practical ambition is to help his students perform
those actions that they already know are right in a virtuous manner. As we have seen,
Aristotle distinguished between performing a virtuous action, and performing an action
virtuously ( 11.4). A eudaimon life, according to Aristotle, is a life that involves virtuous
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activity in the strong sense—that is, a life that consists of not only virtuous actions, but
of virtuous actions performed virtuously. As we shall see, Aristotle does not think that
one could learn how to act virtuously merely by gaining theoretical knowledge.
Nevertheless, he does believe that theoretical knowledge is necessary for acting
virtuously, or at least, that it could help one learn how to act virtuously. By
understanding why right acts are right, and what it lakes to perform these acts
virtuously, we may be able to understand in what ways we miss this mark when we do.
and possibly modify our actions in order to habituate the proper emotional responses
that would enable us to hit the mark, or at least come closer to the mark, in future
actions.
At the very beginning of the Nicomarhean Ethics Aristotle argues that there
must be one chief good which is the end of all our actions, and he indicates that the
motivation for his inquiry is practical. “If, then, there is some end of the things we do,
which we desire for its own sake,” Aristotle writes in 1.2.
clearly this must be the good and the chief good. Will not the knowledge
of it, then, have a great influence on life? Shall we not, like archers who
have a mark to aim at, be more likely to hit upon what is right?”
( 1094a 18-24, Ross trans.)
The purpose of this inquiry, we are told, is to identify the chief good. Knowledge
of this good is supposed to be useful or practical in the same way in which identifying a
target is useful or beneficial to an archer. In the remainder of Book 1, we learn more
about the chief good; we find out that different kinds of things have different functions,
and that what is good for each kind of thing is to perform its function well. Thus we
learn that "the good of man is an activity of the soul in conformity with excellence or
virtue.” (1.7: 1098al5, Ostwald trans.) In book II, as we have seen in the previous
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section, we get an account ol the nature ol virtue and virtuous activity. Knowledge of
the chief good, which includes knowledge of particular virtues and the doctrine of the
mean, is meant to be useful by way of setting a target for us to aim at.
It is important to realize that having a target to aim at is important not only in
order to determine whether a shot is successful, but also in order to identify where those
shots that miss the bull's eye hit relative to it. Indeed, knowing in what direction one
missed the bull's eye is essential in order to calibrate the sights of one’s weapon, or in
order to be able to correct for one’s mistakes in those shots that were unsuccessful. A
qualified student for these lectures can already tell whether an act is virtuous— i.e.,
whether it hit the bull's eye—but without a target to aim at, she would not know in what
way she missed the mark when she did— i.e., where those shots that missed the bull’s
eye hit relative to it—and what she needs to do in order to hit the mark in the future.
The archery metaphor is instructive in another way. Having a target to aim at,
though clearly helpful in hitting the mark, is not enough; we are not likely to hit the
bull's eye consistently unless we practice the art of archery. Yet the fact that we must
practice archery in addition to identifying the target in order to be able to hit the bull's
For an interesting discussion of the relationship between Aristotle’s thoughts on
eudaimonia in Book I, and his theory of the moral virtues see Broadie (2006). Broadic
identifies two levels of moral theorizing in Aristotle, which she dubs “architectonic”
and “ground-level” (or “quotidian”). The architectonic level is focused on the final goal
of human activity
—
eudaimonia—and its goal is to “articulate and implement the best
arrangement overall for life in human society.” (351 ) Architectonic thinking, according
to Broadie, is independent of any particular context. Instead, it is concerned with "life-
shaping arrangements that are hard to reverse: those that make the context of everything
else.” (351) Ground-level practical thinking, in contrast, concerns practical thinking
about particular actions within given contexts. According to Broadie “Architectonic
thinking engaged in by Aristotle is first and foremost what is producing the whole
inquiry ... the | ground-level | thinking that typifies the phronimos figures oidy as one of
the subject matters ... | it is
|
part of | the architectonic | goal as correctly elucidated."
(351-2)
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eye does not undermine the practical significance of having a target to aim at, nor does
it entail that learning to identify our target is not learning something of great practical
import.
With these observations in mind, let us examine Aristotle's comments about his
practical ambitions more carefully, starting with his comment in 1.3:
1 1 | a young man is not equipped to be a student of politics; for he has no
experience in the actions which life demands of him, and these actions
form the basis and subject matter of the discussion. |2| Moreover, since
he follows his emotions, his study will be pointless and unprofitable, for
the end of this kind of study is not knowledge but action. |3| Whether he
is young in years or immature in character makes no difference; for his
deficiency is not a matter of time but of living and of pursuing all his
interests under the influence of his emotions. |4| Knowledge brings no
benefit to this kind of person, just as it brings none to the morally weak.
1 5 1 But those who regulate their desires and actions by a rational
principle will greatly benefit from a knowledge of this subject.” (1.3:
1095a3-12 Ostwald trails.)
One reason why young men are not Aristotle's preferred audience is their lack
of experience 1 1 1, as we discussed in the previous section. But there is another reason:
young men tend to follow their emotions. And this is why the study of ethics would not
help them in action |2|. Our goal is not merely theoretical; in order to become eitdaimon
it is not enough to know that all our actions aim at eudaimonia, or that we ought to act
virtuously, or even to know what virtue is. This knowledge might help us to achieve this
goal. But this knowledge will not help us to become good if we do not put this
knowledge to use, in much the same way that for an archer, having a target to aim at
will not help her hit the bull's eye if she doesn't make use of the knowledge she gains
by seeing where her missed shots hit relative to the bull's eye. One who is guided by
one's emotions, like the weak willed person, is clearly not guided by one's knowledge,
and consequently knowledge of why right actions are right, or why some actions that
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resemble virtuous actions are not virtuous, provides no practical benefits to those who
act impulsively |4|. And this is no less true of adults who act impulsively than it is of
young men [3|.
Pace Joachim, I do not think that Aristotle believes that theoretical knowledge is
worthless; instead, it seems to me that Aristotle thinks that theoretical knowledge has
great instrumental value—at least for certain kinds of people. Those whose actions can
be guided by reason will greatly benefit from the knowledge they will gain from these
lectures |5). So Aristotle's practical goal is to provide knowledge to those people who
can pul it to use, and he is well aware that not many people can do this:
Argument and teaching, I am afraid, are not effective in all eases: the
soul of the listener must first have been conditioned by habits to the right
kind of likes and dislikes... for a man whose life is guided by emotion
will not listen to an argument that dissuades him, nor will he understand
it. How can we possibly persuade a man like that to change his ways?
And in general it seems that emotion docs not yield to argument but only
to force. Therefore, there must first be a character that somehow has an
affinity for excellence or virtue, a character that loves what is noble and
feels disgust at what is base. (X.9: I l79b24-30, Ostwald trails.)
So proper students for these lectures must not only be able to identify virtuous
actions, but they must also be the kind of persons who are motivated to become
virtuous, and can overcome their emotions and “regulate their desires and actions by a
rational principle.”
It is worth noting that Aristotle says nothing that is incompatible with the
thought that theoretical knowledge in ethics is intrinsically valuable. So given
Aristotle’s interests in theoretical knowledge in all other areas of inquiry, it is, perhaps,
more plausible to read Aristotle as arguing that in so far as we are interested in acting
well, theoretical knowledge has instrumental value. And although theoretical
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knowledge about matters of eonduet also has intrinsic value independent of its
contribution to helping us to become eutlainion , for the purposes of our current inquiry
we should focus on its instrumental value.
In II. 2, Aristotle diseusses the unique practical purpose of the study of ethics:
[6 1 The purpose of the present study is not, as it is in other inquiries, the
attainment of theoretical knowledge: |7| we are not conducting this
inquiry in order to know what virtue is, but in order to become good,
else there would be no advantage in studying it. |8| For that reason, it
becomes necessary to examine the problem of action, and to ask how
they arc to be performed. |9| For, as we have said, the actions determine
what kind of characteristics are developed. ( 1 103b26-30, Ostwald trails.)
Some inquiries are conducted solely for the sake of intellectual edification, yet
this investigation has an additional goal |6J; in ethics and in politics we are also
concerned with acting well. Since a significant portion of the Nicomachean Ethics is
devoted to elucidating what virtue is, it is plausible to understand Aristotle's claim that
"we are not conducting this inquiry in order to know what virtue is," as saying that we
are not conducting this inquiry merely in order to know what virtue is. Aristotle’s
comments in X.9 seem to support this interpretation:
The aim of studies about action, as we say, is surely not to study and
know about a given thing, but rather to act on our knowledge. Hence
knowing about virtue is not enough
,
but we must also try to possess and
exercise virtue, or become good in any other way. ( I 1 79b I
-4, Irwin
trails. My Italics)
Our goal is to become eudaimon
,
and knowledge of what virtue is, in so far as it
is a means to this end, is advantageous |7|. But even though knowledge in these matters
might well be intrinsically valuable, its contribution to good conduct is not automatic.
In order to see how knowledge relates to action we must understand how actions are
performed |8|, and how actions relate to character and virtue [9].
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In 11.4 Aristotle turns to the question how virtuous actions are performed when
they arc performed virtuously, and how such action are related to the virtuous person's
character:
1 1 0 1 But in the case of the virtues an act is not performed justly or with
self-control if the act itself is of a certain kind, hut only if in addition the
agent has certain characteristics as he performs it: 1 1 1 1 first of all, he
must know what he is doing; 1 1 2 1 secondly, he must choose to act the
way he does, and he must choose it for its own sake; 1 1 3 1 and in the third
place, the act must spring from a firm and unchangeable character... ( 14
1
In other words, acts are called just and self-controlled when they are the
kind of acts which a just and self-controlled man would perform; 1 15]
hut the just and self-controlled man is not he who performs these acts,
but he who performs them in the way just and self-controlled men do.
( 1 I05a29-b9, Ostwald trails.)
In this passage we learn that in order to become eudaimon it is not enough to
perform virtuous actions, hut we must perform these actions virtuously 1 1()|. In order to
act virtuously one must know what one is doing 1 1 1 1; one must choose the action one is
performing for its own sake 1 12], and. finally, the action must “spring from” one’s
character 1 1 3 1 . So even though we were able to identify virtuous actions even before we
began reading Aristotle's work, we now know that there is more to acting virtuously
than performing virtuous actions 1 1 4 1 ; we must learn how to perform these actions in
the way that a virtuous person would perform them 1 15]. And this is exactly what
Aristotle hopes to teach us.
Teaching people how to act virtuously is clearly a practical goal. Nevertheless,
one of the requirements for acting virtuously is that one must know what one is doing;
so at least some knowledge is required. Now it is not completely clear what knowledge
Aristotle has in mind here," but it seems plausible to read Aristotle as claiming that one
~ l
See, for instance, Taylor (2006), esp. pp. 83-94.
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must know why the action one is performing is right in order to act virtuously.
Aristotle's claim that knowledge is the least important condition of the three conditions
he mentions ( I I()5b2) is compatible with this interpretation, since we can imagine
people performing virtuous actions even though they lack knowledge of moral theory,
and hence do not know why the right actions they perform are right. The knowledge
requirement, it seems, can be compensated for by ample experience, as Aristotle
explains in VI. 1 1
:
We ought to pay as much attention to the sayings and opinions,
undemonstrated though they are, of wise and experienced older men as
we do to demonstrated truths. For experience has given such men an eye
with which they can see correctly." ( I 1 43b I 1-14, Ostwald, trails.)
And again in X.9:
Of course, there is probably nothing to prevent even a person with no
scientific knowledge from taking good care of a particular case, if he has
accurately observed by experience what happens in a particular case, just
as there are some who seem to be their own best physicians, even though
they are incapable of giving aid to another. Nevertheless, if a man wants
to master a skill or art of some theoretical knowledge, he ought, one
would think, probably to go to a universal principle, and to gain
knowledge of it as best as possible. For, as we have stated, it is with this
that (he sciences arc concerned. ( I 180b 16-23, Ostwald trails.)
While the knowledge requirement has “little or no importance" because it can be
made up for by sufficient experience, the other requirements “count not for a little but
are all-decisive." ( 1 105b3) One must act from a stable character in order to act
virtuously, and clearly enough, one cannot develop the proper characteristics simply by
engaging in philosophical theorizing:
1 1 6 1 Thus our assertion that a man becomes just by performing just acts
and self-controlled by performing acts of self-control is correct: without
performing them, nobody could ever be on the way to becoming good.
1 1 7 1 Yet most men do not perform such acts, but by taking refuge in
argument they think that they are engaged in philosophy and that they
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will become good in this way. 1 18| In so doing, they act like sick men
who listen attentivel) > what the doctor says, but fail to do any of the
things he prescribes. ( 19| That kind of philosophical activity will not
bring health to the soul any more than this sort of treatment will produce
a healthy body. (1 1 05b 1 0- 1 8. Ostwald traits.)
In order to develop the proper characteristics, one must form the right habits;
and in order to form the right habits, one must engage in the right kinds of activities. So
in order to develop a virtuous character one must perform virtuous actions 1 1 6 1
.
Philosophical theorizing is no substitute for genuine moral practice 1 17|. The
failure of “those who lake refuge in argument” is not that they seek theoretical
knowledge, but that they wrongly believe that theoretical knowledge is all that is needed
in order to become eudaimon | 1 7 1 . But theoretical knowledge is important—indeed, this
knowledge is necessary, though not sufficient, for a healthy soul—since it provides us
with a target to aim at. Aristotle's metaphor is, again, illuminating: a sick man must
listen to what the doctor says, and must also follow the doctor's instructions in order to
get healthy. Our theoretical study is analogous to the doctor’s orders 1 19]. And those
who believe that theoretical knowledge is all that is required are akin to those who listen
to the doctor but fail to follow the doctor’s advice 1 18|.
Recall that the qualified students for Aristotle's lectures can already identify
right actions, and they can already tell apart virtuous actions from vicious ones. Yet
although such students can typically know whether the actions they perform are right or
wrong, they might not know why they have the normative status they have, and
consequently, they might not know what they need to do in order to act virtuously in the
future. However, once they study Aristotle’s lectures they will learn why right acts are
right, and consequently, they may understand why and how their actions that weren't
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right missed their mark, and why and how the acts they got right were successful. If
they understand in what way they missed their mark when they did. they may he able to
correct for these mistakes in the future. For example, while I might have known that my
behavior in battle was not virtuous, I can now know that it wasn't virtuous because I fell
too much fear. I now know that in order to act virtuously I need to be less fearful and
more confident, and I can choose to perform actions to help me to become less fearful.
Likewise, I might have known that my act of donating $50 to charity was not virtuous,
but I now know that it wasn’t virtuous because given my financial situation, I should
have donated more.
“It is no easy task to be good,” Aristotle tells us in 11.9,
for in everything it is no easy task to find the middle, c.g. to find the
middle of a circle is not for every one but for him who knows; so, too,
any one can get angry—that is easy—or give or spend money; but to do
this to the right person, to the right extent, at the right time, with the
right motive, and in the right way, that is not for every one. nor is it
easy. ( I 109a24-29, Ross trans.)
Yet although becoming good is undoubtedly difficult, once we are able to
recognize how we go wrong when we do, we may be able to fix it. And in II.9 Aristotle
gives us some practical advice on how we should do this. “Hence he who aims at the
intermediate must first depart from what is the more contrary to it.” ( 1 109a3l, Ross
trans.) Since we can tell whether particular acts are virtuous, and since we now know
why the virtuous acts arc virtuous, we can tell that with respect to some virtues it is
more common to err towards one extreme rather than the other (e.g., with respect to
courage, it is more common to err in the direction of cowardice than it is to err in the
direction of recklessness.) So it is reasonable to expect that we are likely to err in this
direction as well.
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Bui of course, not all people are alike. So it is important to pay attention to our
own inclinations: “But we must consider the things towards which we ourselves also are
easily carried away; for some of us lend to one thing, some to another.” ( I I09b2, Ross
trails.) Since we can now identify where our action is relative to the virtuous action, we
can try to pull ourselves in the right direction: “We must drag ourselves away to the
contrary extreme; for we shall get into the intermediate slate hy drawing well away
from error, as people do in straightening sticks that are bent.” ( 1 109b5, Ross trails.) We
do not have direct control over our emotions, so we cannot simply decide to feel less
angry, for example, if we recognize that we are angrier than we ought to be. But we can
choose not to act out of anger, and we can pay attention to our emotion and try, as best
we can, to calm down. “It is no easy task to be good,” but presumably, if we understand
the way in which we err when we do err, and if we arc willing to focus our attention on
trying to become good, it is not impossible to change our characteristics. “It is by doing
this.” Aristotle summarizes at the end of book II,
that we shall best be able to hit the mean. But this is no doubt difficult,
and especially in individual cases; for it is not easy to determine both
how and with whom and on what provocation and how long one should
be angry ... such things depend on particular facts, and the decision rests
with perception. So much, then, is plain, that the intermediate slate is in
all things to be praised, but that we must incline sometimes towards the
excess, sometimes towards the deficiency; for so shall we most easily hit
the mean and what is right. ( 1 109b 13-26, Ross trails.)
Aristotle’s lectures equip us with theoretical knowledge that allows us to
understand why right act are right, and the ways in which actions can fail to be done
virtuously. With this knowledge we can locate each action on the target relative to the
bull's eye— i.e., an action performed virtuously. Once we locate an action relative to the
bull's eye, we can see why it is that we missed our mark, and consequently, we can take
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measures to improve our success in the future. The measures wc can take arc indirect
—
we cannot change our emotional responses and our character instantaneously by
volitional fiat. But once we understand what kind of actions wc need to perform in order
to modify our emotional responses and character in the right direction, we are more
likely to hit the mark in the future. In this sense, then, the theoretical knowledge we
gain from Aristotle’s lectures is practically useful. Those who have had a decent
upbringing should be able to identify right acts as right, and wrong ones as wrong. But
although they can tell right from wrong they may not know in what ways the wrong
actions are wrong, and what needs to be changed in order to make them right.
Nevertheless, if wc understand why right actions are right, and if we are the kind of
people who can “regulate their desires and actions by rational principle,” then
Aristotle's lectures could help us to become good.
4.5 Aristotle and Moral Explanation
I have argued that Aristotle offers an explanatory schema. If we are asked to
explain why a particular act is right, we should identify the relevant scale and show that
on this scale the action (or the relevant emotion) lies in the mean relative to the agent
i.c., that the action (or emotion) in question is neither excessive nor deficient—and that
the action was performed in the right time, towards the right people, with the right
motive, and so forth. But why, one might ask, would this qualify as an explanation of
the rightness of this action?
Now this is a difficult question to answer for several reasons. First, it is not clear
what kind of an answer would be acceptable. Perhaps what we need in order to answer
this question is a theory of explanation. But as wc have seen in Chapter Three, there is
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no agreement about what the correct theory of explanation is, or even on what
conditions an explanation must satisfy. So any answer to this question is bound to be
contentious.
Second, the question “Why is this an explanation?” is a question we could ask
about any proposed explanation, and wc could reiterate the questions with respect to
whatever answer we receive to our original question. For example, consider some
proposed explanation, /?, of the rightness of some action, A. We could ask, “Why is E
an explanation of the rightness of AT' Now suppose someone argued that E is an
explanation because it satisfies condition C. It seems that wc could very well ask, "Why
is the fulfillment of condition C an explanation?” And surely, if one were to propose an
answer to this question, wc could reiterate again and ask, "Why is this an explanation?”
It seems that at some point wc would have to resort to a response of the form "This is
just what an explanation is!”
So perhaps there is no reason to reject an answer of this kind to our original
question. Consider: "Why does Aristotle’s schema explain the rightness of an action?”
"Because to show that an action lies in the mean relative to the agent, and that it is
performed at the right time, with the right motives, and so forth, is just what an
explanation of the rightness of an action is!” Indeed, although Aristotle doesn't
explicitly talk in terms of explanations, we could read the Nicomachean Ethics as
offering a theory of explanation of rightness and wrongness of actions. Moreover, by
explicating the considerations that led Aristotle to define virtue as he did, and the
relationship he identifies between virtuous activity and eudaimonia, we could, perhaps,
alleviate some of the dissatisfaction with this kind of response, since this would
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demonstrate that the explanatory schema Aristotle pul forward is the product of a
comprehensive theoretical framework.
But maybe we could say a bit more in order to motivate the claim that a properly
filled out schema of the form I proposed on behalf or Aristotle is explanatory. An
explanation to the effect that a particular action is right entails that any action that is
relevantly similar to this one must also be right. But while in the physical sciences we
can sometimes (maybe often) specify in practically useful terms the conditions under
which objects or situations arc “relevantly similar,” in ethics, and perhaps in the social
sciences in general, we cannot do this: “the decision depends on the particular facts and
on perception.” (IV: I I26b4, Ross trans.)
Nevcthcless, Aristotle might endorse a generalized principles like this: a
particular action, A, is right for a particular agent, P, in situation .S', if and only if, A
would be a right action for anyone relevantly like P in any situation relevantly like S.
And perhaps the explanatory schema 1 proposed on behalf of Aristotle allows us to
identify the ways in which actions, situation, and agents are relevantly similar with
respect to the rightness of actions. Thus, although we cannot capture these kinds of
similarities with a set of exceptionless generalization expressed in practically useful
terms, we can formulate a schema that would enable those who have been brought up
well to explain the ways in which right actions are similar to one another.
Now since we know that if an action is right, then there is some scale on which it
is in the mean, we also know that if there is no scale on which an action is in the mean,
then the action is wrong. Nevertheless, Aristotle’s proposed explanatory schema in its
general form is almost vacuous. And Aristotle, as we have seen, is well aware of this
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fact; lie thinks that simply slating the schema in its general form doesn’t explain much
(VI. I : I 138b 1 9-35, cited above). Only when we find the relevant scale on which the
action lies in the mean, and when we replace the schematic hedges with particular
features of the case in hand, will we have a genuine explanation.
4.6 Conclusion
Aristotle's is not trying to answer the moral skeptic. For Aristotle, our starting
points for moral theorizing are the normative statuses of actions, in much the same way
as our starting points for theorizing about motion are the ways in which particular
bodies move, and our starting points for theorizing about history are historical events.
The theories we construct in our attempts to explain the motion of bodies, for example,
try to answer questions like these: “Why do bodies move as they do?” Or “Why does
this particular body moves as it does?” We are not trying to answer the question
w hether an object moves as it appears to move; that it moves as it appears to move is
our starting point. Similarly, when we try to explain past events—say, why a particular
battle occurred when it did, and unfolded as it had—we are not trying to answer the
question w hether this battle actually took place; that the battle took place when it did is
our starting point. Similarly, when we try to explain why a particular action is right, we
are not asking whether it is right; that the act is right is part of our data. And Aristotle’s
lectures are aimed towards students who can correctly identify right actions as right.
Yet although Aristotle's preferred students can correctly identify right and
wrong actions, Aristotle thinks that his lectures could help such students to become
good. Given the data about right and wrong actions, Aristotle constructs a theory that
enables his students to understand the ways in which wrong actions miss their mark.
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Surely, if one’s judgments about rightness of actions are mistaken, one's judgments
about the way in which various actions miss their mark are bound to be wrong as well.
Nevertheless, those who have had proper moral upbringing—those who have formed
the right habits, who can identify right acts when they see them, who can control their
actions by rational principle, and who have the right likes and dislikes—can profit from
Aristotle's lectures. They would learn what an explanation of the rightness of actions
ought to look like, and they would learn how to correctly substitute the generic features
of the explanatory schema with the relevant particular features of the actions they
evaluate. Moreover, by recognizing the ways in which their own actions miss their mark
when they do, they could choose to perform actions that will help them acquire the right
habits in order to hit the mark in the future.
Aristotle's explanation of the rightness of particular actions is not based on the
availability of exceptionless moral principles. Aristotle believes that the moral
landscape is extremely complex, and that there is very little we could say about morality
by way of exceptionless universally quantified statements. Nevertheless, this does not
mean that we cannot discuss moral phenomena intelligibly, or that we cannot construct
explanatory moral theories, as Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics so aptly illustrates. This,
I believe, provides a direct demonstration that particularism is a viable research
program. Indeed, if my proposed interpretation of Aristotle is plausible, then the most
influential moral theory in the history of philosophy is, arguably, a part icu larist theory.
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